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Abstract 
 
 
 
The widespread reliance on abortion in the Soviet Union, occasionally even referred to as an 
“abortion culture”, has been documented in a number of studies. However, the notoriously 
high abortion rates are not the only reason why the Soviet case stands out in the global history 
of abortion. Having decriminalised abortion by decree in 1920, Soviet Russia became the first 
country in the world where the termination of pregnancy was discussed as a legalised 
phenomenon.  
Russian discussions on the abortion issue, however, did not begin with the Decree on 
the Legalisation of Abortion in 1920. Neither were the debates originally initiated by the 
Bolsheviks. The abortion question first started to attract serious attention among liberal 
intellectuals during the years before the First World War. Two different medical congresses, 
and one convention of criminologists, had voted in favour of decriminalisation in 1911, 1913 
and 1914 respectively.   
Seeing as there were voices even in the pre-revolutionary years who called for 
decriminalisation of abortion, it can be questioned whether the Decree of 1920 really 
represented a turning point in the Russian abortion discourse. In this thesis, the patterns of 
continuity and change in Russian and Soviet abortion discourse between 1910 and 1930 will 
be examined. A closer comparison of pre-revolutionary and early Soviet sources indicates that 
despite Soviet efforts to prove otherwise, there was more continuity than change in the 
abortion discourse during these two decades. Thus, it can be argued that the Decree of 1920 
was less of a watershed than it might seem at first glance. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The widespread reliance on abortion in the Soviet Union, occasionally even referred to as an 
“abortion culture”, has been documented in a number of studies (Agadjanian 2002: 237). In 
1988, the Soviet Union’s Ministry of Public Health published official abortion statistics for 
the first time since 1929. The figures presented indicated that since the late 1950s, the Soviet 
incidence of abortion had been higher than anywhere else in the world (Popov 1991: 376), 
with a lifetime average of three abortions per woman in the late 1980s (Popov et. al. 1993: 
233-234).
1
  
However, the notoriously high rates are not the only reason why the Soviet case stands 
out in the global history of abortion. Having decriminalised abortion by decree in 1920, 
Soviet Russia became the first country in the world where the termination of pregnancy was 
discussed as a legalised phenomenon. During the first decade after the 1917 revolution – 
when there was still room for relatively open public discussions in the Soviet Union – the 
abortion question was addressed within academic circles, but also in public enlightenment 
pamphlets and in the largest women’s journals. Abortion was regarded as a social disease that 
the state sought to combat, but under the socioeconomic conditions of the 1920s, legalisation 
was seen as the lesser of two evils. The incidence of abortion was increasing across the 
Western world; consequently, prohibition had no effect, but only exacerbated the problem by 
making women resort to illegal abortions.  
Russian discussions on the abortion issue, however, did not begin with the Decree on 
the Legalisation of Abortion in 1920. Neither were the debates originally initiated by the 
Bolsheviks. The abortion question first started to attract serious attention among liberal 
intellectuals during the years before the First World War, when it became a matter of 
professional discussion for legal and medical scholars. Two different medical congresses, and 
                                                 
1
 The official rate for the 1980s – 111.9 abortions per 1,000 women aged 15-44 – was equivalent to an average 
of nearly three abortions per woman, but as this number was likely to be underreported, it was assumed that a 
more realistic estimate for the year of 1982 would be a lifetime average of five abortions per woman (181: 
1,000) (Popov et. al. 1993: 233-234). Writing in late 1991, Andrej Popov noted that “the USSR is perhaps the 
only country in the world where the fertility transition occurred as a result of the widespread use of induced 
abortion. Moreover, the stable low level of fertility in the country – (…) presently 2.4 births per woman – is 
maintained due to the use of induced abortion. This feature has no analogy among contemporary developed 
countries (Popov 1991: 369, my italics).” 
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one convention of criminologists, had voted in favour of decriminalisation in 1911, 1913 and 
1914 respectively. 
The Bolsheviks, in contrast, had hardly paid any attention at all to the abortion issue 
before the revolution. While adopting the “orthodox” socialist view on sexual matters – 
elaborated by German Social Democrats in the 19
th
 century – (Stites 1991: 259), only a small 
number of Russian left-wing writers chose to deal with such topics, and those who did, 
expressed themselves very vaguely. Regarding the abortion question, there is one article by 
Lenin – “The Working Class and Neo-Malthusianism” (1913) – touching upon the issue, but 
then simply as a demand for “the unconditional repeal of all laws against abortion or against 
the distribution of medical literature on contraceptive measures (Stites 1991: 264).” 
Alexandra Kollontai seems to have given the subject of abortion (and contraception) little 
thought during these years; her main concern was the development of maternity benefits for 
working women (ibid.: 265). Otherwise, there do not seem to have been any “revolutionary” 
participants in the pre-revolutionary abortion discourse. 
There are not many studies dealing with the abortion discourse of the pre-
revolutionary years and the early Soviet period. One of the few articles on the pre-
revolutionary discussions is Laura Engelstein’s “Abortion and the Civic Order: The Legal and 
Medical Debates” (1991). The abortion question in the early 1920s has been treated by Mary 
Buckley (Women and Ideology in the Soviet Union, 1989) and especially Wendy Z. Goldman, 
who includes a particularly detailed account in her Women, the State and Revolution. Soviet 
Family Policy and Social Life, 1917-1936 (1993).  
However, there do not seem to be any studies where the years between 1910 and 1930 
are regarded as a whole. By examining the patterns of continuity and change in Russian and 
Soviet abortion discourse over these two decades, this thesis will aim to fill at least some of 
this gap and answer the following questions: seeing as there were voices even in the pre-
revolutionary years who called for decriminalisation of abortion, can the Decree of 1920 
really be seen as a turning point in Russian abortion discourse? Did the abortion discourse of 
the 1920s represent a break with the pre-revolutionary discussions, or was there – despite 
Soviet efforts to prove otherwise – more continuity than change in the abortion discourse?    
There are a few reasons why this thesis only covers the two decades between 1910 and 
1930. For our purposes, it can be argued that the starting point of the pre-revolutionary 
abortion discourse in Russia was in April 1910, with the Eleventh Congress of the Pirogov 
Society, the country’s leading medical association. The year 1930, on the other hand, marked 
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something of a watershed in the abortion discourse. That year, the woman question was 
declared “solved”, the department for work among women (Zhenotdel) was closed down and 
the onset of Stalinism led to a stifling of the discussion (Buckley 1989: 108). For “reasons to 
do with social change, labour discipline, dislocation, the need for emotional support, reaction 
against the ‘liberation’ of the 1920s, birth rates and anxiety about war (Buckley 1989: 129),” 
the state set out to promote stable, nuclear families. Along the new ideological lines, 
childbirth and motherhood were idealised; on 27
th
 June 1936, abortion was outlawed 
altogether. It remained prohibited until 1955 – two years after Stalin’s death – when abortion 
was legalised again.  
Increasingly adapted to fit the new ideology, the abortion discourse of the 1930s 
started to diverge from the debates of the preceding years. These developments can be 
illustrated by the following quotes from two abortion essays (1936 and 1938 respectively): 
 
Our vast, rich country needs to be populated by numerous, strong, healthy and happy peoples  
(narody), guided by the Communist Party [that is] headed by the brilliant Stalin. Therefore, we  
are resolutely against abortion and in favour of strong and serious marriages, in favour of the  
healthy, happy Soviet family with many children (za zdorovuyu, schastlivuyu i mnogodetnuyu  
sovetskuyu sem’yu) (Rusin 1936: 28, italics in original). 
 
Another justification for this policy reversal was the protection of the mother’s health 
(Buckley 1989: 130): abortion was considered a dangerous and harmful procedure. Moreover, 
it was argued the conditions that had made it necessary to legalise abortion in 1920 were no 
longer present. While the Decree of 1920 on the Legalisation of Abortion had stated that “the 
moral survivals of the past (moral’nye perezhitki proshlogo) and the difficult economic 
conditions of the present” still forced a lot of women to resort to abortion, by 1938  
 
 “the difficult economic conditions and the moral survivals of the past” have been (...) eliminated  
forever. Thus, our government, firmly defending the workers’ interests and not wanting to put  
the woman’s health at unnecessary risk, (...) has created such conditions for motherhood and  
infancy, and given mothers such a wealth (takie bogatstva), that this in itself has removed all  
the economic reasons that [used to] push women towards abortion. (...) there is no other  
country in the world that has created such brilliant conditions for the realisation of women’s  
most valuable right – the right to motherhood (Khaskin 1938: 8). 
 
While the discourse participants of the 1920s did present Soviet abortion policies in a 
favourable light, they also tended to admit that there were serious challenges ahead, that it 
took a long time to implement the desired welfare measures and that the health care system 
still had fundamental shortcomings. In contrast, the discourse of the 1930s has a “heroic”, 
propagandistic style that can be found neither in the pre-revolutionary debates nor in the 
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discourse of the 1920s. Thus, the discourse of the 1930s should be analysed through a 
different lens than the debates of the two earlier decades – for instance as a reflection of the 
Stalinist culture. An additional reason why it makes sense to speak of the year 1930 as a 
watershed is the fact that Soviet abortion statistics were not published at all between 1929 and 
1988 – yet another indication that the relative openness of the 1920s had come to an end by 
the turn of the decade.  
As the abortion discourse of 1910-1930 is wide-ranging and involves a number of 
different topics, it has been necessary to make a selection. Two aspects in particular have been 
left out almost completely – the question of eugenics, i.e. whether legalised abortion could 
lead to a qualitative improvement of the population, and the question of demography, i.e. 
whether abortion could lead to demographic decline. The first question is occasionally 
mentioned both before and after 1920, but delving into this subject would require more 
attention than the scope of this thesis allows for. The demographic argument in the Soviet 
abortion discourse of the 1920s has already been treated in a study by Susan G. Solomon 
(1992), where she concludes that this question “for most of the 1920s (...) played a relatively 
insignificant role in the case against legalization (Solomon 1992: 60).” (For discussions on the 
question of eugenics, see, for instance, Alberto Spektorowski’s article on “The Eugenic 
Temptation in Socialism: Sweden, Germany, and the Soviet Union” (2004).) 
1.1 Method 
 
This thesis is largely based on primary sources. Chapter 4 (on the pre-revolutionary discourse) 
builds on reports from the main legal and medical congresses dealing with the abortion issue 
between 1910 and 1914. A few other publications have also been used, for instance the 
Imperial Gynaecological Institute’s account of its work between 1904 and 1907 (published in 
1911) and a collection of essays published by the Study Group on Criminal Law at St. 
Petersburg University (1913). This material – which can be said to cover the most central 
events of the pre-revolutionary abortion discourse – was collected in The Slavonic Library in 
Helsinki, Finland, in January 2012.  
Chapter 5 (on the discourse of the 1920s) is based on academic monographs and 
essays, public enlightenment pamphlets, women’s journals, and various medical publications. 
The academic literature and the public enlightenment pamphlets date from the mid-1920s, as 
5 
 
it is hard to find any extensive literature of this kind from the years before 1924. The 
women’s journals and the medical publications, on the other hand, are slightly older: the 
earliest one, Kommunistka (Communist Woman) was published in 1920, while the earliest of 
the medical journals included in this thesis is an issue of Ginekologiya i akusherstvo 
(Gynaecology and obstetrics) from January/February 1922. These sources were gathered in 
the Russian State Library (Biblioteka imeni Lenina), Moscow, and the Library of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences (Biblioteka Rossiiskoi akademii nauk), St. Petersburg, in November 
2011. Taken together, these sources cover the aspects of the Soviet abortion discourse that are 
the most relevant for this thesis – the academic literature, on the one hand, and the public 
enlightenment literature on the other.
2
  
These sources include a number of different statistics. Because of the often significant 
dark figures, abortion statistics are known for being unreliable, and this fact was also 
repeatedly stressed by the discourse participants themselves. Nevertheless, with regard to 
their reliability, the Soviet data from the 1920s are in a special position. According to Popov 
(1991: 368), the Soviet Union was the “world leader in the study of abortion and family 
planning” throughout this decade, having an information base that was “unique with respect 
to the magnitude of data collection, the depth of data analysis, and the accessibility of 
secondary information.” An extensive report on the abortion statistics from the year of 1926 
was published in 1929 (the next report would, as mentioned earlier, be published sixty years 
later). Consequently, the Soviet statistics from the 1920s are the most complete data available 
for this time period, and as such they are far from being irrelevant. Moreover, it could be 
argued that for our purposes, it is not so much the statistical figures per se, but how they were 
used by the debaters that has the most significance. 
The research for this thesis has been conducted by means of qualitative content 
analysis. This method is flexible, with few or no standardised research techniques (Grønmo 
2004: 245), but it generally involves a systematic classification process where recurrent 
themes are identified and coded in a way that makes it possible to discern the general patterns 
within the material. As the main focus of this thesis is on the changes in the discourse’s 
content, i.e. in lines of reasoning, approaches and attitudes, and not the language as such, the 
debaters’ choice of words will only be addressed when this is relevant for understanding the 
developments in the discourse as a whole.  
                                                 
2
 For reasons that will be explained later, the women’s journals can be said to form part of this educational 
literature. 
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In this case, the presentation of the pre-revolutionary and the Soviet debates have been 
structured in two different ways. The participants of the pre-1917 debate can be divided into 
two main categories: for and against decriminalisation. Thus, it is also possible to divide their 
arguments into these categories. After abortion was legalised in 1920, on the other hand, the 
voices of those who opposed the new law were for the most part only referred to indirectly by 
the authors who adhered to the official party line; in other words, there was less room for 
dissenting views in the public discourse. In addition, the discourse of the 1920s involved a 
new genre – public enlightenment literature – that could not be found in the pre-revolutionary 
years, or at least not to such an extent. Consequently, while the Soviet authors did address 
various aspects of the abortion question, including arguments against legalisation, it is 
questionable whether the abortion discourse of these years can be called an open debate. 
Thus, it proved more fertile to structure the chapter on the Soviet discourse according to the 
various genres represented in it.  
Even so, the topics addressed within the discourse both before and after 1917 have a 
lot of common features, and they can be categorised and analysed along similar lines: 
arguments for and against legalisation, the causes of and solutions to the problem, the 
different dilemmas surrounding the abortion issue, and a few other related topics. These 
subjects will be addressed in both chapters. 
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2 The Western context of Russian 
abortion discourse 
 
In many respects, the history of abortion in pre-revolutionary Russia forms part of a universal 
history of fertility regulation. As has been documented in numerous studies, the concern with 
controlling or regulating family size is nothing new. The pioneering work in this field was 
Norman Himes’ Medical History of Contraception, first published in 1936 as a survey of the 
history of birth control over a period of three thousand years. According to Himes,  
 
[t]his survey seems to show that men and women have always longed for both fertility and sterility,  
each at its appointed time and in its chosen circumstances. This has been a universal aim, whether  
people have always been conscious of it or not (Himes 1970: xii, italics in original).  
 
This claim is supported by later studies (e.g. Shorter 1984; Gordon 1990; McLaren 
1990). Abortion was “not condemned in classical antiquity (David 1992: 2).” In the Old 
Testament, moreover, termination of pregnancy was not considered murder, but a 
misdemeanour punishable by a fine. The early Christians did not think of abortion as murder 
before the soul had entered the body, i.e. before the movements of the foetus could be felt by 
the mother. The Catholic Church, despite discussions about when life begins, did not 
introduce any marked changes in church law until 1869, when the distinction between a 
“formed” and “unformed” foetus was eliminated (David 1992: 2-3).3  
At the turn of the 20
th
 century, abortion was prohibited by law in every European 
country (David 1992). Some countries, for instance England and the United States (following 
England’s lead), had only increased the restrictions in this sphere after 1800. In England, the 
abortion law was modified in 1861, declaring “surgical abortion at any stage of pregnancy a 
criminal offense, punishable by life imprisonment (David 1992: 3)”; thus, English abortion 
law became the most severe of its kind in Europe.
4
 
                                                 
3
 From then on, the Roman Catholic Church deemed abortion punishable by excommunication (for both the 
woman and the abortionist) even in cases of medical necessity. However, “therapeutic abortion on medical 
indication” was not explicitly condemned until 1895 (David 1992: 3).  
4
 However, “just like elsewhere, the law proved inefficient and was not implemented completely (Elgán 1994: 
93)”. In theory, the English abortion law of 1861 remained in effect until 1967, when the United Kingdom (with 
the exception of Northern Ireland) liberalised its abortion laws by the 1967 Abortion Act, implemented in 1968 
(Elgán 1994; David 1992).  
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According to Harmsen (1950: 402), the German Penal Code of 1871 provided “severe 
punishments for criminal abortion.” Elgán (1994: 93), however, refers to the 1871 Code – 
with a maximum penalty of five and ten years of penal labour for the woman and the 
abortionist respectively – as “moderate” in this respect. In France, the Penal Code of 1810 
contained similar provisions for terminating pregnancies – five to ten years of penal work 
(réclusion) for both the woman and the abortionist; for attempted abortions, however, the 
woman herself would not be punished. As in the provisions of the Russian Criminal Code of 
1885, medical personnel found guilty of procuring abortions (e.g. doctors, surgeons, 
pharmacists or midwives) would face even stricter penalties (Elgán 1994: 81).
5
  
 In the United States, English common law (the model for American lawmakers at the 
time) was adhered to in the abortion question for nearly two decades after abortion laws had 
been changed in England. Abortion was not considered a crime (especially not if it was 
performed before quickening – i.e. the moment when the mother first noticed the foetus’s 
movements inside the womb) until 1821, when abortion was first criminalised in the state of 
Connecticut; the other states followed suit during the subsequent decades (Solinger 2005). 
According to Solinger (2005), abortion was generally “folded into omnibus anticrime bills but 
rarely prosecuted in cities and towns across the nation”; for decades after abortion was first 
criminalised in the country, several American states kept to the traditional “quickening 
doctrine (Solinger 2005: 55)” (i.e. a tolerant attitude towards abortions that were performed 
before quickening).
6
  
 The “quickening doctrine” in itself reveals a somewhat blurry perception of when life 
begins, and it would take a while before this notion was finally dispersed. Although the idea 
of conception as an immediate event (as opposed to a gradual process) was developed after 
1827, when the existence of the human egg was confirmed, the dividing line between 
contraception and abortion seems to have remained hazy for the general public.  To many, 
abortion mainly represented “one more step on a continuum of fertility-controlling practices,” 
                                                 
5
 During the Ancien Régime, abortion was in France considered a crime punishable by death. After the 
revolution of 1789, the woman involved was exempted from punishment, but her abortionist would still face a 
severe sentence (Elgàn 1994: 81).
  
6
 Gordon (1990) notes that quickening should not be mistaken for actual viability outside the womb. She also 
mentions how “the time of quickening was usually set earlier for males than for females (…): Aristotle 
computed it at about forty days after conception for the male, ninety days for the female; Hippocrates put the 
figures at thirty and forty-two days respectively; the later Roman view was forty and eighty days. (…) The 
Catholic Church (…) identified quickening with the acquisition of a soul, and most Protestant groups had gone 
along with that definition. Thus abortion before quickening was not only not a crime, but not even a sin 
(Gordon 1990: notes on pp. 52-53).” 
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remaining “for most a ‘back-up’ method of fertility control, obviously necessary when all 
methods of contraception were unreliable (McLaren 1990: 189).” These perceptions, as we 
will see, could also be found in Russia. 
2.1.1 Western attitudes towards abortion in the 19th and early 20th 
century: De jure repression, de facto tolerance 
 
Studies of 19
th
- and early 20
th
-century abortion practices in Western Europe and North 
America seem to confirm the argument that women generally viewed abortion (at least before 
quickening) as a matter of their own choice regardless of what legal or medical professionals 
might say. Furthermore, abortion and contraception “were fused in the popular mind in the 
single category of birth control (Brookes 1988: 2).” In a study of abortion in England between 
1890 and 1914, McLaren (1977) notes that “women who sought abortion did not consider 
what they were doing to be wrong. (…) evidence of such attitudes were (sic) to be found 
every time serious observers questioned working women (McLaren 1977: 395-396).”7  
 Believing that the foetus did not become alive until “quickening”, women generally 
assumed that abortion was illegal only after the third month of pregnancy, and only then if 
procured by an outside party. During the first trimester, women did not think of themselves as 
pregnant, but rather as “irregular”, seeking not so much to abort as to “bring on their period 
(McLaren 1977: 396).”8 Studies of birth control practices in Norway and France seem to 
support this argument (Blom 1980: 51; Elgán 1994: 42). 
 More often than not, abortions were only detected by authorities in cases where 
something went wrong. If the abortion went well (which seems to have been quite common), 
the woman’s risk of being “discovered” and brought to court was low.9 In the first place, the 
procedure was traditionally of a very private nature: not only was abortion illegal, but women 
who turned to illegal abortionists often wanted (or needed) to keep their pregnancy a secret. 
                                                 
7
 According to McLaren, the same seems to have been the case with middle-class women of that period, but as 
“contemporary commentators noted, a middle-class woman’s abortion would less frequently be brought to the 
attention of authorities because she could afford more skilled methods (McLaren 1977: 392).” 
8
 In the 19
th
 century, the advertisement and sale of “female pills” – quack abortifacients promoted as remedies 
to cure “irregularities” in the menstrual cycle – could be a lucrative business for publishers and frauds alike 
(McLaren 1977; Shorter 1984; Olasky 1988).
 
 
9
 Some contemporary authors suggested that only one out of ten thousand abortions were actually brought to 
court (Oleinik 1913: 113). 
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Furthermore, even in cases where the abortion brought severe complications or death, women 
would often remain loyal to their abortionist, blaming themselves rather than any third party 
for what had happened to them (McLaren 1993).  
 Even if an illegal abortion was brought to court, the risk of actually being convicted 
was relatively small. Many trials ended in acquittals. In his study of abortion prosecutions in 
British Columbia, Canada, between 1886 and 1939, McLaren (1993: 808) notes that while 
judges generally disliked such cases, juries “often refused to convict no matter how 
overwhelming the evidence.” According to Brookes (1988), the English law governing 
abortion (from 1861) – the most severe of its kind in Europe – was practically 
“unenforceable”:  
 
Abortion was impossible to police and, because of the frequency of the act and popular  
sympathy with the practice, juries were reluctant to convict. (...) The small number of  
 convictions for the crime stand in sharp contrast with contemporary estimates of its  
 prevalence  (Brookes 1988: 22). 
 
This fact, combined with the fact that even “obvious” cases tended to end with acquittals, led 
Grin (1914) to conclude that “people are punished not so much for procuring abortions as for 
causing someone’s death (Grin 1914: 24).”  
 Thus, by the First World War, there seemed to be a significant and widely recognised 
discrepancy between theory and practice in the abortion question, where public opinion 
seemed to be on the side of the women having abortions. The pre-revolutionary abortion 
discourse should be analysed with this in mind. 
2.1.2 Abortion methods in the pre-legalisation era 
 
To get rid of an unwanted pregnancy, a woman would move progressively from the least to the most 
dangerous procedures, stopping at whichever worked. The least dangerous rarely worked (Shorter 1984: 
178). 
 
Studies from various countries – England (McLaren 1977), Germany (Neuman 1978), 
Norway (Blom 1980), the United States (Gordon 1990), Russia and the Soviet Union 
(Goldman 1993), Sweden and France (Elgán 1994) – suggest that the abortion methods 
employed across Europe and the United States were similar in many respects, albeit with 
some regional variations. This allows for certain generalisations. What, then, were the 
methods available for a woman seeking to terminate her pregnancy towards the end of the 19
th
 
century?    
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 Before ca. 1850, instrumental abortion was an unrealistic possibility for most women; 
instead, it was common to use different kinds of drugs or potions that were intended to 
provoke miscarriages. Whereas the actual effect of such abortifacients is uncertain,
10
 the fact 
that such remedies played a part in traditional folk medicine is less disputed. In a particularly 
thorough account of abortion practices in the pre-legalisation era, Shorter (1984) argues that 
abortifacient drugs remained important throughout the first half of the 20
th
 century, albeit 
slightly more so in the United States than in Europe (Shorter 1984: 208). The following quote 
from a 47-year-old German woman in the early 20
th
 century indicates that the use of such 
remedies was commonplace:  
 
The wife of my husband’s workmate mixed a tea for me that had helped her every time. She  
had already ‘clipped’ [gekippt: aborted] five times after [drinking it]. It worked grand for me  
 too. (…) She helped the whole street with it (quoted in Neuman 1978: 417). 
 
 Towards the end of the 19
th
 century, there appeared a new range of “inorganic” drugs 
that were effective because they were poisonous – based on “arsenic, phosphorous, lead, and 
other metals” – and “worked by killing the fetus before the mother (Shorter 1984: 210).” They 
were, however, also dangerous for the mother. An instrumental abortion, on the other hand, 
could also pose serious risks for the woman involved: when procured illegally, the operation 
could lead to infections, whereas the danger of causing perforation of the womb was present 
even among skilled surgeons (Shorter 1984: 208).  
2.1.3 Increasing abortion rates after 1880: an “abortion revolution”? 
 
For understandable reasons, it is hard to establish any definite statistics for the pre-legalisation 
era. The records that can be produced include reports from doctors and midwives called to 
attend abortions because of complications, as well as the number of women being admitted to 
the hospital for “incomplete” abortions (where remains of the foetus were left inside the 
womb). The dark figures are probably significant, and the picture is further complicated by 
the fact that many women, even when brought to hospital, refused to admit that they had tried 
to terminate their pregnancy in the first place (Shorter 1984). Moreover, even in cases of 
                                                 
10
 ”Recipes for such potions [herbal abortifacients] have a high proportion of magical elements and, therefore, 
are the least successful method of abortion. (…) (Most doctors, in fact, believe that folk recipes for 
abortifacients are almost never effective and attribute the reported successes to the coincidence of women 
having miscarriages from other causes (Gordon 1990: 36, parentheses in original).)”  
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abortus incompletus, it could be difficult to determine whether the abortion was provoked or 
was simply a spontaneous miscarriage (Yakobson 1911; Lichkus 1912). 
 Nonetheless, the records of unsuccessful abortions do serve as an indicator of overall 
trends. At the turn of the 20
th
 century, the number of septic abortions – and cases of related 
fatalities – seems to have risen across Europe. This suggests a general “upsurge” in the total 
abortion rates (Shorter 1984: 194; McLaren 1990: 189). According to Shorter (1984), “so 
many women were getting abortions that the small mortality rate accompanying the procedure 
became translated into a large absolute number of deaths (Shorter 1984: 195; emphasis in 
original).”11 Sources from several countries indicate an increase in the number of women who 
were reported to have had “miscarriages” (either spontaneous or induced) between ca. 1880 
and the interwar years. For instance, the figures for Berlin show an increase from 12 to 36 per 
cent between 1882-1885 and 1915-1916; for Vienna: 8 per cent in 1907, 20 per cent in 1920-
24; for Amsterdam: 7 per cent in 1883-1884, 24 per cent in 1943 (Shorter 1984: 196). 
Brookes (1988) notes that the use of abortifacients lead to rising numbers of infant deaths 
from prematurity, with an increase from 13.7 per 1000 births between 1875 and 1884, to 19.8 
per 1000 births between 1895 and 1904 (Brookes 1988: 23).  
 Regardless of the uncertainty of this data, some contemporary doctors “asserted that 
up to a quarter of all conceptions were terminated (McLaren 1990: 191)” at the turn of the 
century. This estimate (at least for urban women) is supported by Shorter, who suggests that 
there might have been an increase “from perhaps 10 percent to 25 percent of pregnancies 
ending in abortion (Shorter 1984: 197)” between ca. 1880 and 1940. In a later article, 
however, McLaren suggests that “perhaps one-sixth of all pregnancies” at the turn of the 
century ended in abortion (McLaren 1993: 797). 
 Contemporary observers towards the turn of the 20
th
 century were far from oblivious 
to the ongoing “abortion epidemic.” In North America and Western Europe, the reported 
increase in the number of abortions made the subject a part of the discourse on the 
“demographic transition” – i.e. the transition from an agrarian society, with high birth and 
mortality rates, to an industrial society, where birth and mortality rates are relatively low 
(Blom 1980: 23). Taking place from the late 1800s onwards, this development roused a lot of 
concern and discussions at the time (Blom 1980; McLaren 1990; Elgán 1994). While birth 
rates in France and the United States had started to drop in the 18
th
 and early 19
th
 centuries 
                                                 
11
 Shorter (1984) goes so far as to speak of an “abortion revolution” in the years after 1880, when abortion 
“changed (...) from a desperate expedient of unmarried servants and child-weary forty-two-year-olds to a 
common means of birth control (Shorter 1984: 191).” 
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respectively, Western European fertility rates started to decrease significantly between 1870 
and 1920, causing family size to be “cut in half” by the First World War (McLaren 1990: 
178).
12
  
 Both at the time and in later years, several theories were proposed regarding the causes 
of this development – a thorough presentation of which would lie far beyond the scope of this 
thesis. A common denominator, however, seems to be the view that as Western societies grew 
increasingly modernised, incentives for having large families started to disappear. 
Contemporary German demographers, writing before the First World War, accounted for the 
fertility decline by mentioning reasons such as  
 
the growth of materialistic hedonism, the decline of traditional religious influence, higher  
 living costs, lack of adequate housing, the various women’s emancipation movements, and, naturally  
 enough, the spread of birth control knowledge among the working classes (Neuman 1978: 410-411).  
 
 Regarding the “spread of birth control knowledge among the working classes,” it is 
questionable whether this factor actually played a role in the demographic transition. As has 
been argued by some researchers on the topic, e.g. Neuman (1978) and McLaren (1990), 
“traditional” methods remained the most central kind of birth control for people way into the 
20
th
 century. This was not least the case with coitus interruptus.
13
 Nonetheless, the reported 
fertility decline did turn the subject of birth control into a “hot topic” of the time, not least in 
England and the United States, where advocates of birth control promoted their ideas from the 
1870s onwards (McLaren 1990).  
 The development in Russia during these years was similar to the Western trends in 
many ways. Russian abortion rates were rising, and as in the West, this increase was thought 
to be related to profound social changes. In the following chapter, we will look at the Russian 
and later Soviet context of the abortion discourse between ca. 1890 and 1930. 
 
 
  
                                                 
12
 “In Germany, marital fertility fell by about 65 per cent in the space of two generations. In England, couples 
who married in 1861-9 had an average of 6.16 children, those of 1890-9 had 4.13 children, and those of 1920-4, 
had 2.13 children (McLaren 1990: 179).” 
13
 Evidence of this is presented, for example, in the article “’They Prefer Withdrawal’: The Choice of Birth 
Control in Britain, 1918-1950” (Fisher and Szreter 2003). 
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3 The Russian and Soviet context, ca. 
1890-1930 
3.1 Social changes 
 
Similar to the Western discourse on the same issue, Russian abortion discourse of the pre-
revolutionary years can be viewed in light of profound social changes that had been taking 
place over the course of the 19
th
 century. For our purposes, two factors of particular 
importance should be highlighted: the increased village-to-city migration taking place in this 
period and the increased influx of peasant women into the urban labour market. In addition,  
the sexual question and the post-1905 phenomenon known as decadence will be briefly 
examined. 
 Towards the end of the 19
th
 century, an increasing number of Russian peasants started 
to migrate to the cities.
14
 This development was caused by a number of interconnected factors. 
After the emancipation of the serfs in 1861, peasants needed more money to pay taxes, 
redeem their land and purchase consumer goods (Engel 1991: 139). At the same time, the 
share of arable land per capita was decreasing as a result of rapid population growth.
15
 In 
order to compensate for this, peasants would often rent or buy additional land from their 
former landlords. Land prices and rentals, however, were growing. Moreover, in order to 
finance the rapid industrialisation of the 1890s, the state increased the peasants’ taxes – an 
economic burden that was added to the peasants’ land redemption dues (Andrle 1994: 61).  
 There were also problems related to the land itself. First, centuries of primitive 
cultivation had rendered it unable to support the growing population – by the 1880s, the 
average peasant household was rarely self-sufficient (Glickman 1992: 56-57). Second, bouts 
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 Although it is very hard to establish any reliable statistics for this era, Moss estimates that in the Russian 
Empire as a whole, from “1856 until 1916, the urban population increased from about 9-10 percent to about 18 
percent of the total population (Moss 2005: 120).” Between 1856 and 1910, St. Petersburg’s population more 
than tripled, while Moscow’s quadrupled – rendering both cities with a population of slightly above and slightly 
below 1.5 million people, respectively, a large proportion of whom were migrant peasants (Engel 1991: 141). 
The next largest cities experienced an even more rapid growth in this period (Moss 2005: 120).
 
 
15
 The rural population of European Russia increased by more than 50 percent between 1863 and 1897 – from 
ca. 50 million to 79 million (Andrle 1994: 61). 
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of extraordinarily poor harvests (e.g. in 1889-1892) had led to periodic food shortages 
(Andrle 1994). In other words, the peasants’ living standards were declining significantly.  
 The ever more acute need to earn money spurred many peasant men to migrate to the 
cities, while the majority of peasant women stayed behind, taking on their husbands’ work in 
addition to their own. Some tried to add to their income by starting up a form of cottage 
industry, selling homemade goods or taking on work (e.g. sewing) outsourced by factories. 
However, as even this opportunity disappeared with the increased industrialisation, a growing 
minority of women started to seek wages elsewhere (Engel 1991: 140). 
 In the 1890s, the number of women in the Russian labour force grew noticeably. The 
largest group of wage-earning women became domestic servants, while an increasing number 
also found work in factories. Stites (1991) notes that the percentage of women in the labour 
force rose from ca. 25 per cent in the 1880s to 40 per cent in 1914, the greatest concentration 
of which was found in the textile industry. Many women were also employed in other light 
industries, e.g. in tobacco or leather factories (Stites 1991: 162). Some women undertook 
seasonal work; others became hired field-hands (around ca. 25 percent of all female wage-
earners in 1897; Stites 1991: 161). According to Engel (1991), by 1900 “marriageable women 
aged sixteen to twenty-five comprised 17.6 percent of the peasant women in St. Petersburg 
(Engel 1991: 141).”  
 The dire living conditions facing workers in the Russian cities before the 1917 
revolution have been described by several authors (Glickman 1978; Engel 1991; Stites 1991). 
In the 1880s, the average working day (without overtime) was 12-14 hours (Service 2009: 
28). Although largely working under the same conditions and for the same number of hours as 
men, women were paid less and generally had to get by on subsistence level. There was 
admittedly a small increase in average real wages between 1900 and 1913, but “it was the 
slightness of the improvement and not the improvement itself that most workers noticed 
(Service 2009: 29).” 
 Overcrowded housing was an ubiquitous problem. Very few could afford a room of 
their own. At the turn of the century, the majority of the population in Moscow and St. 
Petersburg lived in “multi-occupied apartments” – the only affordable option for most people. 
According to Andrle (1994: 91), the average Moscow apartment in 1912 “housed between 
eight and nine residents, of whom less than one-half were in any way related to each other.” 
As for factory employees, Stites (1991: 164) notes that there was a “growing tendency (...) for 
workers of all ages and sexes to live in barracks provided [to] them by the owners,” where the 
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cramped conditions and the lack of sanitary facilities made for a system of which 
“conventional sexual morality was a casualty (Stites 1991: 164).”  
 If “conventional sexual morality” was suffering under the given conditions, so was 
public health. Health care was very poor; social insurance was expensive (Service 2009). The 
big cities were particularly unhealthy places to live: overcrowding and inadequate sanitation 
made them a fertile ground for epidemic diseases (e.g. typhus, cholera, tuberculosis, syphilis), 
as well as “the real or imagined moral depravities of slum living (Andrle 1994: 92).”  
 The combination of increased urbanisation, the crowded (and unsanitary) living 
conditions among city dwellers, the general poverty and the increasing complexity of social 
relations in the growing cities forms part of the setting in which the pre-revolutionary abortion 
discourse took place. 
3.1.1 The sexual question: changing norms and “decadence” 
 
As the urbanisation of the 1880s and 1890s made life ever more complex, the question of 
sexual morality started to attract attention among Russian intellectuals (Stites 1991). On the 
one hand, living in the cities allowed for a certain sexual freedom: no longer “directly subject 
to patriarchal control,” peasant women were reportedly “much freer than their rural sisters to 
court and to live as they chose (Engel 1991: 141),” despite the limits imposed by financial 
hardship, heavy work and, for some of them, legal and psychological ties to their village. 
According to Stites (1991), this kind of relative independence made for a wider gap between 
rural and urban sexual norms.  
 Moreover, “[a]s increasing numbers of women penetrated into public and previously 
male space, the woman question took on a new and complex life (Engel 1991: 142)” – 
another indication that the society was changing. The starting point of this development might 
be traced back to the 1860s and 1870s, during the relatively liberal reign of Alexander II 
(1855-1881), when the question of woman’s role in society was given enough publicity to 
produce some concrete results – “a gratifying reform of women’s education, a bright galaxy 
of female revolutionaries, and a widespread acceptance of women’s equality among the 
intelligentsia (Stites 1991: 159).” 
 However, although women in the cities might be freer and more visible to the public 
eye than their rural counterparts, their “independence” was limited by a number of factors – 
economic, social and psychological. Facing difficult working and living conditions, urban 
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women’s range of options was generally restricted. On the darker side of the spectrum, the 
low status of female servants and factory workers made them subject to exploitation by their 
masters or factory managers: “From the 1890’s onward, labor newspapers and underground 
leaflets regularly printed complaints of sexual exploitation and mistreatment of women; and 
some factories were used as recruitment pools by white slavers and pimps (Stites 1991: 165).” 
Moreover, prostitution – and with it, the spread of venereal disease – seemed to be increasing, 
becoming a much-debated problem at the time (Engel 1991; Stites 1991). By the mid-1890s, 
St. Petersburg had between 30,000 and 50,000 prostitutes out of a population of 1,400,000, a 
ratio comparable to those of the large Western European cities (Stites 1991: 183).  
Although Russia had a lower illegitimacy rate than other European countries, 268 per 
10,000 births between 1884 and 1892 (Stites 1991: 179), the rate was serious enough. 
Unwanted children, when not aborted or killed after birth, might end up on the streets and 
become child prostitutes – another phenomenon that seemed to be growing during the pre-
revolutionary years. 
Decadence after 1905 
 
When the 1905 revolution ultimately failed to produce any long-term political changes, there 
was a widespread sense of disillusionment among the Russian intelligentsia:  
 
After sixteen years of gradually increasing social activity and ferment, beginning with the famine of 
1891 and reaching its climax in the stormy years 1905-1907, there had been a sudden collapse followed 
by political reaction and social immobility. It was as though the inflated spirit of the nation had been 
pricked like a balloon (Stites 1991: 185). 
 
Partly because of this, the educated public started to turn their focus inward (Stites 1991; 
Engelstein 1992). The subject of sexuality received ever more attention, especially in relation 
to the phenomenon known as decadence. The term was used to denote the heightened focus 
on sex, sensualism and the human psyche (in literature as well as in life) that was said to be a 
feature of the post-1905 years. During these years, there appeared a number of literary works 
dealing with sexual themes, most notably Mikhail Artsybashev’s novel Sanin (1907) and 
Anastasiya Verbitskaya’s Klyuchi schast’ya (Keys to Happiness; 1910). Among critics, Sanin, 
“the story of a young man without social ideals who spends his time in aggressive pursuit of 
sensual pleasure, defying respectable conventions and violating the rules of both sexes 
(Engelstein 1992: 383),” met with particular hostility. However, the novel was also said to 
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reflect the spirit of  the post-1905 years: young people, it seemed, were finding an outlet for 
their “blocked energies” in sexual escapades and/or self-destructive behaviour. This also 
caused much debate: 
 
Suicide and sensualism, said a Kiev critic, were both (...) desperate responses to the apparently  
insoluble problems that Russian society faced as it stood amid the rubble of an unsuccessful  
revolution. Sanin (...) merely reflected the spirit of social and psychological despair that had 
engulfed youth and was driving it either to self-immolation or to sexual self-oblivion (Stites 1991: 187). 
 
The decadence of the post-1905 years, and the Russian intelligentsia’s preoccupation with it, 
reflects some of the climate in which the pre-revolutionary abortion discourse was taking 
place. In order to get a more complete picture of this discourse, these factors are worth 
keeping in mind. 
3.2 Abortion in Russia before 1917 
 
Under the conditions of life in early 20
th
-century Russia, children were an economic burden 
for urban workers. The mother “enjoyed no adequate maternity protection until 1912 (Stites 
1991: 165)”. For unmarried women, an unwanted pregnancy could – in addition to everything 
else – also lead to social sanctions. Birth control – a much-debated subject in the Western 
World at the turn of the century – seems to have met with little success in Russia (Stites 1991: 
180). References to the topic (at the time also referred to as Neo-Malthusianism)
16
  appeared 
in the Russian press only after 1905. Lenin, for instance, only wrote one article on the subject, 
“The Working Class and Neo-Malthusianism”, in which he condemned birth control as an 
unacceptable solution to social problems, but still supported the legalisation of abortion 
because the alternative was “hypocritical” (Kommunistka, no. 1, 1925: 30). 
 Engelstein (1992: 113) argues that city life did little to make children more wanted; 
instead, “cities offered more effective, less violent and desperate ways of getting rid of them.” 
An observer writing in 1904 noted that “although urban living ‘reduce[d] infanticide, it 
increase[d] abortion’ (Engelstein 1992: 113).” 
                                                 
16
 The term ”Neo-Malthusianism” is connected to the ideas of Thomas Malthus, whose influential Essay on 
Population (1798) focused on the social consequences of population growth. Malthus argued that since a large 
population demanded large resources, the lower classes would need to limit their numbers in order to achieve 
social improvements. Poverty “was a problem caused by the poor which they would have to solve themselves 
(McLaren 1990: 182).” It is exactly this notion which is rejected by Lenin.  For more information on the birth 
control movement, see, for instance, Gordon (1990) and McLaren (1990). 
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 Abortion rates in Russia seemed to be growing between ca. 1890 and the outbreak of 
the First World War in 1914. In Moscow, abortion rates were reported to have increased 2.5 
times between 1909 and 1914, whereas St. Petersburg noted a tenfold increase between 1897 
and 1912 (Stites 1991: 181). Statistics from the Imperial Gynaecological Institute in St. 
Petersburg suggested a near fivefold increase between 1883-1893 and 1904-1907, when the 
average abortion rates were 2.6 percent and 11.8 percent, respectively; in 1907, however, the 
clinic noted an abortion rate of 14 percent (Yakobson 1911: 90).   
 This development transformed the abortion question into a seemingly pressing social 
problem after 1900, like the earlier mentioned issues of prostitution, venereal disease, 
infanticide and abandoned children that had been receiving public attention for decades.  
Whereas the articles on the subject of abortion had been relatively sporadic before the turn of 
the century, the subject started to be debated more during the years before the outbreak of the 
First World War.  
3.2.1 Pre-revolutionary abortion legislation 
 
With regard to abortion, the criminal codes of tsarist Russia were strict. The Criminal Code of 
1845 stated that anyone convicted of performing an unwanted abortion (i.e. without the 
mother’s consent) would lose their civic standing and risk a sentence of six to ten years of the 
most severe kind of penal labour. Furthermore, they might be  
 
subjected to branding and the lash if they belonged to the unprivileged ranks, which were liable to 
corporal punishment. Abortion by the mother or with her consent also entailed loss of civic rights but 
only exile or resettlement in Siberia (and the lash in appropriate cases)   (Engelstein 1991: 188, note 
16).   
 
In the 1885 edition of the Criminal Code,
17
 following the elimination of corporal punishment 
from Russian law, the provisions on abortion were slightly modified. Abortion was defined as 
a premeditated act of murder (Engelstein 1991; Goldman 1993), permissible only to save the 
life of the mother,
18
 but the penalties were lowered to “loss of rights plus simple penal 
servitude (again six to ten years) where consent was absent (Engelstein 1991: 188, note 16)”. 
                                                 
17
 The 1885 Criminal Code was in effect until 1917. 
18
 Infanticide, on the other hand, was defined as an “unpremeditated form of murder since the guilty mother 
was presumed to have acted impulsively, under the pressure of overwhelming emotion, in an abnormal 
physical and mental state occasioned by ‘shame and fear’ or in the commonplace anguish of postpartum 
distress (Engelstein 1991: 188).” 
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The most severe penalties were to be invoked if the abortion led to serious medical injuries or 
death, but penalties could also be increased if the procedure had been carried out by trained 
personnel – “a doctor, an obstetrician, a midwife or a chemist, or if it is discovered that the 
defendant has been guilty of a similar crime in the past (Gens 1926a: 12; Engelstein 1991)”. 
Abortion performed by the mother, or with her consent, could lead to deprivation of rights 
plus prison sentences ranging in severity from four to six years for both the woman and the 
person(s) helping her (Savage 1988; Engelstein 1991).
19
  
 With regard to the attitudes towards abortion, Russia does not seem to have differed 
all that much from her Western contemporaries. Abortion seems to have been a rather 
common phenomenon in the pre-revolutionary era, and the general public seems to have been 
rather tolerant towards this method of birth control. Thus, the risk of being turned over to the 
authorities by an acquaintance or a neighbour was probably very small. This view is 
supported by Grin (1914: 16): “Personally, I have never heard of a single case in which 
someone was informed on [for having had an abortion]”. Grin further argues that many 
women saw nothing wrong in trying to “induce their menstruation” during the first stage of an 
unwanted pregnancy. Neither did they have any difficulty in asking their doctors for help to 
“do away with the consequences of conception (Grin 1914: 19).” Furthermore, 
 
it is a commonly known fact that in the eyes of the general public, there is nothing particularly 
disgraceful about having an abortion shortly after conception. If there is any kind of motive behind the 
decision to terminate the pregnancy, public opinion will be especially sympathetic. (…) Furthermore, 
people consider abortion during the first months of pregnancy only slightly – and then quantitatively 
(kolichestvenno) – different from contraception, where a lot of eggs and billions of sperm are wasted 
(Grin 1914: 19-20). 
 
This argument seems to be supported by Brodskii (1914), who notes that “people do not 
perceive the abortion of a small foetus of one or two months as murder (Brodskii 1914: 12).” 
According to him, people did not consider the foetus to have a soul at that stage of pregnancy. 
Under the social conditions of the day, abortion was a necessity for many people; if nothing 
else, it seems like the phenomenon was accepted as a “fact of life” during the pre-
revolutionary years and well into the Soviet period. 
3.3 Abortion in Soviet Russia, 1920-1930 
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 It should be noted, however, that there were discrepancies between theory and practice in this area. 
According to some pre-revolutionary sources (e.g. Grin 1914), many judges showed a rather tolerant attitude 
towards women who were accused of having abortions. Thus, abortion trials could often end with the 
defendant being acquitted rather than punished. 
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After the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, Russian (Soviet) abortion policy started to develop 
along a different and unprecedented path. When abortion was legalised in 1920, the Soviet 
government enacted a piece of legislation that was ahead of Western Europe by several years; 
the next country to pass a modified abortion law (with the concept of “medicosocial 
indications” included) was Iceland in 1935 (David 1992: 4).  
 Consequently, Soviet abortion discourse of the 1920s is the first case in which 
abortion is being discussed as an already legalised phenomenon. Even so, the issue remained 
controversial. The Soviet government regarded abortion as a social evil that they sought to 
combat. Decriminalisation of the procedure did not mean endorsement. Rather, the Decree of 
1920 was considered a pragmatic response to contemporary social and economic 
circumstances. As the increasing abortion rates were regarded as a result of poverty and social 
hardship, legalisation of the operation was thought to be a temporary solution. It was assumed 
that once the state succeeded in improving the country’s socioeconomic conditions, the need 
for having abortions would disappear and the evil would cease to exist. 
 The focus of the following part of this chapter will be on Soviet abortion legislation of 
the 1920s and its origins. First, an outline of the Soviet ideology on women will be presented 
by giving a rough presentation of the theories of Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, August Bebel 
and Klara Zetkin, and of how these theories were furthered by early Soviet theorists. 
Although it would be questionable to think of the legalisation of abortion in Soviet Russia as 
an act mainly connected to “the woman question”, an overview of the socialist ideas on 
women’s emancipation might provide a necessary backdrop for the further reading. 
Subsequently, the history of the legalisation of abortion in Soviet Russia in the early 1920s 
will be outlined. 
3.3.1 “The woman question” in Soviet Russia and its origins 
 
Soviet theorists’ ideas on women’s role in society had at their core an elaborate framework of 
19
th
-century socialist theory, mainly represented by the works of Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, 
August Bebel and Klara Zetkin.  
In The German Ideology (1845-1846), Marx and Engels suggested – in accordance 
with their materialist conception of history – that the social form of the family was relative to 
a society’s prevailing mode of production. However, they also argued that women’s 
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oppression was rooted in the family’s biological or sexual division of labour, especially in 
motherhood. Owned by men, women were the first form of private property (Goldman 1993). 
While at the time still unable to resolve this contradiction between the “social perspective on 
the family and their strictly biological explanation for women’s oppression within it 
(Goldman 1993: 32-33),” some of the ideas outlined by Marx and Engels in The German 
Ideology were to remain almost intact throughout their subsequent work. This is the case, for 
instance, with their argument that if women were to be liberated, all domestic work would 
need to be transferred to the public scene. Along with the “collectivisation” of the family 
economy, the family in its present, bourgeois form would cease to exist.  
These ideas were furthered in subsequent works, such as The Communist Manifesto 
(1848). By removing the principle of private property altogether and educating children 
collectively, the main bases of traditional marriage – property-based dependence, the wife’s 
dependence on her husband and the children’s dependence on their parents – would be 
eliminated (Marx and Engels 2004). All that would remain were bonds of genuine affection. 
The most comprehensive and influential account of Marxist thinking on women and 
the family, however, was Engels’ The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State 
(1884), published after Marx’s death. Compared to Marx, Engels showed a more elaborate 
interest in questions related to sexual and family relations under communism (Hunt 2010). In 
The Origin, Engels argued that women’s oppression was a result of the destruction of the 
traditional communal household. The transition to individual family units, “the monogamous 
family,” had turned the wife into a domestic servant.  
Modern monogamous marriage, according to Engels, was based on property relations 
and founded on the subjugation of the woman by the man, with “the express purpose being to 
produce children of undisputed paternity; (…) because these children are later to come into 
their father’s property as his natural heirs (Engels 1972: 92).” Among the propertied classes, 
where marriages were arranged as matters of convenience and in accordance with each 
spouse’s social status, there was little room for what Engels termed “individual sex love”;20 
instead, the relationship between the husband and the wife could be compared to general class 
antagonisms: “Within the family [the husband] is the bourgeois, and the wife represents the 
                                                 
20
 “Our sex love (…) assumes that the person loved returns the love; to this extent the woman is on an equal 
footing with man (…). Secondly, our sex love has a degree of intensity and duration which makes both lovers 
feel that non-possession and separation are a great, if not the greatest, calamity (…). And finally, there arises a 
new moral standard in the judgement of a sexual relationship. We do not only ask, was it within or outside 
marriage, but also, did it spring from love and reciprocated love or not? (Engels 1972: 108)” 
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proletariat (Engels 1972: 105).” Bonds of genuine affection could only be forged among 
proletarians, as their lack of property left no incentive for the husband to suppress the wife.  
Once men and women possessed equal legal rights, it would “be plain that the first 
condition for the liberation of the wife is to bring the whole female sex back into public 
industry, and that this in turn demands that the characteristic of the monogamous family as the 
economic unit of society be abolished (Engels 1972: 105).”  
By enabling women to become involved in production, capitalism had created the 
preconditions for her economic independence and eventual liberation. In turn, the family 
structures would have to be adapted to fit the new gender roles – for instance, private 
housekeeping should be replaced by public and children should be educated collectively. This 
could only be achieved through socialism.  
August Bebel, one of the most influential socialist thinkers and one of the founders of 
the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), as well as the “most widely read of the male 
socialists on the woman question (Boxer 2007: 133),” was “the first Marxist to fit the woman 
question into the larger framework of Marxist theory (Stites 1991: 233).” In 1879, he made a 
significant contribution to the discussions on this issue by publishing his book Woman and 
Socialism. Providing an account of women’s history from the ancient times to the present, the 
book was wide-ranging enough to become “the unofficial Bible of the European Marxist 
movement (Stites 1991: 234).”  
In this work, Bebel, like Marx, argued that men’s oppression of women was an 
expression of a general social dependence rooted in “the economic dependence of the 
oppressed upon the oppressor (Bebel 1904: 9, italics in original).” Women could only be 
emancipated once their social conditions changed radically. Equality of the sexes, in turn, was 
a precondition for the emancipation of humanity.  When everything that made human beings 
dependent upon each other was removed, the relations between women and men would 
improve.  
The German socialist Klara Zetkin was, after Engels and Bebel, “the principal 
theoretician on the woman question in the European socialist camp before the First World 
War (Honeycutt 1976: 131).” Like many other Marxist thinkers, Zetkin believed that 
women’s participation in productive labour was a prerequisite for her emancipation. 
However, she also placed greater emphasis on women’s role in reproduction. This led her to 
the conclusion that in order to reach their full potential, women had to develop in two separate 
directions at once: as a female human being – through motherhood and as a social being – 
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through productive work. Both these directions would then, in a mutually beneficial way, 
contribute to expand the horizons and abilities of women and help them become a resource 
for society (Honeycutt 1976). Consequently, motherhood was a social responsibility. In the 
words of Honeycutt, this standpoint  
 
followed logically from [Zetkin’s] conception of woman’s place within the larger social order and her  
conviction that the interests of the female sex must not be placed before those of humanity as a whole.  
(…) the totality had priority over the particular, “the interest of the species” over that of the female sex,  
and “the welfare of humanity over the rights of the individual” (Honeycutt 1976: 135-136). 
 
Following this logic, regarding the question of whether birth control and abortion could play a 
positive role in women’s liberation, Zetkin’s attitude was downright dismissive; she believed 
that social problems needed to be solved by collective action, not by resorting to what she 
regarded as individualistic solutions. In this respect, she was far from alone among her 
peers.
21
   
According to Neuman (1974: 277), many German Social Democrats had an 
ambivalent attitude towards contraception (as well as an ambivalent attitude towards sexual 
questions in general). While the Social Democratic Party (SPD) of Imperial Germany was 
critical of middle-class morality and the Christian church’s traditional attitudes towards sex, 
Neuman’s study of the writings of Bebel, Kautsky and other Social Democrats  
reveals that in spite of their attacks on traditional sexual morality and marriage they in fact shared many  
of the most widespread and repressive sexual misconceptions of their time and that they helped to  
spread these misconceptions through their writings, thereby encouraging their supporters to find an  
answer to the sexual question in the sublimation of the sexual drive and in that eminently bourgeois  
institution, monogamous marriage (Neuman 1974: 272). 
 
Thus, the sexual conservatism of the SPD, according to Neuman, was revealed in what he 
refers to as “the socialist solution to the sexual question” – namely, sexual restraint, studies, 
hard work, self-mastery and marriage (ibid.: 273). Some Social Democrats, including August 
Bebel, regarded contraception as “offensive”, “immoral” and “unnatural”. Neuman argues 
that these “bourgeois reactions” might have an additional reason, i.e. the “misconception of 
the time (...) that contraception was simply another form of masturbation and thus represented 
a threat to good health (ibid.: 279).” The idea that masturbation could have an adverse effect 
on a person’s health was indeed fairly widespread in the 19th century. For instance, Sigmund 
Freud’s early writings include assertions that “masturbation was itself a cause of nervous 
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 In his article “The Working Class and Neo-Malthusianism” (1913), Lenin expressed a similar negativity 
towards contraceptives, using arguments that largely echo Zetkin’s view (Kommunistka, no. 1, 1925: 30). 
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debility”; consequently, contraception “either by coitus interruptus or by condom [Freud] 
presented (…) as little more than a sub species of self-abuse (McLaren 1979: 518).”   
3.4 Early examples of Soviet theorising on the 
woman question 
 
After the First International Congress of Socialist Women in 1907, the “German position” on 
the woman question – as promoted by Zetkin – also gained supremacy among Russian 
socialists (Stites 1991). At the turn of the 20
th
 century, the ideas of Marx, Engels, Bebel and 
Zetkin were well-known among Russian social-democrats, some of whom had gained insight 
in Marxist literature by studying abroad. Bebel’s Woman and Socialism had been published in 
1895, followed by a number of other works dealing with these issues (Stites 1991; Goldman 
1993).  
The first Russian Marxist discussion on the woman question was The Woman Worker, 
a brochure written by Nadezhda Krupskaya – Lenin’s wife – in 1900. Echoing the ideas of 
Bebel and Zetkin about the liberating force of productive labour and of how only the working 
class itself could bring about its own emancipation, she portrayed a socialist future where 
 
exploitation and inequality will have vanished; when people would work in clean, well-ventilated,  
spacious factories; when society would care for the old, the weak, and the sick; when no one would  
have to die alone or be fed by charity; when mothers would be assured that their children would be fed,  
clothed, and cared for in decent public institutions, and not left to the mercy of ignorant village babas,  
“angel factories,”22 or the infested streets of the factory towns (Stites 1991: 241).   
 
The Woman Worker was printed abroad, smuggled into Russia and used as propaganda 
material among factory workers, and was to remain the only Russian Marxist work on these 
issues until Aleksandra Kollontai’s The Social Bases of the Woman Question appeared in 
1909 (Stites 1991). According to Stites, Krupskaya’s contribution (the publication of which 
had been supported and encouraged by Lenin from the beginning) also helped to raise some 
consciousness on the problem among Russian social-democrats. At its Second Congress in 
1903, the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party included a section in its programme 
calling for equal rights between men and women, exclusion of female workers from 
potentially harmful industries, maternity leave, factory nursery facilities and women 
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 The term “angel factories” referred to the tsarist-era foundling homes for poor children, where mortality 
rates could be quite high. 
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inspectors at the workplace. These principles were retained – among both groups – even after 
the Party split into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks (Stites 1991). 
 Lenin’s own writings on women furthered the ideas of Bebel, Engels and Marx, but 
placed greater emphasis on the practical side of the matters, i.e. the concrete policy goals that 
were needed to agitate for revolution in Russia and build socialism (Buckley 1989). In 
accordance with the orthodox Marxist position on women, Lenin was convinced that a 
socialist revolution was needed to free women from the yoke of capitalism. In order to 
achieve a successful revolution, women needed to be involved. In Lenin’s words, “you cannot 
draw the masses into politics without drawing women into politics as well. For the female half 
of the human race is doubly oppressed under capitalism (quoted in Buckley 1989: 25)”. Like 
Klara Zetkin, Lenin was opposed to the idea of separate women’s organisations, but he did 
recognise the need for special political work among women (Buckley 1989). 
3.5 Revolutionary legislation: Putting theory into 
practice 
 
The Decree of 18
th
 November, 1920 on the Legalisation of Abortion formed part of a series of 
reforms in the sphere of family law. In the years immediately following the October 
revolution of 1917, the family legislation of the 1836 Russian Code was replaced by a whole 
“package” of more radical – and modern – laws based on the Marxist principles outlined 
above. Now both men and women were granted rights which had previously been denied to 
large groups of the population: formal equality before the law; a set minimum wage that 
applied to both sexes; the principle of “equal pay for equal work”; maternity leave; an annual 
paid holiday; equal rights to education. The first constitution of 1918 granted both sexes the 
right to vote and to be elected as deputies to the soviets (Buckley 1989: 34-35).
23
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 The radical nature of these reforms becomes more visible when they are compared with Imperial Russian 
family law. In tsarist Russia, marriage was defined as a “religious institution based on patriarchal authority, 
unquestioning obedience, and unequal status (Wagner 1989: 66).” The husband’s authority over the wife was 
absolute; similarly, a father had the right to dominate his children completely. A woman would need the formal 
permission of her father or husband if she wanted to leave her household or take on paid employment. Divorce 
could only be obtained for a limited number of reasons – “adultery, sexual incapacity arising before marriage, 
exile to Siberia due to a criminal conviction, or disappearance (Wagner 1989: 67).” The divorce procedures 
were complicated and potentially humiliating. Nobody, male or female, could marry without the consent of 
parents or other authorities. Although women had the right to keep their own property after marriage, they 
had very limited rights of inheritance (Engelstein 1992: 32). 
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Assessing the pre-revolutionary situation in a somewhat propagandistic, but 
nonetheless colourful way, Nikolai Semashko – People’s Commissar of Health between 1918 
and 1930 – stated that 
 
[i]n Tsarist Russia, the working woman was the most down-trodden and exploited of all beings. 
Enslaved by domestic life, chained to the kitchen and to the washing through, tied hand and foot by the 
children, fettered by the “sacredness” of Church marriage, the woman was unable either to work, study 
or take part in the life of the community. The November Revolution (sic) of 1917 radically changed the 
situation. Soviet legislation made of woman man’s equal in every respect (Semashko 1934: 72). 
 
Although there may have been discrepancies between theory and practice, the reforms made 
in Soviet family law did signify “a foundation for changed patterns of behaviour (Buckley 
1989: 35).” As early as December 1917, the restrictions on divorce were lifted. Mutual 
consent was no longer needed; from now on, divorce could be granted at the request of either 
the wife or the husband. According to Buckley, the Decree on the Introduction of Divorce 
was “a reaction to the harsh restrictions of Tsarist law and an attack on the Orthodox Church 
(Buckley 1989: 35).”  
In a similar vein, the new marriage regulations – enacted as part of the Code of Laws 
concerning the Civil Registration of Deaths, Births and Marriages of 17
th
 October, 1918 
(a.k.a. “the Family Code”) – were a contrast to the restrictions of the previous Russian Code 
of 1836. “Church marriage” was replaced by civil marriage, registered in the Bureau of 
Registration of Civil Acts (Otdely zapisei aktov grazhdanskogo sostoyaniya or ZAGS). 
Unregistered or de facto marriages, however, were recognised equally (Semashko 1934: 73). 
As a general principle, neither spouse should be able to place restrictions on the other; thus, 
the principle of equality between the sexes should – ideally – be adhered to both privately and 
publicly. In practice, however, this proved to be very difficult. 
 With regard to family rights, the concept of “illegitimacy” was removed: from now on, 
“[c]hildren descended from parents related by non-registered marriage have equal rights with 
those descended from parents whose marriage was registered (Schlesinger 1949: 37, excerpt 
from the Family Code)”. In other words, all children, “regardless of whether their parents 
were married, were entitled to parental support until the age of 18 (Goldman 1993: 133).”  
The regulations concerning alimony and child support were also reformed 
considerably. If a marriage (registered or de facto) was dissolved, the wife – if she was 
disabled or in need – would be entitled to receive alimony for one year afterwards.24 If she 
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 Goldman (1993: 133) describes this system as follows: ”The very concept of alimony – the monetary 
expression of women’s dependence on men – signified the persistence of the family as the primary form of 
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had “become disabled through the husband’s fault – beatings, frequent abortions, etc. – the 
court grants her alimony from the husband, until she regains ability to work (Semashko 1934: 
74).”  
Since all children were granted the right to receive financial support from their 
parents, it also became a lot easier for unmarried women to sue their ex-partners for child 
support. A 1925 survey of 300 alimony cases in Moscow’s city and provincial courts revealed 
that although “men denied paternity in about one-third of the cases, the woman received an 
award for child support 99% of the time (Goldman 1993: 135-136).” 
The law on inheritance was also changed: article 160 explicitly stated that “[c]hildren 
have no rights to the property of their parents, or parents to that of their children (Schlesinger 
1949: 40, excerpt from the Family Code)”. Thus, the new Soviet government – at least on 
paper – did away with what had been considered the foundations of bourgeois marriage: 
economic dependency on the one hand (seeing as both sexes now were formally equal, also 
on the labour market), and property relations (inheritance) on the other. 
On 18
th
 November, 1920, the Decree on the Legalisation of Abortion was enacted. On 
the one hand, this decree formed part of the general package of revolutionary legislation that 
was intended to “do away with” the relics of the past; on the other, it was a temporary 
measure, a response to contemporary circumstances. This decree will now be examined in 
greater detail. 
3.6 The Decree of 18
th
 November, 1920 on the 
Legalisation of Abortion 
 
On 18
th
 November, 1920, following a series of radical reforms, Soviet Russia became the first 
country in the world to allow “artificial discontinuation of pregnancy” for other than strict 
medical reasons.
25
 The Decree was first promulgated by the Sovnarkom (the Council of 
                                                                                                                                                        
social organization and security. The practice of alimony, ensuring that the male wage earner rather than the 
state took responsibility for the needy woman and the child, revealed the scarcity of social services and the 
paucity of options for women outside the family.” 
25
 According to Savage (1988), penalties for abortion were cancelled de facto almost immediately after the 
Great October Socialist Revolution. Given the circumstances, this was a pragmatic solution. The First World 
War had drained the country of resources and led to disastrous consequences for the civil population. As 
doctors had been called to serve at the front, the rural areas of the country had been drained of qualified 
medical personnel. Hunger, cold, famine and rampant epidemics led to a tripling of the death rate in the cities, 
and the food shortage grew steadily worse towards the end of the decade. By the end of the civil war in 1921, 
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People's Commissars, the government of the early Soviet republic) in the R. S. F. S. R. It took 
a while before it was made public in the other Soviet republics. In the Ukraine, for instance, 
the Decree was publicised only in the summer of 1921 (Ginekologiya i akusherstvo, no. 4-5, 
1922: 104). 
The Decree
26
  stated that repressive measures were not only ineffective in combating 
the rising number of abortions, they were also potentially harmful, “driv[ing] the operation 
underground and ma[king] the woman a victim of mercenary and often ignorant quacks.”  
 
The Workers’ and Peasants’ Government is conscious of this serious evil to the community. It combats  
this evil by propaganda against abortions among working women. By working for socialism, and by  
introducing the protection of maternity and infancy on an extensive scale, it feels assured of achieving  
the gradual disappearance of this evil. But as the moral survivals of the past (moral’nye perezhitki 
proshlogo) and the difficult economic conditions of the present still compel many women to resort to 
this operation, the People’s Commissariats of Health and of Justice, anxious to protect the health of the 
women and considering that the method of repressions in this field fails entirely to achieve this aim, 
have decided (…) [t]o permit such operations to be performed freely and without charge in Soviet 
hospitals, where conditions are assured of minimizing the harm of the operation (Decree of 18
th
 Nov., 
1920, reprinted in Semashko 1934: 83-84)”.  
 
The decree further stated that abortions were to be performed in hospitals and by trained 
doctors only; nurses or midwives found guilty of performing abortions, as well as doctors 
doing so with “mercenary aims,” would face sanctions (Semashko 1934; Savage 1988; 
Goldman 1993).  
In accordance with the premise that the laws of a proletarian state would be 
constructed “with [their] own obsolescence in mind (Goldman 1993: 1),” legalisation of 
abortion was intended to be a temporary solution. By spreading anti-abortion propaganda and 
introducing an extensive welfare system for mothers and children, the socialist state would 
seek to combat abortion as a phenomenon by gradually eliminating the need for women to 
terminate their pregnancies. Until then, lifting the ban on such operations would be the lesser 
– and necessary – evil. 
Despite enacting the world’s most liberal abortion law at the time, the Soviet 
government did not consider fertility control a private matter that should be left to the 
individual. It was already clear from the outset that abortion was not really considered a 
“woman’s right”. In an article published in the journal Kommunistka a few months before the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Moscow had lost half its population, Petrograd had lost two-thirds, and the country was in ruins (Buckley 1989; 
Meyer 1991; Goldman 1993: 60-61).
 
 
26
 The Decree on the Legalisation on Abortion will henceforth be referred to as “the Decree of 1920” or simply 
“the Decree”. 
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enactment of the Decree, Nikolai Semashko stated that the abortion question should be solved 
“not as a matter of individual rights, but by taking into account the interests of the entire 
collective (society, race) (Semashko 1920: 21).”   
Savage (1988) argues that the Decree of 1920 “did not establish a woman’s right to 
choose whether to have an abortion, but rather constituted a health measure responding to 
contemporary circumstances (Savage 1988: 1038).” A Soviet citizen’s right was relative to 
the given political and historical context. Thus, 
 
legal provisions with respect to any subject may vary as the purposes of the Communist Party of the  
Soviet Union (C.P.S.U.) and the state vary, and legal rights may exist nothwithstanding an underlying  
moral disapproval by the Party and the state (...) rights in the U.S.S.R. [were] devices of democratic  
participation, class struggle, and socialist transformation, not ends in themselves (Savage 1988: 1031- 
1032; my italics).  
 
This helps to explain why the Soviet state could allow for abortions to be performed legally, 
while at the same time considering the practice an “evil”. The Decree was indeed meant to be 
a temporary solution,
27
 and the “right” to have abortions was conditional, based on the given 
historical context and the needs of contemporary society.  
To some Soviet theorists, the notion of abortion being a woman’s right could in itself 
be interpreted as an expression of “bourgeois feminism”. Aleksandra Kollontai, for instance, 
“supported the abortion law of 1920 as a matter of principle but, like most Bolsheviks, saw it 
as a necessary and temporary evil (Stites 1991: 355).” Whereas marriage and sex were 
personal affairs, motherhood was a social concern; avoidance of maternal duties, in turn, 
represented a “selfish and immature lack of responsibility (Stites 1991: 355).”  In Kollontai’s 
view, women’s responsibility towards society was twofold – on the one hand, they should 
“effectively contribute to society” through their work; on the other, they should “provide 
society with healthy offspring (quoted in Schlesinger 1949: 45).” 28  
In order to harmonise these two demands, the Soviet state sought to extend the system 
of welfare services and make it possible for women to combine motherhood with working 
outside the home. To Kollontai, society should help mothers raise their children: “Every 
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 This “temporary” character was an important trait not only of the Decree, but of Soviet legislation in general. 
Aleksander Goikhbarg, head of the committee drafting the new Family Code of 1918, expressed it thus: “Of 
course, in publishing these law codes, proletarian power, in constructing socialism, does not want to create 
‘eternal’ codes or codes which will last for centuries (quoted in Goldman 1993: 53).” – “Law, like the family and 
the state itself, would soon wither away (Goldman 1993: 53).” 
28
 This was in line with arguments voiced by Klara Zetkin at the turn of the century (see above). According to 
Karen Honeycutt, the “notion, widely accepted today, of woman’s right to control her own body would have 
been unintelligible to Zetkin, influenced as she was by a cultural heritage and by socialist ideas which accorded 
priority to the good of the whole over that of the individual (Honeycutt 1976: 136).”  
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mother must be convinced that once she fulfills her natural function and gives a new member 
to communist society, i.e. a new worker, the collective will love and attend to her and her 
child (quoted in Stites 1991: 355).” In turn, the introduction of welfare measures – such as 
public child-rearing arrangements
29
 – would lead to the eventual elimination of abortion as a 
phenomenon. 
“Modern” arguments, such as the question of whether abortion should be a woman’s 
inherent right (i.e., whether a woman should be in charge of her own body), were virtually 
absent from the official discussions. Soviet abortion discourse should be analysed with these 
factors in mind. 
3.7 Practical implications of the new abortion 
legislation 
 
Although the enactment of the Decree of 18
th
 November, 1920 was a revolutionary step in the 
world history of abortion policy, the new legislation did not signify a complete liberalisation 
of Soviet abortion laws.  
First, access to abortion was restricted formally: the People’s Commissariat of Health,  
Narkomzdrav, initially required that abortions be denied to women who were pregnant for the 
first time, unless childbirth would pose a serious threat to the life of the mother. Neither 
should the operation be permitted if the woman was more than two and a half month 
pregnant. Abortions should be performed by surgical operation, after which the woman was 
required to stay in the hospital for three days; she was also required not to return to work for 
two weeks (Savage 1988). Doctors had no right to deny the abortion requests of women who 
fulfilled the official requirements. However, they could – and were supposed to – try in every 
way to dissuade them by stressing the dangers of having the operation, and “[i]f the woman is 
excessively afraid of giving birth, [the doctor] needs to ensure her that her fears are 
exaggerated and unfounded. He should instil in her an optimistic attitude towards her 
pregnancy and future childbirth (Vasilevskie 1924: 112).” 
For various reasons, access to abortion also continued to be limited by practical 
circumstances. First, the government was simply unable to provide enough health care 
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 However, the state “would not take children away from their parents, and all public child-rearing 
arrangements would be voluntary on the part of the parents (Stites 1991: 354-355, emphasis in original).” 
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facilities to meet the enormous demand. In addition, many physicians were opposed to 
legalisation in the first place and found their own ways of refusing women’s requests (Savage 
1988). According to Vasilevskii and Vasilevskii, women seeking to terminate their 
pregnancies often met with hostility from doctors who had nothing but contempt for the “so-
called ‘social reasons’ (Vasilevskie 1924: 108).” Doctors could sabotage the new abortion 
directives by telling their patients to return in two or three months, referring to the lack of 
hospital beds. Given Narkomzdravs’s demand that the operation be performed within the first 
ten weeks of pregnancy, postponement of the surgical procedure was an effective way of 
preventing women from having legal abortions (Vasilevskie 1924: 108; Savage 1988: 1039).  
3.7.1 Abortion in the countryside: A particular problem 
 
Extending the new abortion services to the country’s vast rural areas, notorious for their 
shortage of medical doctors and health care facilities, would prove problematic – especially in 
the early 1920s. The First World War and the subsequent civil war had destroyed much of the 
country’s infrastructure and, as most rural physicians had been called to serve at the front, 
emptied the countryside of qualified medical personnel (Gens 1926a; Semashko 1934; 
Avdeev 2008).
30
 As it turned out, returning doctors to the rural districts after the civil war 
proved to be a difficult task – “the extremely low wages, on the one hand, the hospitals being 
in a state of disrepair and lacking adequate heating, the hunger, and the lack of even the most 
essential medicines and instruments all contributed to scaring doctors away from working in 
the countryside (Gens 1926a: 19).”    
As a result of the rural areas’ desperate lack of resources, it took a while before legal 
abortion became accessible to the country’s large peasant population. According to Gens, this 
situation started to improve somewhat in the mid-1920s, but even by 1925 several district 
hospitals still lacked the equipment necessary to carry out surgical abortions. Consequently, 
by the middle of the decade “in the rural areas of Russia (sic),31 the Decree has had virtually 
no perceptible impact on public health, and the overwhelming majority of abortions continue 
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 Semashko paints a rather vivid picture of the health care situation in Russia during the First World War: 
“[T]he medical service, poor as it was, was finally disorganised, the great majority of the doctors having been 
mobilised for the war. Owing to food, fuel and other difficulties, the lack of necessary medicines and of food for 
the patients, even the hospitals which remained intact dragged on a miserable existence, while some were 
forced to close down (Semashko 1934: 15).”  
31
 Here, Vasilevskii and Vasilevskii are probably referring to the R.S.F.S.R (The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist 
Republic), and not to the Soviet Union as a whole. 
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to be performed by midwives, babki
32
 (…) and others, if not by the pregnant women 
themselves (Vasilevskie 1924: 109).”  
“So far,” wrote Vera Lebedeva, the head of the Department for the Protection of 
Maternity and Infancy (Otdel okhrany materinstva i mladenchestva, OMM) in 1925, 
 
our policy for the rural areas has, in a way, consisted of “not allowing” abortion to  
enter the countryside. We were afraid, and not without reason, that abortions would  
“overwhelm” the weak rural health care networks. (…) It seemed dangerous and  
unacceptable to open the doors of the district hospitals for abortions as long as they  
did not have enough space for this (Lebedeva 1926: 5).  
 
The bureaucratic process of obtaining a legal abortion was complicated. First, the woman’s 
pregnancy had to be attested by a doctor; second, her overall health had to be documented; 
third, she had to get documents from her workplace stating her income level; fourth, she 
needed to have her marital status confirmed by her domkom (domovyi komitet), the residents’ 
committee of the house where she lived. Unemployed women would have to be registered by 
the Labour Exchange (Gens 1926a). To peasant women living far away from the nearest 
medical facility, the amount of time and work needed to obtain a legal abortion – along with 
the embarrassment of revealing the most intimate details of their personal lives to a 
commission of health officials – could be enough to deter them from the procedure altogether 
and go to a babka instead. 
3.7.2 Illegal abortions 
 
For various reasons, illegal abortions remained widespread in the countryside even after 1920. 
Goldman (1993) argues that since a lot of peasant women had never even been to a doctor, let 
alone in a hospital, the babka – a familiar figure in the village – would be a natural person to 
turn to when they needed an abortion. Many peasants seem to have “simply trusted the 
practices of the babka and midwife over those of the modern doctor (Goldman 1993: 281).” 
Moreover, the intimate nature of the issue could play a role of its own; Gens (1926a: 28) notes 
that even at the local medical centre many peasant women preferred talking to a midwife 
(“woman to woman”) instead of addressing a male doctor.  
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 “Quacks”; women performing abortions by using various folk remedies. This derogatory term was widely 
used in Russian and Soviet discourses on maternal health, childcare, and abortions.  
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 Furthermore, as has already been mentioned, the process of obtaining a legal abortion 
was complicated. Not only did the bureaucratic machinery pose practical difficulties, it also 
made it difficult to keep the pregnancy a secret. While Soviet anti-babka campaigns 
repeatedly stressed the fact that pregnancy outside of wedlock was nothing to be ashamed of, 
the customs of village life often dictated otherwise, and whereas legal abortion equalled a 
degree of exposure, the babka granted secrecy (unless, of course, something went wrong). 
Additionally, peasant women usually made every effort to keep the babka’s identity a secret 
(Gens 1926a: 28).
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 The methods traditionally used by underground abortionists in Soviet Russia do not 
seem to have been all that different from the ones used in the Western world. Goldman (1993: 
281) mentions “teas from saffron, camomile, aloe, and ergot,” as well as primitive 
instruments (e.g. knitting needles, crochet hooks and goose feathers), teas brewed from 
different types of herbs, or advising women to inflict external trauma to the uterus (e.g. by 
heavy lifting) or to take drugs such as quinine and bleach (Gens 1926a: 30-31; Goldman 
1993: 281).   
 As mentioned earlier, the frequency of illegal abortion is generally hard to establish. 
Since the procedure was shrouded in secrecy, the only abortions recorded are those that ended 
up in the hospital. The statistics on the “success stories” are all but impossible to establish. 
Furthermore, since not all incomplete abortions were the results of illegal operations (some 
miscarriages could be spontaneous or accidental), even this number provides an inaccurate 
picture. Complicating matters even further is the fact that many women refused to admit that 
they had had an illegal abortion in the first place (Gens 1926a: 28). Nevertheless, the number 
of registered incomplete abortions does provide a rough indication of the overall trend.  
3.7.3 The development of Soviet abortion legislation during the 
1920s 
 
The Decree of 1920 was of a declaratory nature and did not mention anything about penalties. 
During the first few years after the Decree’s enactment, however, the abortion directives were 
altered several times.  
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 In many ways, the babki and the women they served seemed to be “bound together in a pact of silence that 
often remained unbroken unto death (Goldman 1993: 281; Gens 1926a).” 
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In 1922, the Decree itself was replaced by Article 146 of the Criminal Code, which 
stated that illegal abortions – that is, abortions procured by persons without the correct 
medical qualifications, or by medical personnel operating in “inappropriate conditions” – 
would incur a sentence of imprisonment or forced labour for up to one year. If the operation 
was undertaken with mercenary aims, without the mother’s consent, or if the mother died as a 
result, the penalty would be increased to a maximum of five years (Vasilevskie 1924: 104-
106).  
Article 146, however, was very vague, leaving room for interpretation – if not 
confusion – on several accounts. Whereas the Decree of 1920 stated that abortions were to be 
performed in hospitals only, the article made no mention of this; neither did it specify the 
qualifications needed to carry out such surgery. As a temporary solution, the Decree was used 
as a set of guidelines for the local health and judicial departments even after the article was 
established (Vasilevskie 1924: 104-106), but the need for specific directives in this sphere 
was made even more urgent “by the chaos that still prevail[ed] in people’s understanding of 
Soviet abortion legislation”:34  
 
The vulgar assumption that all norms and restrictions in this sphere – not to mention the legal  
repressions – have been lifted is, of course, completely false, but nonetheless extraordinarily  
widespread. People everywhere tend to explain the new regulations by saying that “now you  
can” (“teper’ mozhno”). (…) The saddest part is that not only uneducated people – especially  
women, – but also medical personnel, including midwives and doctor’s assistants, have a very  
vague understanding of what, exactly, you “can” and “can’t” do these days. This (…) has to be  
changed (Vasilevskie 1924: 108). 
 
In January 1924, to ensure a certain level of control over the abortion practices, 
Narkomzdrav ruled that every provincial Department for the Protection of Maternity and 
Infancy (OMM) was to establish commissions to consider every individual request at the 
women’s consultation bureaux.35 These commissions would consist of a doctor and 
representatives from OMM and the zhenotdel, and based on a set of very specific criteria, they 
would decide whether a woman was “qualified” to have an abortion. As the commissions in 
fact were intended to prevent the use of abortion (Savage 1988), they were “expressly 
instructed to explain the health risks of abortion and its negative impact on society (Goldman 
1993: 261)” to the women they interviewed. In addition, the local departments of OMM were 
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 “(...) v ponimanii sovetskogo zakonodatel’stva ob aborte gospodstvuet poistine khaos.” 
35
 Women’s consultation bureaux, organised by the Department for Protection of Maternity and Infancy, 
provided health care services aiming to “teach women to prevent female diseases by hygienic measures, and 
systematically to examine expectant mothers and thus detect all abnormalities and effect their cure (Semashko 
1934: 80)”, in addition to providing information on abortion, contraception, and the existing maternity and 
infancy protection laws. 
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to arrange lectures, seminars and public trials against midwives who were accused of having 
performed abortions, with the aim of exposing the harmful effects of abortions in general and 
illegal abortions in particular (Gens 1926a).
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 The selection criteria for granting abortions were based on a hierarchy where class 
position and social vulnerability played an important role (Goldman 1993). If a woman’s 
reasons for seeking abortion were regarded as well-founded, the commission “balanced her 
need with the shortage of beds (Savage 1988: 1040).” First priority should be given to women 
with health problems; second, healthy women with social insurance would be considered in 
the following order:  
1. Unemployed single mothers receiving benefits from the Labour Exchange               
2. Single women workers with one child 
3. Factory employees with several children 
4. Worker’s wives [and peasant women] with several children 
5. All other categories of insured women 
Then: Uninsured women in the above-mentioned order                           
(Gens 1926a: 14).
37
  
 
This hierarchy, then, reflected the official view on abortion as a phenomenon caused by 
poverty and difficult social conditions. Vera Lebedeva expressed this way of reasoning as 
follows: 
   
[I]n permitting abortion for social reasons, we regarded the following reasons as the most  
important: poverty and having several children (mnogodetnost’) (…). Often, however,  
requests for abortions are made by women who have no social reasons for terminating  
their pregnancies, but who nonetheless insist on doing so. As a state, as legislators, we  
do not ban these women from having abortions or prosecute them if they do, but we  
do not consider ourselves obliged to help them either (Lebedeva 1926: 9).   
  
In other words, abortion was not considered a “right”, but a way of responding to the 
contemporary needs of a large part of the population. The commissions would then ensure 
that the distribution of this public health service was kept under control and offered only to 
those who needed it the most. In practice, however, this was a complicated task. 
3.7.4 Problems related to the abortion commissions: The 
bureaucracy and the limited capacity 
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 “[The commissions’] function contravened the requirements of paragraph 1 of the Decree of November 18, 
1920, which stated that abortions should be permitted freely in state hospitals (Savage 1988: 1040, note 64).” 
37
 The group of women without insurance included “students, servants, handicraft workers, the free 
professions (writers, artists, etc.), peasants, and the unregistered unemployed (Goldman 1993: 261).” White-
collar and blue-collar workers were insured, along with their families. 
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In the countryside and in the provincial towns, the commissions – if they were at all 
established – proved to have a largely counterproductive effect. The painstaking and 
sometimes humiliating process of compiling the necessary documents, along with the 
embarrassment of being interviewed by the commissions, could be enough to discourage a 
woman from seeking abortion legally. According to a survey made in the mid-1920s among 
provincial physicians, peasant women who did ask their doctor to carry out an abortion often 
requested that it be done “secretly” (Gens 1926a: 20).  
This problem did not go unnoticed by the authorities. At the Third All-Union 
Conference on the Protection of Maternity and Infancy in December 1925, the question of 
how to handle the abortion issue in the countryside was dealt with especially. The right to 
grant hospital abortions, it was agreed, should be handed over to the local doctors, who would 
then be working under the supervision of provincial commissions. Such commissions, 
however, should not be established in the local hospitals, as they proved to be “unfavourable 
under the conditions of village life (Kommunistka, no. 1, 1926: 43-44).”  
 Furthermore, the shortage of resources meant that the state hospitals were unable to 
perform even the limited number of abortions that the commissions would permit (Savage 
1988). In fact, the capacity of the abortion commissions could in itself be highly inadequate, 
as was reported in the town of Ivanovo-Voznesensk: 
 
Registration begins at 8 am (and women start lining up from 3-4 am). Since early 1926, we  
have only been registering the first 25 people in the queue; the rest of them are rejected, neither  
registered nor counted (Kommunistka, no. 9, 1928: 49). 
 
The large number of women who were “rejected, neither registered nor counted” only 
exacerbated the problem and made for a vicious circle: As abortion wards were filled with 
women needing treatment after ill-fated illegal abortions, the hospitals’ capacity was strained 
even further, forcing even more women to seek help outside of the public health care system. 
As a consequence, it became clear that the right to perform this operation had to be extended 
somewhat beyond the directives given in the Decree of 1920. According to the original 
decree, abortions were to be performed in Soviet hospitals only. The new regulations of 1924, 
on the other hand, allowed for the operation to be performed by physicians in private practice, 
as long as they did so in a state-approved medical facility. This could be done for a fee.  
Although the Decree of 1920 intended the legal abortions to be free of charge, the 
strain on the state hospitals was so great that further attempts had to be made to reduce it. In 
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the latter half of the 1920s, it was agreed that free abortions should only be granted to women 
who were unable to pay for them. A woman’s inability to pay would have to be demonstrated 
to the commission before a free abortion could be granted; thus, the role of the commissions 
changed from deciding whether a woman “qualified” for a legal abortion to deciding whether 
she would be able to pay for it (Savage 1988: 1041). Abortion fees were then established 
according to per capita income. In the Siberian town of Kamen’, for example, those with an 
income of less than 50 rubles would be granted free abortions, whereas someone earning 
more than 150 rubles would have to pay 20 rubles for the operation (Kommunistka no. 2, 
1929: 40).
38
  
This was considered a pragmatic measure. Rather than paying underground 
abortionists (as a lot of women were already doing) for performing the operation, it would be 
better if their money were spent in state-owned medical centres, where they were guaranteed a 
higher level of safety. Furthermore, the state would use the abortion fees to finance abortaria, 
special abortion clinics in the larger cities, and thus further expand the possibilities of having 
a safe abortion. “The important thing is to turn women away from the babki, from the 
incompetent midwives, [and] from the unskilled doctors (ot khalturshchika-vracha) 
(Kommunistka no. 2, 1929: 39).” 
3.7.5 Combating abortions: Propaganda, public health and welfare 
measures 
 
Commenting in 1934 on the Decree of 18
th
 November, 1920, Nikolai Semashko noted that 
 
[a]lthough legalising abortion is in the interest of women, the People’s Commissariat  
of Health at the same time carries on a determined fight against the spread of abortion,  
as an operation adversely affecting health. The fight is carried out in three directions: 
1)  Propaganda of birth-control measures under the direction and control of the women’s consultation  
bureaux. 
2) The development of the network of maternity and infancy protection institutions (crèches,  
mother-and-child homes, etc.) (...), eliminating in many cases the need for an abortion; with the  
same object in view, the health authorities have organized special committees of doctors and  
representatives of women’s organizations which consider the different applications for abortion  
(...). 
3) The third method of combating abortions consists of general sanitary education. A large number of  
pamphlets and leaflets are distributed, explaining how dangerous abortion is to a woman’s health, even  
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 The highest fee – 25 rubles – was reserved for “members of the exploiting classes” (netrudovoi element) and 
kulaks (kulachki), regardless of income.  
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when performed under most favourable hospital conditions (Semashko 1934: 87-88).
39
 
 
This quote gives a concise account of the official view on abortion in the early Soviet state. 
On the one hand, providing legal abortions was “in the interest of women” (and also, it might 
be added, in the interest of public health); on the other, abortion was a phenomenon that the 
state sought to combat.  
 With regard to the stated goal of propagating birth control measures, it is questionable 
whether this measure helped to reduce the number of abortions. Even if the women’s 
consultation bureaux did provide information on fertility regulation, the actual contraceptive 
devices – e.g. condoms or diaphragms – were largely unavailable to the general public 
(Goldman 1993). As a result, women still resorted to traditional folk practices – the 
withdrawal method, douching, barrier methods, and as a very last resort, abortion. Given the 
unreliability of the most common contraceptive measures, termination of pregnancy remained 
a widespread method of preventing births: in 1930, a survey conducted among peasant 
women in a collective farm revealed that abortion was their “second most popular form of 
birth control after coitus interruptus (Goldman 1993: 60)”; according to a Soviet 
demographer, even in big cities like Leningrad, abortion was the primary means of limiting 
births in the late 1920s (ibid.).   
 On the other hand, the “development of the network of maternity and infancy 
protection institutions,” as well as the programmes of general sanitary education, were carried 
out more systematically. The programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
included a clause stating that the C.P.S.U. would “base its public health measures on a 
comprehensive series of health and sanitary measures aiming to prevent the development of 
disease (Semashko 1934: 22-23).” The fight against abortions constituted a part of this series 
of prophylactic measures.   
The measures that were “designed to improve the health of the female population 
(Semashko 1934: 80)” also had a distinctly politicised character, as their core aim was to draw 
more women into the labour force (Avdeev 2008). This in turn was connected to what – in the 
words of Aleksandra Kollontai – constituted women’s “twofold responsibility to society”, i.e. 
work and motherhood.  
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 In the Soviet Union, hospital abortions were performed by the process of dilatation and curettage 
(vyskablivanie matki). As we shall see in chapter 5, the complications that might result from such operations 
were frequently referred to in Soviet sources warning of the dangers of abortion. Repeated procedures might 
cause permanent damage to a woman’s health. Abortions were, nonetheless, performed using this technique 
during the entire Soviet period (Henshaw 1990; Goldman 1993).  
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The decision to create the Department for the Protection of Maternity and Infancy 
(Otdel okhrany materinstva i mladenchestva, termed OMM or – by a typical Soviet-style 
abbreviation – Okhmatmlad) had been made already in December 1917 by the People’s 
Commissariat of Social Welfare (Narodnyi komissariat gosudarstvennogo prizreniya), headed 
by Aleksandra Kollontai. On 1
st
 January, 1918, the OMM started its official work under the 
leadership of Vera Lebedeva. In an effort to combat the country’s high infant mortality rates, 
the OMM initiated a wide-ranging campaign to organise orphanages for infants (doma 
mladentsa), women’s homes (zhenskie doma) and children’s hospitals (Avdeev 2008). This 
work continued into the 1920s with the organisation of crèches (day care centres) for the 
youngest children, women’s consultation bureaux, milk kitchens, etc. (Semashko 1934; 
Avdeev 2008).  
In order to facilitate the combination of work and motherhood, several measures were 
enacted to protect “female labour”. Working women and “many categories of women 
employed in non-physical occupations” were entitled to maternity leaves for eight weeks 
before and eight weeks after childbirth, during which time they could not be discharged from 
their jobs (Semashko 1934). After the maternity leave was over, the baby would ideally stay 
in a crèche while the mother was at work; from the age of three, the child could attend 
kindergarten (Avdeev 2008: 35). Other regulations were enacted concerning night work, 
overtime, mandatory business trips, paid breaks for breastfeeding during the workday etc. 
(Semashko 1934: 75).  
Welfare measures such as these were intended to eliminate women’s need for having 
abortions. However, given the poor living conditions of the vast majority of the country’s 
population, the absence of reliable contraceptives and the still inadequate health care services 
of the 1920s, abortion as a phenomenon proved very difficult to combat, and discussions on 
the subject continued throughout the decade. 
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4 Law versus life: Abortion discourse 
in pre-revolutionary Russia, 1910-1914                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
4.1 The intelligentsia and the abortion question 
 
In late Imperial Russia, a new generation of liberal intellectuals was beginning to play an 
active part in public discourse. This development was a result of the general modernisation 
process that had been taking place over the past few decades:  
 
[T]he growth of the factories, educational and welfare institutions, zemstvos,
40
 and government  
bureaux brought about a substantial enlargement of the professional employment sector,  
renewing a split between the radicals who chose to devote their life to revolutionary parties and  
those choosing to serve progress in salaried careers (Andrle 1994: 18). 
 
It was the liberal wing of the intelligentsia, and especially legal and medical scholars, that 
would dominate the pre-revolutionary abortion discourse. During the years preceding the First 
World War, the abortion issue “crystallize[d] as a special object of professional discussion 
(Engelstein 1992: 335).”  
 The increasing interest in the abortion issue was, first and foremost, related to the on-
going “abortion epidemic” – a development that was attracting attention across Europe. 
However, for Russian intellectuals, the subject of abortion seems to have been useful for an 
additional reason as well: whereas the political atmosphere of the 1860s and 1870s had 
allowed for comparatively open political struggles (Engel 1991; Moss 2005), the more 
repressive climate of the 1880s and 1890s – and the state’s reaction to the social turmoil 
following the 1905 revolution – made it difficult to express political ideas in print or by direct 
action. Consequently, Russian intellectuals needed to find alternative ways of conveying their 
views. One way of doing this was to frame social and political issues as matters of 
professional interest. According to Engel (1991) and Engelstein (1991, 1992), this approach 
made it possible for Russian liberals to “circumvent” tsarist censorship and find an outlet for 
their ideas. The abortion issue, in turn – as it involved a whole range of political, moral and 
philosophical dilemmas – provided ample grounds for such discussions. 
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 Organs of rural self-government. 
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 Discussions on the abortion question remained sporadic before 1910. From that point 
on and until the outbreak of the First World War, the abortion issue was debated at a number 
of medical and legal congresses, occasions that were followed by the publication of several 
congress reports and articles. It was no coincidence that the majority of the discourse 
participants were legal and medical experts: while doctors had to face the problem on a 
regular basis, the abortion issue also revealed the ineffectiveness of current legislation. 
Consequently, for doctors as well as legal scholars, the abortion question was not merely of 
intellectual interest – it was a matter of direct relevance to their professional work: 
 
 Not only was the rise [in abortion rates] in itself an ominous sign, but it increased the disjuncture  
between formal legal principles and both medical and judicial practice: physicians found  
 themselves more often engaged in criminal activity, and the courts came up against the force of contrary  
 public opinion and social reality (Engelstein 1991: 192). 
  
This “force of contrary public opinion and social reality,” in turn, lay at the core of the pre-
revolutionary abortion discourse. 
 In April 1910, the abortion issue was addressed at the Eleventh Congress of the 
Pirogov Society, Russia’s leading medical association (Engelstein (1991: 186).41  These 
discussions were followed by debates at the Fourth Congress of Russian Gynaecologists and 
Obstetricians in December 1911. In the early summer of 1913, at its Twelfth Congress, the 
Pirogov Society addressed the question again. On both these latter occasions, the congress 
participants voted in favour of decriminalisation. This position, moreover, was echoed by the 
Russian Group of the International Union of Criminologists
42
 in February 1914, when the 
matter was discussed at the group’s tenth national convention.43 38 participants voted in 
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 Founded in 1885, the Pirogov Society had “spearheaded the profession’s drive for disciplinary autonomy and 
become the focus of its oppositional political activity during 1905 (Engelstein 1991: 186).” Later dissolved 
(likvidirovano) by Soviet authorities because of its opposition to the 1917 revolution, the society nonetheless 
played an important part in pre-revolutionary public debates. In 1925, Vera Lebedeva described the society as 
follows: “[The Pirogov Society] organised a series of congresses where doctors made an effort to respond to 
the hot questions (bol’nye voprosy) of that time; thus, they discussed the abortion question, spoke out against 
the death penalty, and so on. During the dark ages of tsarism, this society played its part in awakening public 
opinion and mobilising the liberal circles of the intelligentsia against tsarism (Kommunistka, no. 1, 1925: 28, 
note 1).” Lebedeva, however, also reproached the Pirogov Society not only for being counterrevolutionary, but 
also for being unable to do anything but “passing liberal resolutions”.  
42
 The Russian Group of the International Union of Criminologists (Russkaya gruppa mezhdunarodnogo soyuza 
kriminalistov) was “an association of lawyers, legal scholars, and specialists in crime of varied political views 
(Engelstein 1992: 349).”  
43
 This convention will henceforth be referred to as “the Criminologists’ Convention in 1914”. 
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favour of decriminalisation, 20 voted against it (Otchet X obshchego sobraniya, 1916: 400).
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The Criminologists’ Convention especially received a lot of public attention. One observer 
remarked that the “February congress has become the center of public attention (...). In the 
daily press and the thick journals, at lectures and fashionable debates, the congress’s basic 
resolutions are discussed with unflagging passion (quoted in Engelstein 1991: 201).”  
 However, although the resolutions calling for decriminalisation received quite a lot of 
attention at the time, and although they – in the words of two Soviet authors – “had a 
significant influence on shaping Russian public opinion in this sphere (Vasilevskie 1924: 
81),” they did not bring about any changes in Russian abortion law prior to 1917.  “The 
government resisted on moral grounds. The most imaginative counter-measure it could offer 
was a Ministry of Justice proposal to increase the punishment of both mother and abortionist 
to three years imprisonment (Stites 1991: 181)” – a proposal that, admittedly, was not carried 
out in practice.   
 The liberal debaters of the pre-revolutionary years were also divided among 
themselves regarding the question of decriminalisation. By and large, the discourse 
participants can be divided into two main categories – a moderate wing seeking to reform, but 
still retain the existing abortion law, and a radical wing seeking complete legalisation. In the 
following section, the opinions of both these camps will be more closely examined.  
“Moderate” and “radical” abortion debaters 
 
While there was a general consensus that the contemporary abortion law had little or no 
preventive effect, and that the need for reforms in this sphere was becoming increasingly 
urgent, the pre-revolutionary abortion debaters had different views regarding how the abortion 
question should be solved. An essential dilemma was whether the discrepancy between law 
and practical life should be taken into consideration when dealing with the abortion problem, 
or whether the principle that abortion was a crime should remain independent of any popular 
attitudes. Debaters who were in favour of decriminalisation generally supported the former, 
while those who maintained that the abortion ban should be retained (but reformed) supported 
the latter. In other words, it was not the need for reforms, but rather the scope of these 
reforms, that was the controversial question. 
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 Henceforth referred to as Otchet… 
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The rest of this chapter will consist of two parts. The first will be dealing with the less 
abstract – and less controversial – questions surrounding the abortion issue at the time: 
abortion statistics; the contemporary explanations behind the “epidemic”; and the question of 
who had abortions. These aspects are presented first in order to make up the framework of the 
second section, which will concern the more “philosophical” aspects of, and suggested 
solutions to, the abortion problem. In this second part, the division between moderates and 
radicals becomes more visible. 
4.2 “Practical” questions 
4.2.1 The rising abortion rates 
 
Notwithstanding the difficulties in estimating abortion rates, the trend was clearly identifiable: 
abortion rates were rising, and the phenomenon appeared to be spreading across all 
demographic groups – in the cities as well as in the countryside (Shabad 1913: 215). 
For the decade of 1883-1893, the Imperial Gynaecological Institute in St. Petersburg 
had recorded an abortion rate of 2.6 percent (i.e. one abortion per 38.4 births). The average 
rate for 1904-1907, on the other hand, was reported to be 11.8 percent, indicating a near 
fivefold increase over the course of these years (Yakobson 1911: 88-90). Most of the cases 
registered at the Institute involved women seeking treatment for so-called incomplete 
abortions, a factor indicating – but not necessarily confirming – that the pregnancy had been 
terminated illegally.
45
 By comparison, the number of legal abortions performed at the Institute 
between 1904 and 1907 was quite low: 0.12 percent, or 12 abortions per 9,554 births 
(Povolotskaya-Vvedenskaya 1911: 206).
46
 
Other hospitals, both in St. Petersburg and elsewhere, noted a similar trend . In 1910, 
33 percent of all in-patients in the gynaecology ward of the Petropavlovskaya hospital in St. 
Petersburg were admitted because of abortions, a near threefold increase since 1906 (12 per 
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 According to Yakobson, determining whether an “incomplete abortion” was the result of an illegal operation 
could be a difficult task. Unless there was any kind of physical evidence pointing in that direction, e.g. if the 
uterus had been wounded or it was obvious that the woman had been poisoned, the exact cause of the 
abortion could be hard to establish (Yakobson 1911: 95). The same point is made by Lichkus (1912: 28). 
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 Yakobson estimated that two thirds of all abortions performed at the turn of the century – in Russia as well 
as abroad – were illegal (Yakobson 1911: 88). 
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cent) (Okinchits 1912: 53). Statistics from the city of Moscow and the province of Saratov 
showed the same tendency (Kuz’min 1912; Pirozhkova 1912).  
In addition to the statistical evidence, some debaters also relied on less direct 
indications: 
 
(…) the countless press advertisements (…) for shelters for pregnant women, where they are promised  
fast and reliable help, [and] for health centres where midwives and obstetricians perform a special kind  
of massage or give baths to “cure the common cold”, give evidence of a hidden abortion practice, just  
like the ads for “cultured female arrangers of marriage and other agreements”, models “posing for 
artists and amateurs”, “young ladies” turning to “nice elderly gentlemen” asking for a loan, and  
the like (…) bear evidence of prostitution and pandering (Chubinskii 1912: 71-72). 
 
M. L. Oleinik, a law student at St. Petersburg University, presented a similar view: “Abortion 
is, of course, most common in the big cities, especially in St. Petersburg. It is not a secret that 
the abundant newspaper ads for ‘shelters for pregnant women’ actually refer to abortion 
clinics (Oleinik 1913: 112).”  
4.2.2 Contemporary explanations behind the rising abortion rate: 
from “light-heartedness” to “iron necessity” 
 
The years following the 1905 revolution were marked by economic hardship and deteriorating 
public health. As a result, the frequency of spontaneous miscarriages was said to be 
increasing.
47
 However, the rising abortion rates were attributed not to spontaneous 
miscarriages, but to a dramatic upsurge in criminal abortions, and it was this trend that really 
needed to be explained. Why would so many women choose – or rather feel the need – to 
terminate their pregnancies?  
The explanations put forth at the time can be divided into different categories. Many 
debaters made a distinction between perpetual, universal explanatory factors (e.g. fearing the 
shame of being an unwed mother), and factors that were directly linked to contemporary 
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 “Apart from the ordinary [reasons], factors that have been influencing the rising numbers of abortions lately 
include: 1) the general rise in sickness rates, caused by worsening living conditions. The high living costs have 
led to overcrowding [and] malnutrition and have forced [people] to work more in order to deal with the high 
prices and satisfy the demands of modern life (as well as an inclination for luxury and expensive pleasures). 
Nowadays, you will rarely find a woman who is only a wife, mother, and housewife; she is also often a teacher, 
midwife, medical assistant, doctor, seamstress, cashier, secretary, saleswoman, servant, factory worker, etc., 
etc. Hence the overwork (pereutomlenie) and a whole range of illnesses (Chunikhin 1913: 91).” (Factor number 
2, according to Chunikhin, was induced abortions.)  
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Russian (and European) society, such as financial hardship. It was the latter group of motives, 
i.e. the present socioeconomic conditions, that was said to be causing the upsurge in criminal 
abortion. The following quote illustrates the reasoning behind this view: 
What is really the matter? Where is the main impulse behind the modern Russian woman’s persistent  
avoidance of childbirth? We are not going to dwell on reasons such as illegal cohabitation, pregnancy  
among widows or [unmarried] girls; these reasons have always existed and will always bring about a  
certain number of abortions. Apart from these reasons, apparently, there are also others [i.e. situational  
factors] that have played a big part in increasing the abortion rate in Russia (Pirozhkova 1912: 105). 
 
Apart from the distinction between universal and situational explanatory factors, a further 
distinction can be made between what can be defined as “individualistic” and 
“socioeconomic” motives for having an abortion. Although the dividing lines between these 
groups may be blurry, it is still a useful classification. “Individualistic concerns” were thought 
to be unrelated – or only peripherally related – to socioeconomic factors. The latter motives, 
on the other hand (including poverty, shame, and fear), were regarded as very serious.
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While many, if not all, debaters expressed a degree of sympathy for women who had 
abortions due to social hardship and/or desperation, they often had less respect for what they 
regarded as petty or self-centred motives. In the following section, we will take a closer look 
at both of these groups of motives. 
 “Individualistic” reasons for having an abortion 
 
The category of individualistic motives included a broad range of personal needs, wants and 
desires that were more or less unrelated to the given socioeconomic context. In the hierarchy 
of abortion motives, such concerns were generally regarded as the least respectable – 
especially if they were related to “trivial” or “petty” worries. In 1912, the legal scholar M. P. 
Chubinskii argued that 
 
[abortion] can be caused by various factors. On the one hand, these include light-mindedness  
(suetnost’); the desire to travel and have fun without being hindered, or for continuous pleasures; the  
fear of ruining one’s beauty or figure; an unwillingness to carry the complicated and serious  
responsibilities of motherhood; extreme selfishness (krainii égoizm); a wish to keep one’s fortune  
intact, i.e. to leave it to one child only, (…) and similar motives that cannot be ascribed to the  
ethical/social category (v kategoriyu étiko-sotsial’nykh)  (Chubinskii 1912: 87). 
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 Shame and fear can  be included in the “socioeconomic” category because they were seen as motives 
generated by society – a single mother would suffer, not only due to the inadequate maternity protection and 
financial difficulties of raising a child alone, but also because of society’s negative attitudes towards unwed 
mothers. 
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However, the motives in this category were generally assumed to play a secondary 
part in influencing abortion rates.
49
 First, this was due to the fact that they were considered 
universal – selfishness, for instance, was a human character trait that could hardly be 
attributed to modern society alone. Second, they were generally regarded as “upper-class” 
motives: given the safe, discrete and reliable medical help that was available to wealthier 
women, it was assumed that only they would be inclined to have abortions for “trivial” 
reasons. Not only were they able to pay “experienced people” (doctors) to terminate their 
pregnancies under safer conditions, they were also able to get help at home if they did suffer 
complications afterwards. This way, they would not have to go to the hospital, where it might 
be discovered that they had had an illegal abortion. Thus, both the risk of complications and 
the risk of exposure was smaller for these women (Lichkus 1912: 47; Gernet 1916: 10).
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Seeing as poor women – i.e. the majority – would have to make do with whatever help 
they could obtain in such cases, it was presumed that they would need more compelling 
incentives for having an abortion.  
 Related to the category of individualistic concerns, but more specific to the Russian 
situation, was a view expressed by Dr. O. Pirozhkova at the Fourth Congress of Russian 
Gynaecologists and Obstetricians in December 1911. In her opinion, the years following the 
1905 revolution were marked by moral decline (upadok nravstvennosti) and decadence, a 
phenomenon that was much debated during these years (Stites 1991). These factors, she 
argued, had also contributed to the abortion epidemic:  
 
This [moral decline] is not a new phenomenon. It has been repeated throughout history: after a  
[revolutionary] upsurge, there is a reaction. There is a greater interest in the sexual question. A  
similar phenomenon could also be seen in French society after the revolution; our Russian  
society had to go through the very same thing. The literature of these years confirms this theory  
best of all: if there had been no demand for that sort of literature, then there would have been  
no supply either. This kind of interest in the sexual question resulted in pregnancies that  
needed to be terminated. (…) In this way, the literature of 1906-1907 was one of the reasons  
why abortion numbers were rising during this period of time (Pirozhkova 1912: 106). 
 
The “literature of these years” – known for dealing with sexual themes – has been mentioned 
earlier. Apart from Pirozhkova, however, very few debaters made such a distinct connection 
between decadence and rising abortion rates.  
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 “Of course, there are ladies who have abortions because they want to preserve their body shape, but they 
are exceptions, and they are not the ones who end up in court (Gernet 1916: 241).” 
50
 The sources do not mention whether these women also had better access to contraceptives. 
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Finally, among the discourse participants of these years, Yakob Vygodskii  (1913),
51
 a 
doctor working in a Jewish hospital in Vilnius, stands out by emphasising socioeconomic and 
individualistic motives alike. According to him, abortion resulted from the combination of 
women’s sexual drive, on the one hand, and the social conditions that required fertility 
regulation on the other (Vygodskii 1913a: 88). In addition, he mentioned three factors that he 
believed had furthered the spread of illegal abortions over the last 25 years: “1) abortionists’ 
success [regarding] abortion techniques and asepsis, 2) the fact that the market price for 
abortion has fallen, 3) the fact that the level of professionalism among abortionists has been 
improved (medical assistants, midwives, doctors) (Vygodskii 1913b: 375).” 
Nevertheless, despite the fact that there might be singular factors – such as the alleged 
drop in market prices for abortion – at hand, most debaters placed the main emphasis on 
broader socioeconomic conditions. The following section will examine the factors that were 
said to be the most important explanation behind the abortion epidemic. 
 “Socioeconomic” reasons for having an abortion: the burden of “iron 
necessity” (gnet zheleznoi neobkhodimosti) 
 
Illegal abortion, infanticide and the use of contraceptive devices are, medically speaking, not  
an illness, but merely symptoms of an illness (Lichkus 1913: 84-85). 
 
Poverty and shame, and fear of the inevitable disgrace of having a child outside of wedlock,  
play the decisive and leading part (…). This is such a banal truth that I do not want to keep  
your attention on it (Gernet 1916: 241).  
 
While speaking at the Fourth congress of Russian Gynaecologists and Obstetricians in 1911, 
Lazar Lichkus – the director of a maternity clinic in St. Petersburg – argued that criminal 
abortion should be regarded as “an epidemic social disease” that was caused by profound 
social inequalities (Lichkus 1912: 37). If unhealthy social conditions could be regarded as a 
universal motive for having abortions, there was little doubt that “now, as life is getting 
                                                 
51 Vygodskii was one out of nine physicians speaking at the 1913 Pirogov Society congress session on abortion. 
According to Engelstein (1991: 192), Vygodskii called “for outright decriminalization [of abortion]” at this 
congress. Engelstein, however, seems to have misunderstood his argument: while Vygodskii did call for 
reduced penalties for abortion, he did not think abortion should be legalised altogether. “Doctors, more than 
anyone else, should fight for (…) the sacred rights of the foetus, rights that are being trampled on everywhere. 
Although it would be highly desirable to soften the penalties for women who have illegal abortions, legalising 
this operation would nevertheless be inconceivable, because that would signify a return to barbaric times, or 
even to savagery, when the life of the  foetus had no value whatsoever (Vygodskii 1913b: 376).” 
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harder and harder, [this reason] is bound to exert an even greater influence on abortion rates 
(ibid.: 38).” A similar opinion was expressed by M. P. Chubinskii at the same congress:  
 
[W]e will have to admit that the reasons behind the given phenomenon are extremely diverse, but an  
enormous amount of them are rooted in the bad conditions of the contemporary socioeconomic system  
in general, and women’s position in particular; in our society’s narrow-minded and biased views (often  
closely related to old prejudices), and in other similar reasons (Chubinskii 1912: 84).   
 
The number of working women was rising, but the lack of welfare measures for working 
mothers meant that they were likely to lose their jobs if they became pregnant. While 
unemployment could cause enough difficulties for a married woman, it would be downright 
disastrous if she was single (Chubinskii 1912: 84-85; Gernet 1916: 242). Morover, living 
costs were on the increase: 
 
After 1905-1906, prices have gone up by 10-15 percent, especially in Moscow. Before the strike  
movement commenced,
52
 families with three or four children could exist in one way or another; but  
ever since the living costs started rising, such families have been become downright destitute (nachali  
polozhitel’no nishchenstvovat’). Naturally, under such circumstances, every newborn was a huge  
burden. This reason, i.e. the financial crisis that followed in the wake of the strikes, is confirmed more  
than anything by the [abortion statistics]. Almost every table shows a sharply rising curve in 1906  
(Pirozhkova 1912: 105). 
 
“Like an iron law,” noted Brodskii (1914: 29), “the economic conditions do not allow the 
majority of the proletariat to start a family. (…) Statistics show that along with the worsening 
economic conditions, the number of abortions increase every year.” 
According to Chubinskii (1912), this situation affected the marriage rate, too. Rising 
living costs meant that less people could afford to get married, or they had to marry at a later 
stage of life. This view is supported by Gernet (1916). As a growing number of unmarried 
women now would have to “satisfy their sexual instincts [outside of] wedlock,” they were 
also more likely to face the abortion dilemma at some point during their lifetime (Chubinskii 
1912: 86). 
In addition, there was the issue of gender inequality: it was the woman, not the man, 
who would have to pay the price of having sexual relations. “[T]he law (…) places the full 
burden of the sexual relationship and its consequences on the woman, while showing 
considerable leniency towards the man, even when it is obvious that he was the seducer 
(Chubinskii 1912: 85).” Furthermore: 
 
[Under Russian law] it is very hard for an unmarried mother to obtain an acknowledgement of paternity  
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 Pirozhkova is referring to the strikes and the social unrest following in the wake of the 1905 revolution. 
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from the child’s father. Whereas the “recherche de la paternité” is protected by law in England, it is 
very difficult, almost impossible, for an unmarried woman in Russia to [do the same] (Pirozhkova 1912:  
106). 
 
Who, then, were the women behind the statistics? In the following section, we will look at 
how this question was answered by the participants in the pre-revolutionary discourse. 
4.2.3 Who had abortions?  
 
In the early 20
th
 century, as has already been mentioned, the phenomenon of abortion was said 
to be common among all social groups: 
 
(…) the use of abortion is becoming increasingly widespread; moreover, it is becoming democratised.  
Whereas [abortion] used to be the privilege of the upper strata of society, it is now also widely practiced  
by the lower classes, in the cities as well as in the countryside (Shabad 1913: 215).  
 
Relying on German sources, Gernet (1916: 241) distinguished between two main categories 
of abortion-seeking women: unmarried girls/women on the one hand, and slightly older, 
married women with several children on the other.  
According to statistics from the Imperial Gynaecological Institute for the period 1904-
1907, nearly 80 percent of the women admitted with abortion complications were married. 
Unmarried women, it was presumed, were more likely to hide their abortions and stay away 
from hospitals. Furthermore, the 1,016 women in question
53
 were distributed across the 
following professions: 
 
 Housewives – 633 
 Servants – 150 (12 of them were laundresses) 
 Educated women (litsa, zhivushchie intelligentnym trudom) (students, teachers, doctors etc.) – 105 
 Craftswomen – 82 
 Unskilled labourers (chernorabochie) – 29 
 Factory workers – 14 
 Wealthy women (iz material’no obespechennogo klassa) – 3 (Yakobson 1911: 94-95) 
 
The number of unskilled labourers and factory workers registered with abortions was 
relatively low. While the author took this as an indication that “hard work is a quite rare cause 
of abortion (ibid.: 95),” another explanation might be the fact that these women were more 
likely to have abortions that went unregistered by the clinic. Brodskii (1914: 29) noted that 
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 As it could be difficult to determine whether abortion complications resulted from an illegal operation or 
simply a spontaneous miscarriage, these figures do not distinguish between spontaneous and induced 
abortions. 
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the majority of abortions were obtained by women from the middle and lower classes. 
Regarding the other groups,  
 
the large number of abortions among middle-class housewives (lits srednego dostatka,  
zanimayushchikhsya domashnim khozyaistvom), among servants and educated women suggests that  
their pregnancies have been terminated illegally. The small number of upper-class women admitted to  
hospital is explained by the fact that these patients usually get medical help at home (Yakobson 1911:  
95).    
 
Yakobson does not mention whether or not these upper-class women generally had fewer 
abortions (e.g. due to a better access to birth control measures). Whether this was the case, 
however, would be hard to establish – statistics are few, not least because wealthier women 
for the most part had abortions that went unregistered. Nevertheless, Yakobson seems to have 
presumed that the abortion rates among these women were higher than the Institute’s statistics 
would indicate.  
 These “practical” aspects of the abortion debates may serve as a framework for the 
second part of this chapter, in which the more complex “philosophical” side of the question 
will be discussed.  
4.3 Suggested solutions to the abortion problem 
 
All participants in the pre-revolutionary abortion discourse, “moderates” as well as “radicals”, 
agreed that the current legislation was ineffective. The abortion law was not only considered 
outdated; in the words of Chubinskii (1912: 70), it was “notable for being extraordinarily 
rigid and remote from life (otlichaetsya chrezvychainoi pryamolineinost’yu i otorvannost’yu 
ot zhizni).” As indicated by the increasing abortion rates, the general public did not seem to 
care about the fact that abortion was prohibited: “Evidently, there are life circumstances that 
sometimes outweigh the law. (…) there are few laws that would arouse less sympathy among 
the general public than the law against abortion (Lichkus 1912: 36-37; 44; my italics).”  
Increasing penalties was considered unlikely to have any preventive effect: if a woman 
was willing to risk her life and health in order to terminate her pregnancy, then the threat of 
criminal punishment would not be enough to dissuade her from having the operation. 
 
(…) there is no punishment that will be strong enough to [discourage] a woman who, under the  
influence of need, fear, and shame, suppresses her natural maternal instinct and lets herself go  
through with an unnatural operation. There is no point in threatening a woman with jail when she fears 
her future child more than imprisonment, illness and death (Povolotskaya-Vvedenskaya 1911: 208). 
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While the need for reforming the existing abortion legislation was universally acknowledged, 
not everyone was in favour of decriminalisation. Before addressing the debates on the 
question of legalisation, however, one of the core issues that seemed to determine the 
debaters’ approach to this subject – the status of the foetus – should be discussed. This subject 
was given a lot of attention in the pre-revolutionary discourse, and it was an issue that aroused 
heated debates among both groups of discourse participants. Thus, this question deserves 
particular attention. 
4.3.1 The status of the foetus: a core issue 
 
By and large, there were two main views on the foetus: One – that it had an inherent value 
and thus should be protected (and that abortion, consequently, was murder). Two – that the 
foetus belonged to the mother just like any other part of her body, and that it was up to the 
mother to decide whether it should be born or not. (There was, however, general consensus 
that if the pregnancy endangered the life of the mother, her life should always be given the top 
priority.) 
The view of the “moderates”: the foetus’s life should be protected 
 
The explanatory note to Article 466 in the Russian Criminal Code
54
 stated that the main focus 
of Russian abortion law was to protect the “conceived, but still unborn foetus”:55 
 
The object of the crime is the foetus (zarodysh), i.e. the conceived, but still unborn foetus (plod  
zachatyi, no ne rozhdennyi) that lives by (…) [sharing] its mother’s circulatory system. It is  
closely connected to the mother’s body, but at the same time, it has an existence of its own.  
The foetus is protected from the moment of its conception to the moment of its birth. The difference  
between foetus animatus and foetus non animatus, established by canonical law, as well as the medical  
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 Article 466 stated: “A person who performs an abortion will be punished: by imprisonment in a house of 
correction (ispravitel’nyi dom). If the abortion is performed by a doctor or a midwife, then (…) the defendant 
should be sentenced and lose the right to practice [his/her profession] for a period of one to five years. If the 
abortion is performed without the pregnant woman’s permission, then the defendant will be punished with up 
to eight years of hard labour (Povolotskaya-Vvedenskaya 1911: 191).”
 
Although the Criminal Code did not 
include any articles on medical abortion, the latter was de facto allowed if the pregnancy threatened the 
mother’s life and health (Povolotskaya-Vvedenskaya 1911: 192-193).
 
 
55
 In the Russian language, the words zarodysh and plod are both used to denote the foetus in a neutral way. 
(Plod literally means “fruit”, but in a figurative sense; e.g. plodotvornyi – “fruitful”; besplodnyi – “infertile”.)
 
 
53 
 
difference between a foetus that is incapable of living outside of the womb (…) and a foetus that is  
capable of this (…), has no influence on the juridical basis of this crime (dlya yuridicheskogo  
obosnovaniya prestupnogo deyaniya nikakogo znacheniya ne imeet) (The explanatory note, quoted in  
Povolotskaya-Vvedenskaya 1911: 191-192, my italics). 
 
Consequently, abortion was defined as a crime against the future human being, not as an 
assault on the woman’s health. 
Moderate discourse participants generally supported this position. Lazar Lichkus held 
the view that “abortion [was] undoubtedly a violation of the foetus’s rights, at every stage of 
the pregnancy (Lichkus 1912: 31).” He expressed a similar view at the Criminologists’ 
Convention in February 1914: “From a medical point of view, every foetus has to be regarded 
as a human life that is beginning to take form (dolzhno rassmatrivat’ (...), kak 
zarozhdayushchuyusya zhizn’) (Lichkus, in Otchet..., 1916: 305).” 
Lyudvig Okinchits (a junior professor) regarded abortion as a form of murder, 
regardless of motives:  
 
In my opinion, regarding (…) the question of whether abortion is murder (ubiistvo vnutriutrobnogo  
ploda) and whether it as such should be subject to (…) criminal penalty, there can be no doubt:  
Regardless of motives, termination of pregnancy will always remain [a form of] murder (vsegda  
ostanetsya ubiistvom), because the life of the foetus, or the future human being, begins with the joining  
of an egg cell and a sperm cell (s momenta soedineniya zhenskoi i muzhskoi semyannoi kletki). While  
it might be possible to argue against this view from a legal standpoint, (…) from a biological standpoint,  
life begins at conception (Okinchits 1912: 53-54).  
 
The question, according to Okinchits, was a matter of deciding when this kind of murder was 
acceptable, i.e. in which cases it would be inevitable and sensible (tselesoobrazno) to go 
through with such an act. 
At the Criminologists’ Convention in 1914, there were two main presentations on the 
abortion issue, each representing different views on the foetus. The first was by the 
sociologist Mikhail Gernet, who was in favour of decriminalisation; the second was by 
Evgenii Kulisher, a St. Petersburg lawyer.
56
 Kulisher considered it possible to regard the 
foetus as a legal subject, and he thought that abortion should be prohibited (with room for 
exceptions) as a general principle. However, he did not necessarily agree that the abortion ban 
should be based on the premise of protecting the foetus’s interests. Rather, the abortion law 
should be retained on principle due to a general respect for human life – including the life of 
unborn human beings (Kulisher 1916: 245-246). Another participant at the convention, 
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 ”Fourteen people spoke on each side of the question – thirteen jurists (including one woman) and one 
physician (also a woman) for decriminalization, ten jurists (including one woman) and four physicians (all male) 
against (Engelstein 1991: 200).” 
 54 
 
Bryukhatov, argued that “the foetus is a [human] life, an organised entity, that has every right 
to life, to further existence (Bryukhatov, in Otchet..., 1916: 283).” Consequently, abortion was 
a form of murder (umershchvlenie).  
The legal scholar M. Isaev brought up the subject of when, i.e. at what stage of 
pregnancy, abortion should be allowed:  
 
[Gernet, the speaker who supported legalisation] did not dwell on a question that, undoubtedly, should  
be a focal point for everyone who is in favour of decriminalisation: (…) Is it all right to perform an  
abortion at any stage of pregnancy, or does he only allow for it to be performed during the first months,  
and not during the fifth, sixth, or seventh month, when the foetus could be able to live outside the  
womb? (…) This question was definitely not clarified by the speaker, and neither was it clarified by his  
first opponents (…), but I nevertheless want to hear a clear and definite answer to this (Isaev, in  
Otchet..., 1916: 281).  
 
This line of reasoning reflects a common problem in pre-revolutionary discussions on the 
abortion question: determining the limits between the “respectable” and “non-respectable” 
being. Those who favoured restrictive abortion laws, like Isaev, sometimes argued that their 
opponents were too vague in the question of late abortions, i.e. that they failed to specify 
whether abortion should be allowed at any stage of pregnancy or not. At the other end of the 
spectrum, radical debaters could argue that if the foetus could be regarded as a potential 
human life, then so could the egg and the sperm – thus, establishing any definite limits 
between the “defendable” and the “non-defendable” object was very difficult.  
The view of the “radicals”: the foetus is not a person – abortion is not murder 
 
According to I. V. Grin (1914), a doctor who participated at the Twelfth Congress of the 
Pirogov Society in 1913, it was “absurd” to speak of the murder of a future human being: “As 
a legal scholar, I understand the principle of selling a future harvest, but [to speak of the] 
killing of a future human being is, in my opinion, pure nonsense (Grin 1914: 30).” The foetus, 
he said, was incomparable to human beings, as it did not have an independent life; it belonged 
to the mother, it was a part of her body, and terminating a pregnancy was no different from 
amputating other body parts. He quoted G. Zak, another Russian debater of the pre-
revolutionary years, with the following words:  
 
“Generally, the life of the foetus is not only impossible to identify with the life of a human being, it is  
also incomparable to it. (...) on the first stages of its development, a foetus bears resemblance to a fish  
or an amphibian, and after that to a primitive mammal. The foetus lacks self-consciousness as well as  
independent life. (...) The most important organs of the higher animals – the brains and the lungs – are  
paralysed. Its ability to live is inconceivable outside of the womb, at least during the first 28 weeks.  
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Thus, it is impossible to say that a foetus is a human being, just like it is impossible to say that an egg is  
a hen (quoted in Grin 1914: 34-35, my italics).” 
 
At a later point during his presentation, Grin referred to the foetus as a “worthless, lifeless, 
useless lump” (“nichtozhnyi, bezdushnyi, nikomu nenuzhnyi komok”) that the pregnant woman 
should have the right to deal with as she saw fit (Grin 1914: 39).   
 In his 1914 monograph Abortion from a medical and socioeconomic viewpoint, V. A. 
Brodskii, a doctor who had participated at the Eleventh Congress of the Pirogov Society in 
April 1910, repeated one of his main conclusions from this congress: “(...) before week six, 
the foetus – compared to a grown-up, conscious human being – represents an almost 
insignificant, primitive mass (Brodskii 1914: 42).” This conclusion was based on his 
knowledge of embryology (a subject that he dealt with at length in this monograph).   
 Mikhail Gernet, one of the two keynote speakers at the Criminologists’ Convention in 
February 1914,
57
 did not say very much about the foetus as such – except that he did not 
consider “the unborn” (“nerozhdennyi”) to be a human being yet (Gernet 1916: 244). 
Consequently, in his view, abortion was not murder. Moreover, in an argument resembling 
Grin’s, he said that “at certain stages of its development, the human embryo can hardly be 
distinguished from other animals – sheep, dogs, monkeys, pigs (Gernet 1916: 244).” 
 Several of the opponents at the Criminologists’ Convention agreed with Gernet’s 
position. The first to speak out, Fuks, argued against the moderate Evgenii Kulisher (the 
second keynote speaker): 
 
[The idea is that the] embryo is a future human being, and that the respect that we have for human life  
should extend to the life that is still [in the process of] maturing. This is the standpoint of E. M. Kulisher  
(…). This thought is the last refuge for those who defend the principle of banning abortions, and I allow  
myself to dwell on it. (…) When talking about respect for the embryo, the future human being, E. M.  
should have included [the notion of] showing respect for the newly fertilised egg. Following this logic,  
he should have talked about the same kind of respect with regard to sperm, admitting that every  
voluntary or involuntary ejaculation of semen is a crime (Fuks, in Otchet..., 1916: 272-273).  
 
Lyubov’ Gorovits, a female physician, likened the foetus to a “parasite”: 
 
From a biological point of view, it does not seem possible to equate abortion to infanticide. The  
fertilisation of a cell, the existence of the foetus, is only a stage towards potential life, a life that is  
slumbering within each sex cell (v kazhdoi polovoi kletke), [a stage] towards the baby’s first breath. The  
very close connection between the foetus and its mother means that the foetus, biologically speaking, is  
a parasite in its mother’s body (Gorovits, in Otchet..., 1916: 294).    
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 Gernet, a socialist, “stayed on to become a respected Soviet legal sociologist (Engelstein 1991: 202, note 
81).” 
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Gillerson, another opponent, thought that “if a woman has a right to remove a tooth that 
causes her pain, then (…) she also has the right to remove a foetus that threatens her with 
disgrace and impoverishment (Gillerson, in Otchet..., 1916: 314).” 
To summarise, the debaters had differing views on the status on the foetus. Their 
views on the question of legalisation were equally divided. 
4.3.2 Legal reforms or complete decriminalisation? 
The moderate view: the abortion law should be retained, but reformed 
 
According to moderate debaters, abortion should remain prohibited as a matter of principle – 
regardless of outward circumstances. Some argued that the question of decriminalisation of 
abortion – or any other crime, for that matter – was controversial for judicial reasons. Did the 
apparent neglect for a given law mean that the law itself should be abolished? Moreover, a 
number of moderate debaters were concerned with the possible consequences of legalisation, 
not least psychologically: decriminalisation, according to some, might lead to declining 
morals.  
In the following, an outline of these debaters’ most frequent arguments against 
complete legalisation – and their suggested legal reforms – will be presented. 
 
The discrepancy between law and life: a reason to reform, but not to decriminalise 
 
M. P. Chubinskii (1912) did not think that abortion should be legalised as a pragmatic 
response to contemporary social circumstances. He protested against the commonly voiced 
notion that decriminalisation would reduce the discrepancy between existing law and public 
attitudes towards abortion – this discrepancy, he said, was not as great as his radical 
counterparts would like to think. Among the lower classes, according to him, abortion was 
considered a grave sin, bordering on murder. Although he acknowledged that there were 
different views among “educated people and intellectuals,” he did not accept the radicals’ 
“categorical generalisations” regarding the popular attiudes towards the abortion question 
(Chubinskii 1912: 76-77). Furthermore, Chubinskii rejected another common argument in 
favour of legalisation – that abortion should be legalised as a preventive measure against 
infanticide:  
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First, a direct and complete causal relationship between the number of abortions and the number of 
infanticides has not been established; (…) second, the standpoint that a lesser evil can be approved in 
order to fight a greater one is hardly acceptable. In that case, we would also have to approve of [petty] 
theft in order to fight robbery, (…) approve of seduction in order to prevent rape, etc. (Chubinskii 1912: 
78-79, italics in original). 
 
Neither did the upsurge in abortion rates, nor the fact that the law thus proved to be futile, 
provide sufficient reason for decriminalisation. While there were a lot of laws that were hard 
to enforce, this did not mean that the laws themselves should be abolished: 
 
First of all, there is a number of [criminal] acts that are committed very frequently, but that are rarely 
brought to court due to a lack of evidence and a broad range of other reasons. Examples of this include 
cases of poisoning, infanticide, fraud, falsification of food products, smuggling, homosexuality and 
others. (…) there are a lot of laws that prove to be ineffective, (…) however, this only means that it is 
necessary to lessen the distance between law and life and make an effort to increase [the law’s] 
importance; it does not mean that all repressions should be abolished in such cases, i.e. [that one should] 
surrender to the growing evil (Chubinskii 1912: 79-80). 
 
These opinions were explicitly supported by Kulisher (1916: 12), who also expressed the 
opinion that “disgraceful crimes can not be legalised simply because there are cases in which 
they can be excused (Kulisher 1916: 391).” Some of his fellow participants at the 
Criminologists’ convention had similar opinions. Zhizhilenko (in Otchet..., 1916: 310) argued 
that “acquittals (…) have never yet served as an incentive for abolishing penal measures.” 
Zarudnyi (in Otchet..., 1916: 357) argued that although the law should make room for 
individual considerations (e.g. the compelling circumstances behind a woman’s decision to 
have an abortion), such considerations alone were not sufficient to decriminalise abortion as a 
general principle.  
 
Legalisation and its potential consequences 
 
While recognising the discrepancy between the formal law and actual abortion practices, 
some discourse participants feared that decriminalisation would increase the abortion rates 
even more. Thus, they regarded the abortion ban as an important preventive measure – if only 
as a matter of principle, because the alternative seemed worse. 
 Chubinskii (1912) emphasised the need to have respect for human life, including the 
life of the unborn. While modern legislation should be based on secular values, ethical 
considerations had a social importance that should not be underestimated (Chubinskii 1912: 
81-82). Certain vital interests, such as the respect for human life, should not be undermined, 
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but rather be promoted by lawmakers in a modern and civilised state. If abortion was 
decriminalised, it would look like the state endorsed the procedure; this, in turn, might give 
hesitant people an additional push towards having the operation – something which might 
lead to a further upsurge in the abortion rates. 
 
I am far from exaggerating the importance of (…) criminal punishment as a means of crime  
 prevention. I do not think [the threat of repressions] should be the main focus (tsentr tyazhesti) in the  
 fight against crime. However, abolishing such a threat is not a way of fighting; rather, it would mean  
 surrendering, renouncing even the modest results that the principle of general crime prevention can –  
 and does – provide (Chubinskii 1912: 82). 
 
Chubinskii argued that there should be room for individual considerations when assessing 
sentences – not only the objective, but also the subjective aspects of the given crime should be 
taken into account. A similar opinion was expressed by Kulisher (1916: 248). Kulisher did not 
think that every individual who was charged with an illegal abortion should be punished – he 
was only in favour of retaining the principle of prohibition.  
 
 I would express this standpoint with the following words: “The foetus is a future human being, and our  
respect for human life also extends to the life that is still in the process of maturing. This  
respect for human life, even the life that is still unformed, is reflected in the criminal law in the  
 form of penal measures against abortion. In this lies the significant moral importance [of these  
 measures]. Thus, by decriminalising abortion, lawmakers would violate (…) ethical [principles] that  
 have been established over the centuries. Furthermore, instead of encouraging and strengthening the  
 concept of the sacredness of human life, [lawmakers] would single-handedly close down one of the  
 sources nurturing this (…) notion (Kulisher 1916: 248). 
 
In other words, there should be made room for individual considerations, but the principle 
underlying the abortion ban – the respect for human life – should not be violated. The 
approach to the foetus, said Kulisher (1916: 248), was a reflection of this kind of respect, just 
like “sunrays in a small drop of water” was a reflection of the sun. Legalisation of any kind of 
act, he argued, led to changes in people’s psychological nature: decriminalisation did not only 
mean that something was allowed; it was also a signal indicating that it was morally 
justifiable (Kulisher 1916: 250). The consequences of such a psychological change would 
have to be taken into account if abortion was to be legalised. In his final remarks at the 
convention, in response to his opponents, Kulisher warned about the grave consequences 
decriminalisation could bring about: 
 Of course, it is not the criminal law that keeps us from being swept away by the waves of immorality  
(not in the narrow sense of sexual morality, but in the broader sense of the word, i.e. (…) respect for  
other people’s lives), but if you remove as much as a single brick from the building of penal law, then  
the whole building, the entire dike, the whole wall will collapse. And this seemingly insignificant act  
would be able to create a moral Niagara (Kulisher 1916: 394-395).    
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Kulisher was not the only participant at the Criminologists’ Convention who worried about 
the moral consequences of decriminalisation. Shiraev (in Otchet..., 1916: 366) argued that the 
moral effect of legalisation would be serious. Moreover, “[m]oral values that have been 
established over the centuries can not be abandoned that easily.” Lawmakers, as educators of 
the general public, should encourage a basic respect for the value of human life. 
Consequently, seeing as decriminalisation of abortion was problematic from a moral 
as well as a legal point of view, and since legalisation might lead to unforeseen consequences, 
moderate debaters called for retaining the law as a general principle while introducing a 
number of reforms.  
 
Suggested legal reforms 
 
The suggested reforms of three of the most prominent moderates taking part in the pre-
revolutionary abortion discourse – Lazar Lichkus (1912), Mikhail Chubinskii (1912) and 
Evgenii Kulisher (1916) – will be presented in the following. 
 
We want to take into account the offender’s personality and the crime’s biological roots, roots that are  
hidden in this personality; we are striving towards an understanding of the social factors behind the  
different categories of criminal acts; we do not defend revenge, but a sensible protection of social  
interests by fighting crime as constructively as possible (Chubinskii 1912: 83). 
 
At the Fourth Congress of Russian Gynaecologists and Obstetricians in 1911, Lazar Lichkus 
argued that under the given socioeconomic conditions, there were social factors that were 
compelling enough to justify abortion. Apart from certain individualistic concerns (e.g. the 
desire to have fun), some social motivations were almost absolute (e.g. poverty). 
Consequently, a legal abortion could in some cases be the lesser evil. The state, Lichkus 
argued, had no right to demand that a woman give birth to a child that was the result of 
seduction or rape – in that case, the state should also take on the full responsibility for her 
baby (Lichkus 1912: 42). 
Doctors, however, should not be alone in deciding whether a woman should be 
granted an abortion. Lichkus quoted another author, Mathes, who called for the organisation 
of special abortion commissions:  
 [Mathes] considers it unacceptable for a doctor (…) to decide whether an abortion should be granted for  
social reasons. In order to do this (…), a special commission should be organised, [and this  
commission] would then solve the case and send the pregnant woman to an establishment especially  
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designed for this purpose. Only then, he says, when [abortion] is no longer connected to personal  
opinions and private interests, and when it is performed openly, (…) the sacredness of the foetus’s life  
will not be undermined by [an abortion for social reasons] (Lichkus 1912: 42). 
 
Lichkus seemed to support Mathes in this. However, in order to prevent any abuse of the 
system, he argued that abortion for social reasons should only be performed in state-owned or 
public medical centres, and not in private clinics. While Lichkus believed that the women 
should be exempt from punishment, he opposed total decriminalisation: doctors who broke 
the rules, as well as underground abortionists, should be penalised (Lichkus 1912: 48). In this 
way, it might be possible to reduce the negative consequences of illegal abortions and limit 
the number of underground abortionists. 
 Chubinskii (1912) insisted that the law should make room for individual 
considerations. He suggested three different categories of abortion: 
1. Lawful abortion (abort pravomernyi). This category would include abortion for  
medical reasons, as well as cases in which the woman was raped; if the sexual intercourse 
took place at a moment where she was “unconscious”; if she was a minor; if she was mentally 
ill or mentally handicapped; or for other similar reasons. In such cases, according to 
Chubinskii, the interests of the foetus would have to be sacrificed for the sake of individual 
freedom.  
2. Unlawful, but non-punishable abortion (abort nepravomernyi, no nenakazuemyi). 
Including cases where the sexual intercourse was voluntary, but where it turned out that the 
father of the child was mentally ill, had a venereal disease (e.g. syphilis), or suffered from 
other conditions that might affect the child. Moreover, this category would encompass cases 
where the woman had to “choose” between abortion, suicide or death. 
3. Punishable abortion, but punishable according to the principles of a broad  
individualisation, with room for a considerable softening of penalties (Chubinskii 1912: 88-
92). 
 In other words, Chubinskii proposed a very tolerant abortion legislation, where 
individual concerns were taken seriously. The maximum penalties, however, should remain 
high for preventive reasons (Chubinskii 1912: 90-91). Moreover, at the 1914 Criminologists’ 
Convention, Chubinskii said the following: 
 
 We have to find a solution; we need reforms, especially reforms based on the Norwegian pattern, where  
 the male seducer is punished if he leaves the pregnant woman in a helpless situation, thus pushing her  
 towards abortion. Generally, we need to broaden women’s rights, and [we need a] broad system  of  
 preventive measures that [include an improved system of] maternity protection. Regarding penal  
 measures, as earlier mentioned, we need a broad individualisation (Chubinskii, in Otchet..., 1916: 377). 
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Kulisher (1916: 16) explicitly supported Chubinskii’s reform suggestions (no. 1-3). He also 
elaborated on the subject of the responsibility of third parties, i.e. the medical personnel. 
Regarding third parties, said Kulisher, the main priority should be the woman’s interests, her 
life and health, even when she had the operation voluntarily. However, according to Kulisher, 
only persons without the appropriate medical education should be punished (but then 
severely). Trained physicians should only be punished in exceptional cases (Kulisher 1916: 
17-18):  
 
[It is] precisely in order to reduce the harmful and dangerous [sides] of abortion that [we need to] 
remove the obstacles that prevent people with a medical education from performing them. (...) the 
doctor should be exempt from penalties if he decided to perform the abortion in view of the pregnant 
woman’s condition, if he honestly believed that the consequences would be fatal if he refused (ibid.). 
 
 To summarise, even the moderates who opposed a total legalisation of abortion 
wanted to introduce significant legal reforms, including a considerable softening of penalties 
and room for individual concerns. Consequently, they were not really that far away from their 
“radical” counterparts as it might seem. 
The radical view: abortion should be completely decriminalised 
 
Thus, on the one hand, we have an enormous number of illegal abortions, several times higher than the  
number of other crimes. On the other hand, there is no doubt that just 1: 10,000 of these crimes are 
actually brought to court. This fact (…) inevitably leads to the question: 1) Is it sensible (…) to  
prosecute such crimes? 2) Retention of legal norms that – in practice – can be violated by anyone who  
wants, without fear of punishment, reduces the authority of criminal law. Retention of such a norm  
undermines the respect for our juridical system, destroys the faith in [the principle of] retribution and  
general justice, and thus leads to the demoralisation of society (Oleinik 1913: 113). 
 
While moderate discourse participants thought that the abortion ban should be retained in 
principle, as a matter of respect for human life, radical discourse participants disagreed that 
this principle should outweigh other concerns. First, as we have seen, the “radicals” generally 
placed less emphasis on the value of the foetus. Second, they did not necessarily agree that 
legalisation represented a moral problem.  
The combination of these two factors – a lesser focus on the foetus, as well a different 
interpretation of what was “morally correct” and what was not – helped to support their 
argument that the discrepancy between law and life in this question was enough to justify a 
complete decriminalisation. This section will focus on the opinions of three “radicals”, 
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because their views are representative for the “radical camp” as a whole: Grin (1914), 
Brodskii (1914) and Gernet (1916). 
I. V. Grin, who participated at the Twelfth Congress of the Pirogov Society in 1913, 
argued that abortion was a crime from a legal standpoint only – it was not a moral crime 
(Grin 1914: 14). The general public, he argued, was tolerant towards abortions. Grin 
explicitly disagreed with the moderate Chubinskii on a couple of accounts. First: 
 
The touching unanimity of [modern] nations regarding the prosecution of abortions, [the unanimity] that  
professor Chubinskii
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 talked about with such delight at the last congress of gynaecologists, can be  
explained very simply: it is a result of blind imitation. And I am convinced that once one of these states  
abolishes the penalties for abortion, the others will follow suit (…) (Grin 1914: 14-15). 
 
Chubinskii, both at the Fourth Congress of Gynaecologists in 1911 and at the later 
Criminologists’ Convention in 1914, seemed to support his arguments against legislation by 
referring to the common traits of global abortion laws. Grin did not accept this line of 
reasoning. On the contrary, Grin seemed to reject the notion that modern abortion legislation 
had any substance at all.  
 Furthermore, some radical debaters suspected that the abortion ban was based on 
motives that were far less noble than they might seem. Brodskii (1914) argued that 
ideological, religious and moral concerns were often used to mask the true, materialistic 
motives behind the abortion law:  
 
By becoming acquainted with the basic principles of general law, we can see that no legislation is based  
on abstract premises, and that there are invisible material motives hidden beneath the visible  
ideological, religious and moral cover. And in this case, before the state was consolidated, abortion was  
considered a danger [because it] might lead to population decline and thus weaken the entire collective.  
Therefore, the state only allowed abortions in cases where the foetus would die anyway. Then, as the  
economic conditions changed, the abortion ban was used to hide the ruling classes’ material interests, as  
they considered the multiplication of slaves (razmnozhenie rabov) a source of their own power and  
wealth. (…) As a legal principle, the absolute value of human life played an insignificant part. This is  
proved by the fact that among members of the ruling class, the same class that promulgated the abortion  
laws, abortions were widespread (Brodskii 1914: 9). 
 
In other words, Brodskii thought that there was a hidden, material agenda behind most ethical, 
moral and religious arguments against abortion. Thus, many of the principles underlying 
modern abortion law were really quite superficial considerations, sometimes rooted in 
ignorance: 
 
In the abortion question, moral guardians generally refer to Christian morality. However, following the  
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laws of the Church, they do not take into consideration the Church’s canonical decrees. According to  
[these decrees], the foetus has no soul for the first 40-80 days;
59
 thus, [during this period,] abortion is  
not considered a sin. (…) Clearly, these moral guardians are completely unfamiliar with embryology,  
according to which the foetus has no brain cells during the first days of pregnancy (Brodskii 1914: 11- 
12).  
 
Thus, the fact that abortion was generally prohibited did not in itself mean that abortion was 
morally wrong. Furthermore, while some moderate debaters – e.g. Kulisher (1916) – were 
afraid of the psychological consequences of legalisation, Grin disagreed that decriminalisation 
might lessen people’s respect for human life or lead to moral depravity: there were excellent, 
loving mothers who nonetheless saw nothing wrong in having abortions (Grin 1914: 19).  
Grin further argued that since the “offender” in abortion cases had no evil intentions, 
but rather sought a solution to a hopeless situation, penal measures was not the correct way of 
fighting the abortion phenomenon. If the abortion was voluntary, then any punishment would 
go against the principle of individual freedom; on the other hand, if the abortion was “forced”, 
as a result of unfortunate circumstances, the abortion should be regarded not as a crime but as 
a misfortune. In such cases, abortion should be fought by means of combating the material 
circumstances that led to the “evil” in the first place (Grin 1914: 32-33). It would be better, 
according to Grin, for the state to deal with Russia’s infant mortality rate than to care about “a 
lump of slime (Grin 1914: 46).” (Grin, as we remember, regarded the foetus as something 
next to worthless.) 
Legalisation of abortion, according to several of the “radical” debaters (Grin 1914; 
Brodskii 1914; Gernet 1916) would be a means of helping poor women through a difficult 
situation, lessen the discrepancy between law and life, and reduce social inequalities 
(wealthier women, it was assumed, would always find a way of terminating their pregnancies 
safely, without risk of punishment). Decriminalisation, argued Gernet (1916: 239-240), would 
help to save lives, improve the lot of underprivileged women, and possibly make it more 
difficult for unqualified personnel to perform underground abortions. Grin (1914) concluded 
his presentation as follows:  
 
1. Abolish penalties for abortion, and you will a) prevent infanticide and, as you would thus provide an  
open access to hospitals, b) prevent the unfortunate women from being exploited by incompetent  
people, and c) reduce the mortality rates to the minimum that can be expected for any operation.  
2. Ensure a solid (…) defence for deceived girls, abolish the category of “illegitimate” children, ensure 
that they are supported financially, and the number of abortions will be reduced sharply.  
3. Increase the welfare of the working classes and the servants, make sure that they are  
guaranteed work, and free them from forced unemployment.Then, few women from these  
classes will turn to abortion (Grin 1914: 48). 
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Brodskii (1914: 42) believed that the religious basis of the abortion ban had a weak 
theoretical foundation, and that the moral considerations that were said to be underlying the 
prohibition were used to mask the true materialistic motives behind the law. Given these 
considerations, and given the social circumstances that seemed to force women to have 
abortions, Brodskii was in favour of legalisation. However, based on his knowledge of 
embryology, he thought that abortions should be allowed on principle only for the first six 
weeks of pregnancy.
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 After this point, he thought that abortion should only be granted for 
medical or compelling social reasons.  
 In other words, “radical” debaters challenged the view that abortion was wrong in 
principle. This was based on their approach to the foetus, as well as their approach to the 
moral aspects of the phenomenon – they did not think that legalisation would lead to moral 
depravity; rather, it would be a way to lessen social inequalities and improve the lot of the 
lower classes. However, they did agree with their moderate counterparts on a number of 
points, such as the need for improved welfare measures. 
A point of consensus: the need for improved welfare measures 
 
Debaters that opposed decriminalisation were by no means oblivious to the social problems 
that seemed to cause the abortion epidemic in the first place. Moderates and radicals alike 
suggested that the fight against abortion should include a range of welfare measures. 
Regarding this aspect of the discussions, then, it is hardly possible to separate the moderate 
discourse participants from the radicals.  
 A number of debaters argued that the state should take on more social responsibility 
for women and their children, whether the latter were “legitimate” or not. Some considered 
the state’s attitude towards abortion to be hypocritical – while the state demanded (indirectly, 
by means of banning abortions) that women bring their pregnancies to term, it did not do 
anything to help these women during pregnancy or after the child was born. For unmarried 
women in particular, this situation left them stuck between two equally difficult alternatives: 
“[O]n the one hand, you have the disgrace [of becoming an unwed mother], and on the other, 
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you have the law, with its strict punishment for those who want to avoid this disgrace by 
means of abortion (Chubinskii 1912: 85).”  
In this respect, the state demanded more than it was willing to give. For families with 
several children, the state had little to offer financially: “The help that is given to [large] 
families is so limited that it can scarcely be taken into account. The state takes almost no care 
of these poor people; thus, they try to help themselves (Lichkus 1912: 40).”  
 Among the welfare measures that were proposed by participants in the discourse, the 
most common included a) sanitary education, b) an improved system of maternity care, c) 
improving women’s social position and legal standing and d) developing – and propagating 
the use of – more effective contraceptives. 
 Yakobson (1912: 13) concluded his presentation at the Fourth Congress of Russian 
Gynaecologists and Obstetricians by stating that “[t]he woman needs to know about all the 
dangers of terminating a pregnancy under the current circumstances (…), including the risk of 
a fatal outcome and the possibility of becoming seriously ill.” Lichkus (1912: 48) suggested 
that information about the dangers of abortion should be spread by means of “lectures, 
brochures etc.” In addition to such information campaigns, he suggested “establishing a large 
number of shelters for pregnant women and women who are about to give birth (dlya 
rodil’nits)” where charity organisations or the state could help them take care of their 
children; “establishing refuges and educational homes for legitimate as well as illegitimate 
children; giving unlucky girls the right to seek [financial] support from the men who have 
seduced them; (…) increasing the material prosperity of the poor, etc., etc. (Lichkus 1912: 47-
48).” Chubinskii, also a moderate, expressed similar thoughts: 
 
(…) our scientific duty would not be fulfilled [in this presentation] if we did not point out the necessity 
of these measures and showed the factors that lead to abortions. Until the focus (tsentr tyazhesti) of the 
fight against abortions gets directed towards [these aspects], until women’s general position is 
increased, until the situation of the woman as a mother becomes easier both de jure and de facto, 
especially with regard to unmarried mothers, until we see a system of financial help offered to expecting 
mothers, – until then, the complicated reasons that lead to abortions will remain, and the situation will 
not be improved (Chubinskii 1912: 86). 
 
Okinchits (1912: 66), who regarded abortion as murder, argued that one of the best ways of 
preventing abortions would be the development of better contraceptives. He also suggested 
public lectures as a means of informing the public about the dangers of illegal abortions.  
 In other words, both moderate and radical debaters were conscious of the relationship 
between the rising abortion rates and the contemporary social problems. Moreover, it can be 
argued that the “moderates” and “radicals” really agreed more than they disagreed. Although 
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they had different approaches to the subject of the foetus and the moral aspects of abortion, 
significant parts of their analyses, and a lot of their suggested welfare measures, have a lot of 
similarities. 
4.4 Summary 
 
In the early 20
th
 century, the increasing abortion rates turned the abortion question into a “hot 
topic” of discussion for Russian legal scholars and physicians. For these groups in particular, 
the issue was directly relevant to their professional lives, and one that attracted a lot of 
attention during the pre-war years.  
 During these years, it was members of the liberal intelligentsia who dominated the 
discussions. In fact, the abortion debates of this era show a remarkable absence of 
“revolutionary” voices. Generally, Russian revolutionaries had a relatively low level of 
interest in “feminist” causes – a lack of interest that reflects their general attitude towards 
feminism. Among Russian intellectuals on the far left, there seemed to be a great deal of 
ambivalence, if not “hostility and indifference (Stites 1991: 257),” towards both Bolshevik 
and bourgeois feminism. While male workers resented female competition, male Marxist 
leaders made little effort to organise women. Conventional (bourgeois) feminism was 
frowned upon by socialists across the board (ibid.).  
 This is not to say, however, that the discussions on abortion among the liberals had a 
particularly “feminist” streak. Although several debaters called for an expansion of women’s 
rights and a strengthening of the woman’s position in society, the abortion question was not 
simply restricted to being a “women’s issue”. In the professional discourse, abortion was 
generally being debated as a social problem with far-reaching implications, an issue that 
reflected social inequalities, unfairness and hypocrisy on many levels. Access to (relatively) 
safe abortions was a privilege of the upper classes. The double standard of sexual behaviour 
meant that only women would suffer the consequences of an “illegitimate” pregnancy. While 
the state prohibited abortion, it was unable to provide any social security or protection for 
single mothers and their children – moreover, the abortion ban had little effect. As the 
abortion rates were increasing, this discrepancy between law and practical life seemed to 
become ever more acute, and the need for legal and social reforms thus became increasingly 
evident.   
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 In this thesis, the pre-revolutionary abortion debaters have been divided into 
“moderates” and “radicals”. This is not the only possible classification. In her 1991 article, 
focusing on “the way in which medical and legal issues were mapped onto the local political 
and cultural terrain (Engelstein 1991: 187),” Laura Engelstein distinguished between the legal 
and medical debates. While this was useful for Engelstein’s study, such an approach would 
probably have been less suitable for our purposes: in discussions on the abortion question, the 
dividing lines between the arguments of physicians and legal scholars could be blurry.  
 Another possible distinction could be made between women and men: there were three 
women, for instance, taking part at the Criminologists’ Convention in 1914. However, there 
are two reasons why such a classification would be less fertile. First, the vast majority of 
discourse participants were men – a fact which would make the comparison asymmetrical. 
Second, the arguments of the female debaters are not too different from their male 
counterparts – at least not different enough to give grounds for a “gender-based” analysis.  
 Although the two congresses of the Pirogov Society in 1911 and 1913 and the 
Criminologists’ Convention in 1914 voted in favour of decriminalisation, these decisions did 
not have any influence on the abortion legislation in late tsarist Russia. Some debaters also 
doubted that they would see any changes in the near future: 
 
These conflicts will not stop, and the tragedy will not come to an end, before we see fundamental 
changes in the existing social structures, changes in the economic conditions, in women’s situation 
within and outside of marriage, in society’s legal perceptions, and partly also in ethical and social 
notions. But that will only happen in a distant future or, more correctly, in a very distant future; but life 
doesn’t wait, life demands an answer. If we can not cure the evil, we will have to provide the best 
possible [pain] relief and soften the particularly sharp (…) edges (Chubinskii 1912: 91-92). 
 
Two years later at the 1914 Criminologists’ Convention, Chubinskii argued that if women 
were granted the right to have abortions, then doctors would in effect be obliged to perform 
such operations, and that would be impossible. Moreover: 
 
 (...) if you really want to offer any real help to women who have abortions, then you have to be  
 consistent and demand a mandatory, state-organised [system of] medical help. But gentlemen, you all  
 know perfectly well that you would hardly find a single state that would spend money on (...) reducing  
 its population numbers, especially in those places where there are not enough doctors [to begin with]  
 (Chubinskii, in Otchet..., 1916: 375-376, emphasis in original). 
 
Ten years later, in 1924, this statement was referred to by two Soviet authors who remarked 
that Chubinskii in this way had proved himself to be a “very weak prophet”, unable to predict 
even the nearest future (Vasilevskie 1924: 85-86). The next chapter will examine how the 
abortion debates developed during the first years of Soviet rule. 
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5 Soviet abortion discourse, 1920-
1930 
 
After the 1917 revolution, the civil war left “neither attention, nor time, nor fighters” for 
“such ‘peaceful’, profoundly civil problems” as the abortion question; thus, the abortion issue 
did not attract any serious attention until early 1920 (Vasilevskie, 1924: 95). At this point, as 
the hardships caused by the war led ever more women to resort to illegal abortions 
(Vasilevskie 1924; Goldman 1993), the rising abortion rate only added to the public health 
crisis and the “civil problem” became a matter of growing concern: 
 
A range of serious consequences of this [abortion] epidemic – the high sickness and death rate among 
women in the prime of life, their inability to work, their barrenness, the overloaded state and the 
strained medical facilities – were particularly noticeable and particularly perceptible under the 
conditions of that time, with the universal destruction and impoverishment caused by the war, the 
subsequent famine and (…) the series of epidemic diseases (typhoid fever, cholera, etc.). As a result, the 
abortion issue started to demand attention (Vasilevskie 1924: 95). 
 
When abortion was decriminalised by decree on 18
th
 November, 1920, Soviet Russia became 
the first country in the world where termination of pregnancy was discussed as a legalised 
phenomenon. After the implementation of the new law, the abortion issue was no longer 
limited to being a topic of professional interest for doctors and legal scholars. Moreover, the 
Soviet government sought to combat abortion as a phenomenon not only by means of 
increasing general living standards, but also by large-scale information campaigns.    
 Generally, the Soviet abortion discourse of these years can be divided into two main 
categories. The first includes monographs, essays and reports from medical congresses. These 
publications were aimed towards educated members of society, especially representatives of 
the Narkomzdrav and the local gubzdravy.
61
 The second consists of public enlightenment 
literature targeting a broader audience, i.e. pamphlets and the women’s journals. This 
literature provided information about abortion and outlined the essence of the official Soviet 
attitudes and policies in a simplified manner. The journals sometimes included elements that 
were absent from the academic discourse, such as short stories and letters from ordinary 
women. In turn, this literature was part of a broader program of sanitary education carried out 
by Narkomzdrav throughout the 1920s.   
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 With regard to their target audience, the women’s journals can also be divided into 
two sub-groups. The five titles included in this analysis – Kommunistka (Communist Woman), 
Rabotnitsa (Working Woman), Krest’yanka (Peasant Woman), Rabotnitsa i krest’yanka (a 
local journal published by the zhenotdel in Leningrad) and Delegatka (Woman Delegate; 
Moscow) – were aimed at different groups of women. Kommunistka, launched in 1920, was 
Zhenotdel’s theoretical journal: 
 
As the leading and guiding theoretical journal for work among women, Kommunistka discussed various 
aspects of the woman question, such as women and work, motherhood, the position of women in the 
countryside, the liberation of Muslim women, abortion and prostitution. It printed the conclusions 
reached at conferences of Zhenotdel leaders and passed on information about party policy affecting 
women. (...) More general articles on current political issues were included too, such as the needs of the 
Red Army, how to fight starvation, the state of the textile industry, decisions of Congresses of the 
Communist International and developments in the international women’s movement (Buckley 1989: 
67). 
 
By contrast, Rabotnitsa, Krest’yanka, Rabotnitsa i krest’yanka and Delegatka were popular 
magazines, targeting a wider audience. These journals aimed to inform the larger public about 
current political problems and about the new rights granted them by the Soviet government 
(Buckley 1989: 67-68). 
 This chapter will be structured a bit differently than the chapter on the pre-
revolutionary debates. Instead of dividing the chapter into “causes” and “solutions”, 
“moderates” and “radicals”, a distinction will be made between the different genres. First, the 
early beginnings of Soviet abortion discourse, reflected in two Kommunistka articles from the 
summer and early autumn of 1920, will be examined. These articles are among the rare 
examples of Soviet abortion discourse before the Decree of 1920. Furthermore, since they are 
representative of the official Soviet attitudes towards abortion, they can be used as a backdrop 
for the following analysis.   
5.1 Early examples of Soviet abortion discourse 
 
One of the earliest articles presenting the “basics” of the Soviet attitudes towards abortion – 
and towards family policy in general – is Nadezhda Krupskaya’s “War and reproduction” 
(“Voina i detorozhdenie”), published in Kommunistka in the summer of 1920. Krupskaya 
began her article by declaring that the civil war had “shaken loose” the foundations of the old 
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family relations, leading to more short-term sexual relationships, unstable living conditions 
and, consequently, a rising number of single mothers.  
Because of this, said Krupskaya, the state should take on the responsibility of 
protecting motherhood and infancy by introducing a system of maternity care (during 
pregancy and after childbirth) and by establishing crèches, kindergartens, camps and 
dormitories for children. This system of public childrearing would improve the woman’s lot 
significantly and “place her on an equal footing with men (Krupskaya 1920: 19).” The Soviet 
government, she said, was making “every effort to free women from their heavy childcare 
duties.” However, the current social and financial troubles meant that it would take a while 
before these measures could be implemented; for now, “the conditions of having and raising 
children are generally even harder than before (Krupskaya 1920: 19).” Consequently, it was 
understandable that a lot of women did not want to become mothers. They might want to have 
children, but as they knew that they would be unable to raise them, they often had no other 
choice but to abstain from childbirth. 
 Throughout the 1920s, the idea that abortion was caused by difficult socioeconomic 
conditions remained essential in the official discourse. Until the state was able to improve 
these conditions, however, and provide the best possible conditions for mothers and their 
children, abortion should be allowed as a temporary measure:  
  
The fight against abortion should not be a matter of prosecuting women who turn to abortion, thereby 
often risking their lives, but should be aimed at eliminating the social factors that force women to 
choose between abortion and suicide (libo abort, libo v vodu). Until these general reasons are 
eliminated, women will be having abortions, no matter how fierce punishments they might be subject to 
(Krupskaya 1920: 19). 
 
Furthermore, Krupskaya argued, “the destruction of a foetus that has not yet become a 
living human being, and that still forms part of its mother’s body” could not be regarded as a 
crime (ibid.). Although legalisation of abortion would not make it psychologically easier for a 
woman to go through with the operation, it would still be a step in the right direction. Another 
step would be the promotion of contraceptive measures. The bourgeoisie, in contrast, was all 
too unwilling to deal with such questions in public: 
 
 Talking about [birth control measures] means talking about the bankruptcy of capitalist society, about  
the extensive category of women who need to limit their fertility, about poverty, social inequalities, etc.  
In order to divert attention from these unpleasant things, the bourgeoisie cries that “once the 
woman is freed from the consequences of her [moral decline], we will open [up] for all sorts of 
depravity.” (...) Luckily, the working masses are not like the bourgeois imagines; usually, it is only 
bitter necessity [that can] force a working woman to give up motherhood (Krupskaya 1920: 20). 
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Krupskaya’s article provides a concise outline of the official Soviet view on the abortion 
question. Furthermore, in the following number of Kommunistka, in the early autumn of 1920, 
Nikolai Semashko summarised his own standpoints as follows: 
 
1. The abortion question has to be solved not as a matter of individual rights, but by taking into account 
the interests of the entire collective (society, race). 
2. From this point of view, abortion is undesirable: [If it becomes] a mass phenomenon, it can affect the 
rate of population growth. Even when performed under the best possible conditions, it can have 
consequences for the woman’s health. Thus, it can affect the interests of the society and the race. 
3. Repressions against abortion make the situation worse. On the contrary, in order to combat back-alley 
abortions – which cause immense harm to the woman and the race – abortion needs to be legalised. It 
needs to be performed freely and, of course, without charge in Soviet medical establishments, where the 
surgical procedure [can be performed] as safely as possible (Semashko 1920: 21). 
 
Abortion as a phenomenon should be fought by “strengthening the work of the organisations 
[dealing with the] protection of maternity and infancy (maternity homes, crèches, shelters, 
consultation bureaux etc.), and also by (…) improving the pregnant woman’s situation in 
every way – with regard to food, her everyday life, housing etc.” Moreover, the 
“organisations for working women need to put this question on the agenda and carry out 
enlightenment campaigns on a large scale (Semashko 1920: 21).”  
Throughout the 1920s, the above-mentioned pamphlets and women’s journals would 
become a vital part of these enlightenment campaigns. At the same time, the question 
continued to be discussed on an academic level. 
5.2 The academic discourse 
 
Within medical circles, rumours about the forthcoming Decree on the Legalisation of 
Abortion started to spread in the autumn of 1920. From that point on, the abortion question 
started to receive increasing attention. 
During the last month before the enactment of the Decree, the Moscow Society for 
Obstetrics and Gynaecology (Moskovskoe akusherstvo-ginekologicheskoe obshchestvo) met 
on a couple of occasions to discuss the question (T’eder and Kolosov 1922: 140-142). In the 
following years, the question was addressed at a number of other medical congresses, as well 
as in the medical press. From the mid-1920s, a number of monographs and essays were 
published on the issue, mainly written by physicians. The continuing “abortion epidemic”, the 
difficulties of implementing the practical measures against abortion and the fact that the 
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question was still controversial among many Soviet doctors meant that the question remained 
a “hot topic” throughout the decade.  
5.2.1 The abortion epidemic and its causes 
 
In both rural and urban areas, abortion rates were rising in the early Soviet period. In 1922, an 
extensive statistical material was published by a professor F. A. Aleksandrov in the journal 
Ginekologiya i akusherstvo (Gynaecology and obstetrics). The same year, abortion statistics 
for the city of Yekaterinburg were published in a local medical journal (Vasilevskie 1924: 
30); other surveys followed suit, covering different parts of the country, urban as well as rural 
areas (e.g. Karlin 1925; Shiflinger 1927; Gens 1929). All these works showed the same 
tendency, i.e. an upsurge in abortion.  
During the first half of 1923, M. Y. Karlin (a physician working at the State Clinical 
Institute of Obstetrics and Gynaecology (Gosudarstvennyi klinicheskii akushersko-
ginekologicheskii institut) in Leningrad) surveyed a total of 1,362 female patients in three 
different medical centres about their reproductive history. The results of this survey suggested 
an abortion rate that was almost as high as the birth rate: on average, each of the 1,362 women 
had had “1.86 births and 1.44 abortions (Karlin 1925: 11).” Moreover, according to Karlin’s 
survey, only ¼ of the recorded abortions were spontaneous; i.e. provoked abortions made up 
¾ of the total number (Karlin 1925: 13).
62
  
In 1929, the physician A. B. Gens published Problema aborta v SSSR (The abortion 
problem in the Soviet Union), a comprehensive account that was based on official statistics. 
According to Gens, the abortion rate in Moscow had increased from 10.2 per cent
63
 in 1914
64
 
                                                 
62
 However, Karlin assumed that the number of spontaneous abortions recorded at the institute were higher 
than the average for Leningrad as a whole. Among other factors, the number of spontaneous abortions was 
thought to have increased due to the hardship of the civil war years, with their “[d]ifficult living conditions, the 
need to spend hours waiting in queues, public work (sawing firewood, heavy lifting, being on night duty), a 
significant drop in food supply, colossal epidemics of (…) typhoid fever, the Spanish disease and others, (…) and 
also psychological shocks (…).” Under “normal” circumstances, according to him, between 10 and 20 per cent 
of all pregnancies ended in miscarriage (Karlin 1925: 13-14).
  
63
 I.e., 10.2 out of 100 pregnancies were terminated. 
64
 Gens does not include statistics from the period between 1914 and 1921, i.e. the period between the 
outbreak of the First World War and the end of the Civil War in Soviet Russia. This is probably due to a lack of 
reliable data from these years.
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to around 19 per cent in 1923-1924. From 1925 onwards, there was a remarkably fast increase 
– from 31.4 per cent in 1925 to 54.7 per cent in 1926, and then to a total of 75 per cent in 
1927 – 40 001 abortions versus 53 369 births. In addition, that year there were 5,851 
registered cases of incomplete abortions. When including the number of incomplete abortions, 
then, Moscow’s abortion rate in 1927 was almost equal to the birth rate (Gens 1929: 7). I. G. 
Burlakov (1927: 7), a Ukrainian physician, noted a similar trend for the given time period: 
according to him, the number of abortions in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic 
increased from 52,836 in 1923-1924 to 156,324 in 1925-1926. How did contemporary Soviet 
authors explain these trends? 
Who had abortions, and why? 
 
From 1
st
 June, 1924, every woman who had a hospital abortion (and who was admitted to 
hospital with an incomplete abortion) had to fill out a registration card. With this new source 
of evidence, it gradually became possible to find out more about these women, especially with 
regard to their living conditions (Gens 1926b: 9). By and large, the official Soviet view – that 
abortion as a mass phenomenon was caused by socioeconomic factors – was supported by all 
available statistics throughout the decade. 
 With regard to the cities (Moscow, Leningrad, provincial towns (gubernskie goroda) 
and other smaller towns), figures from 1925 indicated that the majority of women having 
abortions were between 20 and 29 years of age.
65
 65-70 per cent were working women 
(rabotnitsy), women who were otherwise employed (sluzhashchie), or who had husbands 
working within these sectors.
66
 In the countryside, on the other hand, the majority were 
between the age of 30 and 40 (Gens 1929: 33). In addition, while urban women generally had 
abortions after having their first child, their rural counterparts usually had three to four 
children by the time of their first abortion (Gens 1929: 42-43).  
 Among women who had abortion while in their twenties, the majority (in both rural 
and urban areas) were unmarried – either single or living in “unregistered” or de facto 
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 Incidentally, this is partially supported by Karlin’s survey from 1923, where the largest group of women 
having provoked abortions were between 25 and 30 years of age. Older women had fewer provoked abortions, 
but more spontaneous miscarriages (Karlin 1925: 28).
 
 
66
 Gens does not specify whether these “wives” were housewives or doing any other kinds of work.
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marriages. In Leningrad, the abortion rate among married women was 31.5 per cent, and 47.2 
among women living in “unregistered marriages”. “The latter group undoubtedly includes an 
‘overwhelming percentage of strictly casual sexual relations (…)’ (Gens 1929: 34).”  
Aside from poverty (the most important abortion motive),
67
 other common reasons 
included – in declining order according to frequency – physical illness, a desire to keep the 
pregnancy a secret, and the fact that the woman already had small children or infants to take 
care of (nalichie grudnykh detei) (Gens 1929: 37-38). 
 In his earlier work, Abort v RSFSR (1926b),
68
 Gens mentioned a couple of interesting 
factors that are not included in his Problema aborta… (1929). The first is a more detailed 
specification of the illnesses causing a woman’s decision to abort. In urban areas, these 
included (in declining order of importance) tuberculosis, various heart conditions, syphilis, 
anaemia, “women’s diseases” and “incessant vomiting” (neukrotimaya rvota). Moreover, in 
the cities, women who had abortions were living under the following conditions: 
  
 Living alone, in one room – 6.4 % 
 Sharing a room with her husband – 14.7 % 
 Sharing a room with someone else (sister, friend, mother, etc.) – 9.1 % 
 Sharing a room with two other people – 25.6 % 
 Sharing a room with three or more people – 44.2 % (Gens 1926b: 15, my italics). 
 
Gens comments on these figures as follows: 
  
The acute housing crisis [that is evident] in almost all of our cities has a severe impact on the abortion 
rates, and what is more, it seems to be one of the most frequent abortion motives. It is perfectly 
understandable that people are unwilling to [increase the number of people sharing their living space]
69
 
when there are already four people or more living in the same room (Gens 1926b: 15). 
 
Vasilevskii and Vasilevskii (1924: 37) mentioned “the growing impoverishment resulting 
from the war, (…) the increasing disintegration of the old family [structures], and the ever 
more acute fight for survival” as contributing factors. As ever more women were leaving their 
families to enter the workforce, they also had to face this “fight” from an early age.  
                                                 
67
 Shiflinger (1927: 63), while agreeing that poverty was the most important of all abortion motives, 
emphasised the fact that “material’naya neobespechennost’” (“a lack of material means”) could be a relative 
term. Women could assess their material conditions differently; moreover, it was important to consider the 
factors that accompanied the material conditions, such as illnesses, marital problems, etc. “In any case, 
although material conditions make up the most important abortion reason, [there are] authors who 
overestimate this factor.”  
68
 In 1926, Gens used statistics for the year of 1924. 
69
 “Vpolne ponyatno nezhelanie vpustit’ v komnatu eshche odnogo pretendenta na zhiluyu ploshchad’, kogda v 
nei zhivut 4 ili bolee lits (…).” 
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According to a Narkomzdrav survey conducted among provincial physicians in 1925, 
abortion had become a mass phenomenon in the countryside as well. In addition to the most 
common motives – poverty and “having many children” (mnogodetnost’) – the third most 
important category included “the shame (…) of being pregnant outside of wedlock, fear of 
‘sin’, ‘disgrace’ etc. (Vasilevskii 1927: 79).” Gens (1929: 57) related this to the “religious 
prejudices” that were still predominant in the countryside.    
In addition, 9 per cent claimed to have abortions because of family problems – 
“arguments with their husband, the husband’s drunkenness, divorce (…) (Vasilevskii 1927: 
79).” According to the author, this was a result of changing family structures (partly caused 
by the war years, when a large number of women had been left alone or widowed).  
L. E. Shiflinger (1927), a doctor working at a Saratov hospital, carried out a survey of 
his own. Over the course of six months, he asked 200 women admitted in the hospital’s 
abortion ward to fill in questionnaires anonymously; only then, he believed, would he be sure 
to get honest answers. Shiflinger’s survey in many ways confirm the statistics provided by 
Gens, except that the largest percentage of women (64 per cent) in his case were housewives, 
and that as much as 90.5 per cent of them were married (Shiflinger 1927: 60-62).  
Moreover, Shiflinger was among the few to register his patients’ personal feelings 
about the abortion procedure. Among the women he questioned, 58.5 per cent felt bad for the 
aborted foetus; 21.5 did not feel anything at all. The majority of registered husbands (65 per 
cent) were “indifferent” towards their wives’ abortions; 15 per cent were against, but bound to 
agree because of the circumstances. However, there were also differing views on the question 
among Soviet physicians. 
5.2.2 Attitudes towards the new abortion legislation 
 
Both before and in the early years after abortion was legalised in November 1920, Soviet 
doctors were divided in the question of decriminalisation. According to Vasilevskii and 
Vasilevskii (1924), Russian doctors had a generally negative attitude towards Soviet medical 
reforms; the abortion issue was no exception. 
 
[I]n the first years after the October revolution, most Russian physicians remained in passive 
opposition,
70
 and only during the second half of 1921 (approximately) did this attitude start to improve 
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 This “passive opposition” was, apparently, directed towards Soviet medical reforms in general. Vasilevskii 
and Vasilevskii (1924: 102) claim that physicians gradually started to display a “more active sympathy and (…) 
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(…). By the time of the implementation of the “Decree” of 20th (sic) November, 1920 (…), their attitude 
towards this reform was still unsympathetic. This is now beginning to change, but only very gradually 
(Vasilevskie (1924: 102). 
 
In February 1920, in order to investigate the general climate surrounding the abortion 
question, Narkomzdrav distributed questionnaires to the local health departments, the 
gubzdravy. The survey respondents were asked to provide their opinion on a number of 
theses, or statements, concerning the abortion issue. In addition, the gubzdravy were requested 
to arrange conferences with physicians, legal professionals, representatives of the social 
services, the local zhenotdely (the women’s departments of the Communist Party) and other 
organisations, where this question would be discussed.   
The majority of the respondents seemed to be against decriminalisation. “As a whole,” 
note Vasilevskii and Vasilevskii, “they gravitate towards the olden times (k starine), that is, 
towards prohibition (k nakazuemosti)
71
 (Vasilevskie 1924: 96).”  
Among the doctors who thought abortion should be legalised, the majority were in 
favour of keeping a restrictive legislation.
72
 In the city of Kursk, for instance, the conclusion 
was unequivocal: except in cases of medical necessity, abortion should be prohibited. In 
extraordinary cases, e.g. if the pregnancy was the result of rape, the decision should be left to 
what was – somewhat vaguely – called “the healthy instinct of the expectant mother 
(Vasilevskie 1924: 97).” Another report declared that “the Soviet Union takes care of women 
and children, and therefore, social reasons [for having an abortion] should not be 
acknowledged in our country (Vasilevskie 1924: 97).” To the respondents in Ryazan, 
legalisation of abortion represented “an excessive waste of human material,” especially 
considering that the country was in need of high birth rates (Vasilevskie 1924: 99). 
Furthermore, legalisation would go against the entire system of maternal and child care that 
was being constructed by the Soviet state – it was not only a “state-sponsored fabrication of 
angels,” but also a “senseless compromise with the prejudices of the past.” Under socialism, 
“even the embryo must be protected.”73  
                                                                                                                                                        
participation in the construction of Soviet medicine” during the early 1920s. According to Starks (2008: 55), on 
the other hand, doctors in these years “could not make up for the dearth of resources with enthusiasm. 
Doctors survived difficult conditions in the 1920s. The state paid them little, and their morale was low. (…) 
Some set themselves up in private practice and proved important as abortion providers, but they were subject 
to harsh crackdowns in the late 1920s.” 
71
 The Russian word “nakazuemost’” literally translates as “punishability”; however, I find “prohibition” to be a 
better choice of word in this case. 
72
 This caused the authors to dismiss their reform proposals as “timid” and “indecisive” (Vasilevskie 1924: 96). 
73
 Nevertheless, under Soviet law, “the fetus (sic) was not considered a person entitled to rights (Goldman 
1993: 257).”  
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In 1922, the medical professor F. A. Aleksandrov argued that abortion should be 
allowed for medical reasons only. This, however, does not seem to have been related to any 
concern for the foetus as such; rather, his view was based on his knowledge of the health risks 
of having abortion. In contrast, he argued that multiple childbirths were less harmful than 
abortion: according to him, there were women (mnogorodyashchie) who had given birth five, 
ten, or even fifteen times without “having the slightest idea about any kind of illnesses 
(Aleksandrov 1922: 23).” To illustrate his point, Aleksandrov mentioned a couple who, after 
50 years of marriage, could celebrate their anniversary together with “all their 23 children, 
along with grandchildren and great-grandchildren. (…) a total of 108 people, all in the same 
family (Aleksandrov 1922: 23).”74  
 The abortion issue seems to have remained controversial among Soviet doctors 
throughout the 1920s (Vasilevskie 1924: 110-111; Lebedeva 1926: 10; Vasilevskii 1927: 132-
133). For instance, at the First All-Ukrainian Congress of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists in 
Kiev (1927),
75
 a Georgian delegate argued that the current Soviet law should be revised in 
accordance with the interests of the foetus. Moreover, the accepted social reasons for having 
an abortion should be restricted (Vinogradov 1927: 372).   
According to Vasilevskii (1927: 133),
76
 a “significant part” of the country’s doctors 
considered abortion “morally unacceptable and even downright unlawful”: 
 
The question of the legalisation of abortion is still far from uncontroversial. Abortion is condemned all 
over the cultured [parts of the] world, except in the Soviet Union. However, even in our own country, 
the construction work (stroitel’stvo) in this field has only just begun. Even [our] legal norms, as we 
have seen, are in many ways not fully established: We are still trying to find the correct ways (…) 
(Vasilevskii 1927: 134).
77
 
 
Consequently, just like people could refuse to take part in military service for religious 
reasons, doctors should be allowed to refuse to perform abortions for moral reasons. This, 
however, seems to have been Vasilevskii’s personal opinion rather than the “official” stance. 
A few years earlier, in 1920, Nikolai Semashko had voiced strong objections to such “medical 
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 Aleksandrov’s argument, and his latter example in particular, were later criticised by Vasilevskii and 
Vasilevskii (1924: 51): “All of this is very striking, but these kinds of patriarchal scenes are beyond the reach of 
the vast majority of workers. (…) And the happy family that the author is so delighted with is, of course, one of 
a kind in our days of general impoverishment (…).” Moreover, according to the authors, modern women were 
unwilling to spend their whole life raising children.   
75
 More than 700 delegates took part at this congress. The participants came from different Soviet republics, 
“sort of turning the All-Ukrainian Congress into an All-Union one (Vinogradov 1927: 363).” 
76
 This was the second edition of Abort, kak sotsial’noe yavlenie (1924). The 1927 edition has some changes, 
but is similar to the earlier version in many ways. 
77
 As described in chapter 3, Soviet abortion legislation was revised a few times throughout the 1920s. 
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ethics”: If a doctor refused to perform abortions for anything but medical reasons, the 
consequences for the women who were rejected could be severe.  
 
And [then], if a woman who is exhausted by [having many] children, emaciated by hunger, or has other 
reasons to have the abortion decides to go through with it anyway, then she is bound to poison herself 
(…), or become disfigured at the hands of  a midwife, or fall into the hands of a learned profiteer. And 
the doctor, crossing his arms on his chest – where his “medical conscience” is hidden – will contemplate 
this while admiring his own conscientiousness. What [total] nonsense and hypocrisy! The doctor is 
obliged (according to a true, and not a hypocritical, priest-like (litsemerno-popovskaya) medical 
conscience) to perform the operation in order to save the woman (…) either from death, from becoming 
a cripple, or from profiteers. I do not know if [these reluctant doctors] exist, (…) but if they do, this 
question should immediately be addressed by the medical press (Semashko 1920: 20). 
 
There are, however, not many direct expressions of anti-legalisation sentiments in the 
academic abortion discourse of the 1920s. Differing opinions are mainly “filtered” through 
the authors of these essays and monographs or included in summarised versions of conference 
reports. Nonetheless, the fact that the issue remained controversial throughout the decade was 
recognised by the vast majority of authors. If anything, this recognition seems to have made 
them even more determined to argue in favour of the current Soviet policies. 
Justifying Soviet legislation: The advantages of the current law 
 
Despite the fact that the new Soviet abortion legalisation was controversial within medical 
circles, the official view remained more or less unchanged throughout the 1920s: abortion was 
harmful, a social evil that needed to be fought, but because repressions would make the 
situation worse, legalisation was the lesser evil.  
A common way of highlighting the revolutionary character of the Soviet abortion law 
was to compare it to “bourgeois” legislation. This comparison was used already from the 
outset in the wording of the original Decree (Semashko 1934: 82-83). Advocates of the 
official view generally portrayed the Western world and pre-revolutionary Russia as 
hypocritical and “rigid” with regard to this question, whereas Soviet Russia was described as 
pragmatic, honest and progress-minded.  
 The two editions of the extensive monograph Abortion as a social phenomenon 
(Vasilevskie 1924; Vasilevskii 1927) are typical examples of this.
78
 Here, the Soviet attitudes 
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 The 1927 edition was authored by L. M. Vasilevskii alone. With a couple of exceptions, this second edition is 
similar to the first when it comes to the use of comparisons. In cases where both versions use the same 
wording, I will be referring to the 1924 edition.  
79 
 
to the abortion question are contrasted to the traditional “bourgeois” position. Turning to 
moral or ethical considerations, according to the authors, was an unsuitable approach; the 
“only correct point of view” was the one rooted in considerations of health and social 
hygiene. The “New Russia” (novaya Rossiya), having chosen the latter approach, would have 
the chance to fight the abortion epidemic more successfully than its bourgeois counterparts 
(Vasilevskie 1924: 5). The following quote can be used to summarise this view: 
 
Soviet abortion legislation has a truly revolutionary character. The main point is not the legal 
assessment of the termination of pregnancies, despite the great importance of this aspect. The essence 
lies in the bold approach to this question, in making a move away from conservatism and hypocrisy. 
Rejecting the notoriously unsolvable problem of when the foetus becomes a living and self-sufficient 
creature, rejecting all the sophistry, the scholasticism, the haze of mystery and the ethical intricacies that 
have been growing around this problem for centuries (…), Soviet Russia has put its emphasis on the 
woman’s health (Vasilevskie 1924: 103). 
 
This way of contrasting the Soviet Union to the bourgeois world is reflected in the authors’ 
choice of words. People who considered every abortion (medical as well as social) a criminal 
act, for instance, were described as “rigid doctrinaires and dogmatists, (…) representatives 
and defendants of simple principles, who are unable to understand real life and make a 
deliberate effort not to listen to it (…) (Vasilevskie 1924: 5).” The strict tsarist-era abortion 
laws were described as “formal”, “inhuman”, “scholastic” and “medieval”, supporting not 
only a “pointless and unfair order [that was] going against the [principles of] science”, but 
also “a crude discrepancy between law and practical life (ibid.: 23-24).” Revolutionary 
Russia, on the other hand, “obviously had to look for completely new legal norms in this field 
(ibid.: 24).” If a woman was willing to defy her maternal instincts by terminating her 
pregnancy, then “bloodless” and “abstract” threats of punishment would have little effect 
(ibid.: 45). 
With regard to the foetus’s interests, the authors used a similar kind of wording: “In 
the highly educated European society of the last centuries, clergymen and scholarly pedants 
have been arguing endlessly about when, during which month of [pregnancy], the foetus 
acquires a human ‘soul’.” Here, the authors refer to V. A. Brodskii (1914), a physician who 
used his knowledge of embryology to “emphasise the groundless scholasticism of [these 
debates].” The science of embryology, developed during the 19th century, had proved that “the 
embryo is a simple substance that does not consist of organs, a lump of protoplasm that only 
gradually (…) changes from something simple into something more and more complex (ibid.: 
23).” The mother and the foetus were “qualitatively different objects: the mother is a human 
being (chelovek), the foetus is not (ibid.: 76).”          
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 Vasilevskii and Vasilevskii also presented a detailed outline of the debates at the pre-
revolutionary congresses that had voted in favour of legalisation – the Fourth Congress of 
Russian Gynaecologists and Obstetricians (1911), the Twelfth Congress of the Pirogov 
Society (1913), and the tenth national convention of the Russian Group of the International 
Union of Criminologists (1914). The authors added that the question of “a complete and 
undisputable prohibition” had become less relevant at this point – “in any case, for Soviet 
Russia, this kind of approach has already become a thing of the past, yesterday’s news 
(Vasilevskie 1924: 61).”  
The most essential arguments against legalisation, said the authors, “boil down to the 
detrimental health effects of abortion on the one hand, and the sacredness of life on the other.” 
Out of these two arguments, the first was “the only one that, in our opinion, does not lead us 
into a quagmire of nit-picking and extreme arbitrariness (Vasilevskie 1924: 67).” Abortion 
was risky and harmful, but the alternative to legalisation only made matters worse; thus, 
prohibiting abortion due to an alleged concern for the woman’s health was hypocritical. The 
latter could also be said with regard to the principle of the “sacredness of life”, as the state’s 
true concerns were related not to ethical considerations, but to its own material needs (i.e. 
population growth) (ibid.: 69). The Soviet government, on the other hand, took a definite 
stance against this kind of hypocrisy.  
 Like Vasilevskii and Vasilevskii, A. B. Gens (1926b) contrasted the Soviet abortion 
law with its “bourgeois” counterparts, but with a heavier emphasis on class antagonisms. 
According to Gens, the birth rate in several countries – most notably in Germany and France 
– was declining. At the same time, the abortion rate was increasing. Thus, he concluded, there 
was a direct correlation between these circumstances; moreover, abortion had become a 
“social phenomenon (Gens 1926b: 3-4)”. While these conclusions were less than original per 
se, Gens’ further analysis of the situation in these “bourgeois” countries is an interesting 
example of how the class argument could be used in the abortion discourse: 
 
I am not going to focus your attention on the reasons behind this social phenomenon: they are clear 
enough. The mechanisation of production has given the capitalists the opportunity to use unqualified 
labour in the factories, and they have thrown themselves precisely on female labour, as [it is] the 
cheapest. And the army of working women is growing year by year; now, [its number] has reached 
more than 10,000,000 people. During the pre-war years, the cheap female labour even started to 
compete (...) with male labour. (…) On the other hand, the low prices (deshevizna) of agricultural 
products, and periodical agricultural crises, leave the peasants (…) in economically unprofitable 
conditions. All of this – along with an increased level of education – forces peasant women, and 
working women in particular, to strive for fertility regulation, because they lack the material means to 
raise their children. Seeing as contraceptive devices are widespread only among the ruling classes, 
among [members of the] bourgeoisie, and because the bourgeoisie (…) is fighting against the 
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distribution of contraceptives, working women and peasant women are limiting their fertility by turning 
to their only available method – abortion (Gens 1926b: 4). 
 
Moreover: 
 
Declining fertility rates are obviously unprofitable for capitalist society, which is in need of a backup 
army of unemployed people in order to keep the salaries on the necessary level. It also needs a backup 
army of men [to use] as cannon fodder (pushechnoe myaso)
79
 in their imperialist wars. These tendencies 
within the capitalist society are reflected in the religion, in the bourgeois morality, in the bourgeois 
family, declaring the sacredness and firmness of marriage, declaring abortion a sin against the 
capitalists’ god, against the capitalist society.  
 And for this reason, the legalisation of abortion, ruining the “sacredness” of marriage and the 
firmness of the religious foundations, changing the bourgeois morality, and – most importantly – 
reducing the birth rate, is unacceptable for bourgeois states, and there, the fight against abortions is 
conducted by means of repression (Gens 1926b: 5). 
 
These quotes are among the most telling examples of how the bourgeois legislation was used 
as a contrast to the newness and uniqueness of current Soviet law. Regarding Soviet doctors’ 
attitudes towards the abortion question, Gens’ explanation was also rather categorical:  
 
In 1920, as the class struggle was becoming more acute, even our doctors unconsciously took the 
bourgeois position, and they used a lot of scientifically founded arguments against the decriminalisation 
of abortion. Now, in 1925, there are few doctors in the Soviet Union who would speak out against 
legalisation. Now, doctors – having become [truly] Soviet (stav sovetskimi) – have thoroughly forgotten 
about their scientific objections against the legalisation of abortion (Gens 1926b: 7, my italics). 
 
In a later work (1929), Gens also compared the Soviet welfare system (the protection of 
maternity and infancy) to the less developed systems of the bourgeois countries. Unlike its 
Western counterparts, the Soviet Union was striving to make it easier to combine work and 
motherhood. Nevertheless, since the Union’s level of economic and cultural development 
remained rather low, the work in this sphere was still far from being completed. “[P]artly 
because of this, the number of abortions among working women is still rather high (Gens 
1929: 13).” In addition, the increasing level of education and the “desire to take part in 
political life” made more people turn to fertility regulation (ibid.).  
While the above-mentioned authors agreed that Soviet abortion policies were much 
more sensible, progressive and pragmatic than those of the bourgeois world, how did they 
evaluate the practical results of the legalisation of abortion?  
 
Estimating the results of legalisation 
 
                                                 
79
 The Russian term literally means “cannon meat” - a telling use of words. 
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According to Vera Lebedeva (1926: 9), the results of the Decree of 1920 were altogether 
positive: “nobody” would argue in favour of “returning to the past.” Abortion rates were high 
across the Western world, proving that repressive measures were futile. Moreover, statistics 
from other European countries indicated that there were more cases of abortion-related illness 
and death in places where the operation was prohibited. Regarding the question of whether 
legalisation had led to moral decline, Lebedeva argued that moral norms were changing 
anyway, and that  
 
our legislation has, so to speak, summed up the changes that have taken place in people’s ‘subconscious 
[mind]’ (…). It is possible that we have accelerated and activated the process of [developing] women’s 
new attitude to this question, but this kind of attitude would have emerged even without us (…) 
(Lebedeva 1926: 7). 
 
Lebedeva concluded by stating that the Soviet approach to the abortion question was the 
correct one: “And that’s all. There is no other way (Lebedeva 1926: 10).” 
With regard to the increasing abortion rates, Gens (1926b: 17) argued that an upsurge 
in legal abortion did not mean an increase in the absolute numbers – it only meant that more 
abortions were actually registered. Growing abortion rates were “a completely natural 
reaction” to the Decree of 1920, which had given women the opportunity to free themselves 
of unwanted children. In the long term, this could reduce the number of foundlings 
(podkidyshi) and, consequently, the infant mortality rate (ibid.). Vasilevskii and Vasilevskii 
(1924: 30-32) and Lebedeva (1927: 383) presented similar arguments. Moreover, according to 
Lebedeva (1927: 383-384), the fertility rates had returned to the pre-war level (43.7: 1000) in 
1927; thus, the Decree of 1920 did not lead to negative demographic consequences. 
Furthermore, Gens (1926b) claimed that the number of abortion- or birth-related 
deaths had become higher in Berlin than in Leningrad: in 1924, the rates were 11 and 2 per 
1000 births, respectively, despite the fact that the hospitals in Berlin had better equipment. 
Consequently, the reduced infection rate in Leningrad was a result of the Decree of 1920 
(Gens 1926b: 8-9). According to another Leningrad survey, the infection rate after abortions 
performed by doctors had been reduced from 8 per cent between 1917 and 1920 to 4.75 per 
cent in between 1921 and 1923 (Karlin 1926: 21).
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 “Our policies have resulted in reduced 
sickness rates (…), a death rate that is close to zero, and fewer cases of gynaecological illness 
(…) caused by [illegal] abortions (Lebedeva 1927: 383).” 
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 The infection rate after illegal abortions was 14.1 and 11.1 per cent, respectively, during these years (ibid.). 
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Regarding the sharp upsurge in abortion rates between 1925 and 1926, Gens attributed 
this development to a more intensive fight against back-alley abortions (Gens 1929: 9).
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This, in turn, was because Soviet hospitals had increased their capacity during the second half 
of the 1920s (Gens 1929: 25): abortions that previously went unnoticed by the authorities 
were now registered, and this caused an upsurge in the official rates.  
Because even legal abortions were dangerous, however, the Soviet government aimed 
to “reduce their numbers sharply (Gens 1926b: 24, italics in original).” Among the measures 
that would help to achieve this goal was the distribution of public enlightenment literature.  
5.3 Combating abortions: Public enlightenment 
 
According to Semashko (1934: 87), Narkomzdrav carried out the “fight against the spread of 
abortions” in three directions – birth control propaganda (via women’s consultation bureaux), 
development of welfare measures for mothers and children
82
 and general sanitary education 
(public enlightenment campaigns). Due to the state’s lack of resources, however, the 
development of welfare measures proved difficult to carry out in practice. As a result, the 
least costly of these three “directions” – birth control propaganda and sanitary education – 
became all the more significant. 
The pamphlets and women’s journals dealing with the abortion question formed part 
of a larger public enlightenment program carried out by Narkomzdrav. During the 1920s, 
sanitary propaganda campaigns were carried out on a large scale – by means of “pamphlets, 
lectures, railroad-car exhibitions, and weeklong campaigns devoted to cleaning out hot spots 
of infection (Starks 2008: 56).” The production of educational literature was extensive: 
 
(…) by [1923], the Medical-Scientific section of Gosizdat83 was in charge of medical publications. Over 
13 million pieces of literature relating to the fight against syphilis, typhus, and other diseases were 
released between 1919 and 1927. Between 1925 and 1927 Narkomzdrav presses printed 40 titles in print 
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 Gens based this conclusion on the fact that the upsurge in abortion rates in 1927 did not lead to decreased 
fertility rates. 
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 The measures intended to protect maternity and infancy have been mentioned earlier in this chapter as well 
as in chapter 3. However, it should be mentioned that the implementation of these measures progressed 
rather slowly – a fact that was admitted in the official discourse throughout the 1920s. Consequently, the long-
term goal of eliminating abortions remained something of a utopian vision.  
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 The State Publishing House of the R. S. F. S. R., the first major Soviet publishing house (“Gosizdat”, 2010, The 
Free Dictionary. [Online]. Farlex. Available from: http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/Gosizdat [7th 
Nov., 2012]).  
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runs of 600,000 copies and produced 50,000 slides to accompany medical lectures (Starks 2008: 56; my 
italics). 
 
In addition, the Moscow Department of Health had its own publishers, while private presses, 
newspapers and journals also produced health care articles (Starks 2008: 56-57).  
Regarded as a “social evil” and a threat to public health, the abortion phenomenon was 
a natural subject to address – along with venereal diseases, alcoholism and other “social 
illnesses”. The pamphlets in particular provided very detailed information on all aspects of the 
issue. 
5.3.1 Abortion pamphlets 
 
Compared to the relatively short journal articles dealing with the issue, the abortion pamphlets 
could be voluminous and detailed. Women, it was assumed, knew too little about abortion 
(and their own reproductive health) to make informed choices; many regarded abortion as a 
trivial procedure, and this attitude had to be changed: “If women knew well about the harmful 
and dangerous [aspects] of abortions, they would turn to [this measure] only in particularly 
important and exceptional cases (Shpak 1927: 7).”  
The pamphlets had varying degrees of complexity. Some were written in a simplistic 
language; others were more “academic” in tone and seemed to be aimed at more educated 
groups of the population, but they all served the same educational purpose. 
 As in the academic discourse, the physicians behind the abortion pamphlets presented 
the abortion phenomenon as an evil that was mainly caused by difficult socioeconomic 
conditions. Moreover, it had become commonplace among all groups of society. The 
physician M. Z. Shpak (1927) summarised this position by saying that the only women who 
did not have abortions were the ones who were infertile in the first place (Shpak 1927: 4).  
Many pamphlets included basic information about the female and male reproductive 
systems and their functions, as well as about conception, pregnancy and birth control 
measures. Some also presented an outline of the welfare measures that were implemented 
after the revolution. Most reflected the official abortion attitudes: unlike the bourgeois 
countries (or pre-revolutionary Russia), the Soviet Union had chosen the most sensible 
approach to this issue, as decriminalisation helped to combat illegal abortions. Nevertheless, 
whether carried out by a “dirty babka” or by a hospital doctor, abortion was always a risky 
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business – thus, women should know about the dangers of both alternatives. Moreover, 
abortion had negative consequences for society in general. 
What were the dangers of having an abortion? With regard to illegal abortions, the 
picture painted was particularly bleak. Because of their ignorance, babki could try to “induce 
the menstruation” for women who were not even pregnant in the first place, thus performing a 
completely unnecessary operation (Gusakov 1926: 5). Moreover, babki could make women 
drink remedies that were poisonous or led to haemorrhages; they could perform the operations 
with dirty hands, causing blood poisoning, or use all sorts of harmful instruments – knitting 
needles, for instance (Shleimovich 1925: 12-13). Shpak (1927) provided some examples of 
women who had tried to perform the abortion at home. They had all been hospitalised – one 
with haemorrhages, another with blood poisoning, and a third with heavy stomach pains after 
spraying iodine into her womb (Shpak 1927: 5-7).
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 The Leningrad professor Nikolai Markov 
(1929) provided a particularly detailed account of the dangers of abortions, illegal as well as 
legal. He also included detailed illustrations of female reproductive organs that had been 
harmed as a result of ill-fated abortions. Another Leningrad doctor, E. I. Kvater (1930), 
provided equally detailed descriptions of the consequences of illegal abortions as well as the 
dangers of turning to a babka. 
 All the authors behind these pamphlets emphasised that legal abortions, even 
seemingly successful ones, were dangerous, and they gave thorough explanations of this. The 
operation of dilatation and curettage, the most common hospital procedure, was considered 
risky for a number of reasons. First of all, the doctor was operating without seeing the insides 
of the womb – i.e. he was operating “blindly”, and this increased the risk of inflicting 
damages. Gusakov (1926) and Markov (1929) argued that as the womb expanded, its walls 
became thinner; thus, the ever-present risk of perforation became higher as the pregnancy 
progressed. Moreover, abortions after the third month involved a higher risk of 
haemorrhaging because of the “closer connection between the embryo (yaitso)85 and the 
womb (matka) (Levi 1930: 23).” For these reasons, even experienced doctors could face 
problems. In any case, the operation was never without dangers: 
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 According to Markov (1929: 13), this latter method had become “enormously widespread” in the late 1920s, 
but it was very dangerous. Apart from the risk of infections, the use of iodine could increase the risk of 
becoming pregnant outside of the womb. 
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 The word yaitso (egg) seems to have been used when speaking about the embryo’s place within the womb, 
i.e. when talking about the medical aspects of the operation. In other cases, e.g. when talking about the foetus 
in general, the words plod or zarodysh (foetus) are most frequently used. 
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The operation of dilatation and curettage involves several possibilities of perforating the uterus. First of 
all, [the womb] can be punctured during the beginning of the operation, when the cervix is expanded. 
By the dilatation of the latter (i.e. the cervix), it is often necessary to [use some force] to put the dilator 
through the cervix. [Because of this], the cervix sometimes bursts and becomes wide open. The dilator, 
having slipped through it, is driven into the womb and perforates it. (…) If the dilatation of the cervix is 
successful, then the danger can arise when the foetus is removed from the womb with the abortion 
pincers (abortnymi shchiptsami) and when the womb [lining] is scraped out (…) (Markov 1929: 17). 
 
Markov then added to this picture:  
 
Sometimes, this perforation is not noticed in time. [The doctor] thinks he is operating within the womb 
and starts to move the instruments, (…) trying to get hold of the foetus and its membranes and pull it 
out of the womb, but instead, he wounds and damages the intestines (ibid.: 18). 
   
Markov’s pamphlet in particular is full of similar descriptions, which makes it one of the most 
detailed and graphic of its kind. He was, however, not alone in trying to provide a “full” 
picture of all the dangers of abortion – by and large, this seems to have been the goal of most 
“pamphlet authors”.  
 What were the harmful effects of a “normal” abortion? According to some authors 
(Shpak 1927: 8; Markov 1929: 12), the termination of a pregnancy was harmful per se 
because it put an abrupt end to the physical changes that were going on in the woman’s body 
(Shpak 1927: 8; Levi 1930: 39). Gusakov (1926: 15-16) noted that the womb remained 
enlarged and “flabby” (dryablaya) after an abortion (and for a longer time than after a normal 
birth, when the womb returned to its normal state within ca. six weeks). This state could 
become permanent, leading to various women’s illnesses and reduce the woman’s capacity to 
work. For women who were pregnant for the first time, the consequences could be 
particularly bad. According to Shpak (1927: 8), a woman’s first pregnancy represented the 
completion of her physical and mental development, and hampering this development (e.g. by 
abortion) was thus very negative. Terminating the pregnancy was a shock for the body, and 
repeated abortions made the harm clearly visible:  
 
 It has been established by observation that every (…) abortion makes the woman look two to three  
years older than she really is; i.e., if the woman starts to have abortion at the age of, say, 18, and then 
has three abortions over the course of two to three years, then she will look not 20-21, but 25-27 (Shpak 
1927: 9, italics in original). 
 
Moreover, repeated abortions – even when “successful” – could cause permanent damage to 
the lining of the womb, heightening the risk of spontaneous abortions. This was one of the 
complications that could make the woman infertile (Gusakov 1926: 16; Levi 1930: 39).  
87 
 
 What, then, about contraception? Contraceptive measures were not entirely 
uncontroversial (some argued that the use of any kind of contraception was potentially 
harmful), but they were still regarded as a better alternative than abortion. While stressing that 
no such method was completely reliable, pamphlet authors still provided (more or less) 
detailed information about the different means available. Condoms were regarded as a simple 
solution: “It is made from thin rubber and sold in every chemist’s shop for an average of 15 
kopecks a piece. (…) This method is relatively harmless (Shpak 1927: 31).”86 Other “easy-to-
use” methods, according to Shpak, involved douching or using tampons soaked in a mixture 
of vinegar and water.  
Some argued that there were dangers involved with birth control measures, especially 
the ones involving the use of chemicals (e.g. iodine). The most popular method, coitus 
interruptus (prervannoe snoshenie), was also strongly warned against. Coitus interruptus was 
said to harm the nervous system of both partners, leading to “sleeplessness, headaches, 
palpitations, etc. (Shleimovich 1925: 17).” Gusakov (1926) went further in stressing the 
consequences for the woman: apart from the damages caused to the nervous system, and apart 
from the fact that the method itself was unreliable,  
 
for women who do not finish the sexual act, the flow of blood to the genital organs does not stop; [thus,] 
the organs swell. If this kind of intercourse is repeated frequently, the woman’s pelvic organs will suffer 
stagnation. This, in turn, often leads to pains in the lower abdomen (…), [nervousness], heavy pains etc. 
(Gusakov 1926: 52). 
 
In any case, the woman was generally encouraged to talk to her doctor before deciding which 
birth control method to use.  
 As we have seen, abortion was thought to be negative not only because of its effects 
on the woman’s health, but also because it was detrimental for the state and the collective as a 
whole. I. S. Shleimovich (1925), a doctor connected with the gubzdrav in the city of 
Voronezh, described motherhood as a social duty:  
 
The birth rate is declining year by year. It is necessary to increase it. The woman can do this. By giving 
birth to a child, the woman fulfils her duty towards the country, by giving it a free (svobodnyi) and 
healthy citizen. If the birth rate is decreasing and the death rate is growing, the country is at risk of 
dying out, as we can see in France. Girls, remember that you will find the joy of life in motherhood. 
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 Whether condoms really were this available, however, is dubious. “Condoms and diaphragms, simple to 
produce and use, were almost impossible to get in the 1920s and 1930s, because of the rubber shortage 
(Goldman 1993: 260).” 
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Remember that you are set out to be mothers. “Only a healthy woman can be a true wife and a mother 
of healthy children” (Shleimovich 1925: 15).
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According to M. F. Levi (1930: 47), a Moscow doctor, the birth rate in the city was declining 
between 1926 and 1928; at the same time, the abortion rates were rising. While this increase 
was partly related to improvements in the registration system, there was also an absolute 
growth in the number of abortions.  
Levi’s further line of reasoning represents something new in the abortion discourse of 
these years:  
 
Our republic is a worker’s state. The foundation of our prosperity is labour. Every worker is a necessary 
member of the collective. If he dies or loses his ability to work, the collective’s power is damaged. (…) 
[all the more so] during our current era of reconstruction, with its unprecedented rates of energetic 
construction in the industrial sector, as well as in agriculture. At our current stage of socialist 
construction, the productivity of the average Soviet labourer and working peasant, undoubtedly, grows 
even more. The realisation of the Five Year Plan (…) will increase the worker’s and peasant’s labour 
productivity several times (Levi 1930: 55) 
 
Levi’s direct reference to the first Five Year Plan stands out among the other pamphlets of 
these years (1925-1930).
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 His further rhetoric was in a similar vein: “In the workers’ and 
peasants’ state, the woman is a working entity who enjoys full rights. The damage caused to 
the state and society by abortion is becoming clear (Levi 1930: 56).” Abortion led to a 
reduction in birth rates that had “enormous significance for our workers’ Union (ibid.: 57)”; 
thus, it had to be combated. “Our country might be deprived of the number of fighters needed 
to complete the construction of socialism. For our, and the world’s, proletarian revolution, 
this is a very serious question (ibid.: 58).” While abortion should not be punished, conscious 
women should fight the phenomenon actively. 
 The “break” represented by Levi’s pamphlet will be addressed in the conclusion of 
this chapter. First, however, an outline of how the abortion question was addressed by the 
Soviet women’s journals of the 1920s will be presented. 
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 With regard to the question of the birth rate, the participants in the scientific discourse were less pessimistic 
– in fact, some of them were optimists, such as Vera Lebedeva, head of OMM: in 1927, she thought that the 
Union’s birth rate was bound to increase in the years to come (Lebedeva 1927: 385).  
Incidentally, Shleimovich argued that the negative effects of abortions could ruin the relationship 
between the woman and her husband: “the woman, unneeded and sick, [is] left by her husband. The man finds 
someone else, who gives birth and keeps her health, and because she is healthy, she is able to work, and she is 
cheerful. Good health is a guarantee of happiness. It has been noticed that a man becomes more strongly 
attached to a healthy woman (Shleimovich 1925: 14, italics in original).” While this line of reasoning was rare in 
the academic discourse and even in the pamphlets, it can be seen occasionally in the women’s journals. 
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 By and large, most authors – in the academic discourse as well as the pamphlets – did not make particular 
references to specific political events. 
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5.3.2 The women’s journals and the abortion issue 
 
Zhenotdel’s official journal, Kommunistka, had a similar target audience to the academic 
monographs and essays, and reflected the official attitudes towards the abortion question. 
Thus, the journal can actually be said to form a part of the academic discourse, while at the 
same time having an enlightenment purpose. Published from 1920 until Zhenotdel was 
abolished in 1930, the journal outlined the goals and ambitions of Soviet abortion policies, the 
current status of the abortion problem, and questions of further reforms in this sphere. It 
included reports from the Second and Third All-Union Conferences on the Protection of 
Maternity and Infancy (held in 1923 and 1925, respectively). In January 1925, the journal re-
printed Lenin’s article “The Working Class and Neo-Malthusianism” from 1913 with 
comments by Vera Lebedeva.    
 Rabotnitsa (from 1923), Krest’yanka (1922), Rabotnitsa i krest’yanka (1923), and 
Delegatka (1923) were popular journals. They were targeting a broader, less educated 
audience and published under the supervision of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party. From 1924, Rabotnitsa was published every two weeks as a supplement to the daily 
newspaper Rabochaya gazeta (The worker’s gazette) – the “most popular” newspaper in the 
entire Soviet Union according to the editors (Rabotnitsa, no. 1, 1924: 2). Krest’yanka was in 
many ways the peasants’ equivalent to Rabotnitsa. Rabotnitsa i krest’yanka (Leningrad) and 
Delegatka (Moscow) targeted both working and peasant women. These journals aimed to 
inform their readers about current policies and matters that were relevant to their daily lives, 
ranging from food recipes and short stories to health-related articles. Readers were also 
encouraged to write letters to the editors about things they were concerned about.  
 The abortion question was addressed by these popular journals on a number of 
occasions throughout the 1920s (at least a couple of times a year – sometimes more often). 
These abortion articles – often written by doctors – were closer to the pamphlets in style and 
content, but (naturally) shorter and generally more simplistically written. The official Soviet 
policies towards abortion were explained, justified and contrasted with the policies of the 
“bourgeois” world. Abortion had become widespread – “they are performed by everyone who 
can be bothered (vse, komu ne len’): both professors and doctors, midwives, simple babki, and 
medicine women (znakharki) (…) (Delegatka, no. 15, 1927: 15).” However, while the Soviet 
Union was right in legalising abortion, every article placed a heavy emphasis on the 
dangerous aspects of every abortion procedure – ranging from the horrifying consequences of 
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illegal abortions to the long-term effects of seemingly “successful” hospital operations. For 
women who were pregnant for the first time, abortion was particularly harmful. Repeated 
abortions were especially dangerous. Most articles included advice on the use of 
contraceptives as the best alternative to abortion (but stated that no method was completely 
reliable; moreover, women should go to a doctor before deciding which method to use). In 
addition, the journals sometimes referred to trials conducted against illegal abortionists. 
Readers were expressly warned against going to babki, who were (as we remember) 
considered dirty and ignorant. Women were also encouraged not to feel any “false shame” 
(lozhnyi styd) if they were pregnant outside of wedlock. Presumably more prevalent in the 
countryside, this kind of shame was a result of prejudices that were regarded as unbecoming 
of the new Soviet society. (Shame was also considered a reason why many women continued 
to turn to babki; thus, the rhetoric used against “false shame” can be seen as a part of the fight 
against underground abortionists.)  
 
It is time for the countryside to give up this prejudice. There is nothing shameful about a girl having a 
child. It is the man who has left his child behind, without any help, who should be ashamed. It is 
necessary to help women who are on their own, and not despise them and push them towards abortion. 
This fight should be carried out by the peasant women themselves (Krest’yanka, no. 9, 1927: 10). 
 
Because the main arguments in these abortion articles are so similar to the ones found in the 
pamphlets with regard to motives, consequences and official attitudes, these aspects of the 
question will not be examined here; they have already been outlined above. Instead, the 
following part of the chapter will be focusing on the interaction between the journals and their 
readers, since this is a feature that is fully absent from the academic discourse (and almost 
absent from the pamphlets). 
 In 1926 (no. 12, p. 32), based on letters written to the editors of Rabotnitsa, 
Kommunistka concluded that the life of a working woman was hard: “Their husbands’ 
despotism and their domestic slavery continue to flourish.” Three years later, the journal 
referred to the following conversation with a working woman: 
 
“My husband was not in the least interested in the ‘consequences’. (…) Whether I had an abortion or 
not was all the same for him. Once he saw [that I had] some contraceptives. He scolded me, even gave 
me a beating. Now I don’t live with him. The other day, he left me altogether.” This working woman is 
21 years old, but she looks much older. She has a son who is two and a half years old, and she stands 
with him in line for hours on end, pleading for an abortion (Kommunistka, no. 2, 1929: 41). 
 
Rabotnitsa i krest’yanka placed a particular emphasis on this kind of interaction with their 
readers. In 1924 (no. 10-11, p. 42), they asked women to express their opinions on a letter 
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from “the woman delegate and housewife P. Il’ina”, who urged women not to have abortions: 
“Comrades! Have mercy on yourselves and your children! Think over the consequences of 
abortions and refuse to go through with them (...)!” The readers’ responses were printed in a 
later issue (no. 2, 1925: 37). One woman wrote that she had recently had an abortion for 
medical reasons, something which had affected her deeply: “It took me four months to regain 
my health. Now I am pregnant again, and I am keeping the child with a deep feeling of joy.” 
Another urged that it should be easier to get hold of cheap contraceptives; a third argued that 
it was better to give birth several times than to have abortions. A “former working woman” 
wrote the following:    
   
I have been living in this village for more than two years now. I knew the local doctor very well. He 
performed a whole lot of abortions, for married women as well as for [unmarried] girls (…). They have 
all become ill – one has consumption, another has pains (...). From being blossoming and healthy, these 
girls turned into melancholy people who were unhappy with their lives. I told them so many times: 
“Don’t have an abortion; it’s better to have the child, there is nothing shameful about this.” They just 
waved their hands in reply – if everybody finds out, nobody will marry me. They agree with me that 
abortion is harmful, but they are still too backward, they are afraid of looking life straight in the eyes. 
(…) Oh, it is unpleasant for me to write about our backwardness and ignorance, and I am ashamed that I 
have done so little to enlighten our village during these years (Rab. i krest’yanka, no. 2, 1925: 37).89 
 
The laboratory worker M. Vasil’evna wrote that women who decided to have an abortion “not 
only think it over, but suffer agonies (…).” She blamed “healthy women who didn’t want to 
have children,” but not the women who had “three to five children,” because the latter had no 
other choice.  
  In the autumn of 1928, Rabotnitsa i krest’yanka printed a short story, Krasnaya 
nitochka (The red thread), that continued over three issues. The story is about a young, 
happily married couple, Raya and Dmitrii, and what happens to them after Raya’s second 
abortion goes wrong. The first abortion is done because Dmitrii is unemployed. By the time 
of the second operation, Dmitrii has got his job back, but Raya does not want to be a mother 
just yet. Dmitrii tries to talk her out of having the abortion (just like he did the first time), but 
Raya insists. As a result of this operation, however, Raya becomes sick and infertile. While 
his wife’s health does not seem to improve, Dmitrii has an affair with another woman, who 
gets pregnant and has a son. Although he does not love the other woman like he loves Raya, 
Dmitrii realises that he is unable to live without his child – his “paternal instinct” is too 
                                                 
89
 This final sentence in particular can seem “propagandistic”. Buckley (1989: 80) suggests that while 
statements of this kind “may reflect reality, it cannot be overlooked that many may have said not what they 
believed, but what the party wanted to hear. Such sources should not be taken at face value.” Nevertheless, 
these sources are, in this case, the closest we get to hearing women’s own voices, and they are as such not 
irrelevant. 
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strong. The story ends when Raya, who has been told about everything, breaks up with 
Dmitrii: apparently, she understands that the fight is lost. In the final scene, Raya is portrayed 
as an unhappy, strained woman (Rab. i krest’yanka, no. 18-20, 1928).  
 The editors of Rabotnitsa i krest’yanka received several hundred letters in response to 
this story, and a select number of them were printed over two issues in December that year. 
Opinions were divided regarding all the protagonists’ choices. With regard to Raya’s second 
abortion, there were also differing views. Some supported her: “(…) she had no other choice 
the first time, when her husband was unemployed. But you can’t blame her for the second 
abortion either; I know how hard it is to raise a child nowadays.” – “I don’t think you can 
blame Raya that much. She was very young and afraid of becoming a mother.” Others were 
less sympathetic: “It is a woman’s duty to be a mother; Raya shouldn’t have been so 
irresponsible (…).” – “Why did she have to ruin her family life with an abortion? The fact 
that Dmitrii was unemployed was no reason not to have the child. (…) And [our social 
insurance] helps children; after all, the story does not take place in a bourgeois country.” – “I 
think [Raya] knew that she might lose her ability to have children after [the abortion]. Let this 
be a lesson for our working women; they shouldn’t rely so much on abortions.” – “Raya is 
guilty because she refused to listen to her husband (…) and had the second abortion, despite 
the fact that she was well provided for financially.” Many of the readers felt sorry for Raya, 
whether they agreed with her or not. (Some, however, objected that the story was too 
unrealistic – very few men, according to them, would let themselves be ruled by their 
“paternal instinct” anyway (Rab. i krest’yanka, no. 23-24, 1928)). 
 The short story in itself illustrates a number of features that were characteristic of 
Soviet abortion discourse during the 1920s, ranging from Raya’s reasons to have the two 
abortions (her husband’s unemployment, first, and then the desire to “live a little”), to her 
experiences in the abortion ward (the woman in the bed next to her dies from post-operation 
complications) and the fateful decision to have the second “unnecessary” abortion. Both 
operations were done legally, highlighting the fact that even hospital abortions could be 
dangerous. In effect, Raya’s life is ruined: she loses her health, her husband, and her ability to 
have children.  
While Rabotnitsa i krest’yanka was not the only journal to print short stories of this 
kind (Delegatka did the same in 1924, printing two different stories about ill-fated illegal 
abortions), The red thread is by far the longest, and the only one that was followed up by 
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responses from the readers. Judging by the number of letters received, it was evident that the 
abortion question interested a lot of them. 
5.4 Summary 
 
From the moment when abortion was legalised in 1920, the official Soviet approach to the 
abortion question was clear: the question was now a matter of public health and social policy, 
and not of morality, ethics, or any legal concerns. Any moral considerations about the foetus, 
or about the ethical aspects of terminating the pregnancy, were rejected.  
This approach is visible on several levels. First: who were the discourse participants in 
the 1920s? In both the academic discourse and the pamphlets, the authors were 
representatives of the health authorities (e.g. Nikolai Semashko and Vera Lebedeva) or 
physicians. The latter group were often affiliated with Narkomzdrav or at least writing within 
the framework of Soviet censorship (Starks 2008: 58), although the 1920s was a decade 
where there was more room for open discussions. On the other hand, legal scholars are 
remarkably absent from the official discourse (although they occasionally participated at 
medical congresses). One reason for this might be the fact that the main legal aspect of the 
question – the question of decriminalisation – was considered “solved”. Apart from the 
doctors, the only ones who are given room to express their opinions on the question are the 
women themselves – reflecting, yet again, the focus on the social and health-related aspects of 
the question. 
The question of when, i.e. at what stage of the pregnancy, an abortion should be 
allowed, was also discussed as a matter of health: after the third month of pregnancy, it was 
argued, the foetus was more tightly “fastened” to the womb, which meant that the operation 
could lead to heavy bleeding. The abortion pamphlets and journals reflect the same thing: the 
focus is on the procedure’s medical and social sides, not on the foetus.  
 Although it was occasionally stated, for instance in some women’s journals, that the 
Soviet Decree of 1920 gave women the “right” to manage their own bodies, this “right” was 
not unlimited. There were a range of abortion motives that were considered less respectable, 
such as the desire to “have fun”, and women were strongly discouraged from having abortion 
unless they saw no other options. Motherhood was regarded as a social duty – refusing to 
fulfil this duty was not respectable. This was also a reason why young, childless women were 
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particularly advised against having abortions, as this could ruin their future chances of having 
children, i.e. contributing to the collective. The “right” to have abortions, then, should not be 
seen as an individual freedom, but rather as a measure that was intended to benefit public 
health until the abortion phenomenon could be combated. 
 The abortion pamphlets and articles can also be seen as part of a larger campaign to 
improve public health. Tricia Starks (2008: 39), for instance, argues that hygiene was “an 
integral component in the transformation of the masses into a politically conscious population 
capable of leading the world revolution and creating the socialist utopia.” Throughout the 
1920s, large-scale programs of sanitary education were implemented across the Soviet Union. 
With regard to the abortion issue, this sanitary aspect is particularly visible in the fight against 
the babki, who – being considered dirty, ignorant, and backward – represented everything the 
new Soviet state wanted to combat.  
 Did the information campaigns of the 1920s succeed in enlightening women on the 
abortion issue? Judging by the sources, the need for information remained significant 
throughout the decade. According to Starks (2008: 57), pamphlet literature in general reached 
a very “limited audience of the interested and educated”; moreover, given the fact that the 
country’s illiteracy rates were high, it is hard to tell how many people actually read this 
material. Regardless of this, the pamphlets and women’s journals help to illuminate more 
aspects of the abortion question, as they provide a glimpse into the daily lives of those who 
were the most affected by the Decree – women themselves.  
While the discourse of the 1920s is rather homogenous during the first few years, a 
change can be noticed towards the end of the decade, i.e. after the onset of the first Five Year 
Plan (1928). From this point on, some authors (e.g. Levi 1930, above) started to make a more 
direct connection between the abortion question and its significance for the collective, i.e. for 
the “proletarian revolution” and the state’s economic development. This marks the beginning 
of a new era with regard to abortion (and the woman question), starting in 1930, when the 
woman question was declared “solved”, the Zhenotdel abolished, and Stalinism “resulted in a 
termination of serious discussion of the woman question (Buckley 1989: 108).”  
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6 Conclusion 
 
After abortion was legalised by decree on 18
th
 November, 1920, participants in the Soviet 
abortion discourse made an effort to emphasise the new legislation’s revolutionary nature. 
Presented as pragmatic, sensible and honest, Soviet abortion policy was contrasted to the 
restrictive legislation of the bourgeois world (and pre-revolutionary Russia), which was 
described as hypocritical, outdated and counterproductive. Vasilevskii and Vasilevskii (1924: 
5, 23-24, passim), for instance, made a clear distinction between Soviet and bourgeois 
attitudes not only through their arguments, but also by their choice of words: the “rigid 
doctrinaires and dogmatists”, “representatives and defendants of simple principles”, the 
“formal”, “inhuman”, “scholastic” and “medieval” tsarist-era legislation, the “crude 
divergence between law and practical life” and the “groundless scholasticism” of pre-
revolutionary Russia and the rest of the bourgeois world was a contrast to the “new Russia” 
and its new ideals in every way.  
The “crude divergence between law and practical life” in this sphere, however, was 
recognised by Russian intellectuals well before the 1917 revolution. Discussions on the 
abortion question did not commence with the Decree of 1920, but at least a decade earlier – at 
the Eleventh Congress of the Pirogov Society in April 1910. During the years before the First 
World War, there were two medical congresses and one convention of criminologists that 
voted in favour of decriminalisation: the Fourth Congress of Russian Gynaecologists and 
Obstetricians (1911), the Twelfth Congress of the Pirogov Society (1913) and the tenth 
national convention of the Russian Group of the International Union of Criminologists 
(1914). In addition, some physicians and legal scholars published articles in which they 
argued in favour of legalisation.  
While the pre-revolutionary abortion debaters were divided in the question of 
decriminalisation, they all agreed that the existing abortion law needed to be reformed. It was 
universally acknowledged that the current legislation was ineffective: it was too rigid, too old-
fashioned and needed to be adjusted to contemporary socioeconomic conditions. Among 
those who opposed outright legalisation, many called for a considerable softening of penalties 
and a greater room for individual considerations. The physician Lazar Lichkus, for instance, 
believed that women who had abortions should be exempt from punishment, while doctors (in 
some cases) and underground abortionists (always) should be penalised (Lichkus 1912: 48). 
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The legal scholar Mikhail Chubinskii suggested that there should be three different categories 
of abortion, among which only one would be “punishable” – but then according to the 
principles of a broad individualisation, with room for a considerable softening of penalties 
(Chubinskii 1912: 88-92). Given the scope of these reform suggestions, it could be argued 
that even the moderates who opposed a complete decriminalisation were not as distant from 
their “radical” counterparts as it might seem at first glance. Thus, they were also not too far 
away from the later Soviet position.  
Furthermore, both moderate and radical debaters were conscious of the social 
conditions that seemed to be causing the abortion epidemic in the first place. As in the 1920s, 
the high abortion rates in pre-revolutionary Russia were mainly attributed to difficult 
socioeconomic conditions, such as poverty. Among the discourse participants of these years, 
there was a general consensus that the fight against abortion should involve a broader range of 
welfare measures, and the reform proposals in this sphere bear a striking resemblance to the 
later Soviet policy. The most common suggestions included a) sanitary education, b) an 
improved system of maternity care, c) improving women’s social position and legal standing 
and d) developing – and propagating the use of – effective contraceptives. These reforms, as 
we have seen, were to become an essential part of Soviet abortion policy in the 1920s.   
Not only Vasilevskii and Vasilevskii, but also many other Soviet authors and policy 
makers decried the “bourgeois” abortion laws for being hypocritical: repressions not only 
helped to preserve the social inequalities of the capitalist system, they also served to maintain 
the sexual double standard. These issues, however, were also addressed by pre-revolutionary 
debaters; moderates as well as radicals. Some radical debaters argued that the state’s abortion 
policy was hypocritical in itself, believing that the seemingly noble reasons for prohibiting 
abortion were used to disguise the true, materialistic motivations behind the abortion ban (i.e. 
demographic concerns). Moreover, the state placed unreasonable demands on the woman: 
while insisting (by means of prohibiting abortions) that women should bring their pregnancies 
to term, it did not provide any adequate protection of motherhood and infancy. Additionally, 
the double standard of sexual morality was criticised by discourse participants of both camps. 
In many ways, moderate and radical participants in the pre-revolutionary discourse seemed to 
agree more than they disagreed.  
The core difference between the two groups was rooted in their outlook on the foetus. 
While moderates believed that the protection of the foetus was an important principle, a 
symbol of respect for human life and that the abortion ban should be retained accordingly, 
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their radical counterparts held a diametrically different opinion. In the Soviet era, it was this 
“radical” stance that was adopted. Whereas the tsarist-era legislation explicitly stated that the 
main focus of Russian abortion law was to protect the foetus, Soviet lawmakers went in the 
opposite direction: according to Soviet legislation, the foetus was not entitled to rights 
(Goldman 1993: 257). Consequently, in the Soviet discourse on abortion, the question of the 
foetus was given less attention than in the pre-revolutionary years. With the Decree of 18
th
 
November, 1920 on the Legalisation of Abortion, it became clear that the legal and moral 
questions related to the abortion issue were “solved”: the focus of Soviet abortion policy was 
to protect the woman’s health and the interests of the collective, and any moral, ethical or 
legal considerations (that were unrelated to health concerns or to the collective’s interests) 
were rejected in the official abortion discourse. 
This new focus meant that the Soviet discourse started to diverge from the pre-
revolutionary debates in a few ways. First, it is questionable whether the discourse of the 
1920s can be called an open debate. Although the authors of the academic essays and 
monographs acknowledged the existence of dissenting opinions, such opinions were not given 
much room in the public discourse. Second, while legal scholars had been significant 
participants in the pre-revolutionary debates, this group of professionals was remarkably 
absent from the discourse of the 1920s. This can also be attributed to the fact that moral 
aspects were now disregarded.  
Both in the pre-revolutionary and early Soviet abortion discourse, a distinction had 
been made between respectable and non-respectable abortion motives. The latter category 
included a host of reasons that were considered trivial, individualistic or selfish: the desire to 
have fun, the fear of ruining one’s beauty or figure, an unwillingness to take on the duties of 
being a mother and so forth. Among the respectable motives were socioeconomic factors: 
poverty, overcrowded housing, having many children to take care of – in other words, 
circumstances that were beyond the pregnant woman’s control.  
In the pre-revolutionary discourse, however, there were two psychological factors that 
were also ascribed to the “socioeconomic” category: shame and fear. These reasons were 
regarded as serious and understandable, not least because it was assumed that these factors 
were imposed on the woman from without: first, the state in late tsarist Russia did not provide 
any adequate maternity protection. Second, a woman was likely to lose her job if she got 
pregnant – something which could be bad enough for a married woman, but downright 
disastrous if she was single. Third, in addition to the financial problems, single mothers would 
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have to face social sanctions, i.e. the disgrace of having a child outside of wedlock. All these 
factors, in turn, made it understandable that some women feared their future child “more than 
imprisonment, illness and death (Povolotskaya-Vvedenskaya 1911: 208).” 
According to the official Soviet discourse, on the other hand, there was nothing 
disgraceful about being a single mother. That kind of disgrace was a relic of the past, another 
manifestation of bourgeois hypocrisy, but not something that should be a part of the new 
Soviet society. Moreover, the state had implemented reforms to support motherhood both 
within and outside of wedlock: the Family Code of 1918 had made it easy to dissolve 
marriages, while unregistered or de facto marriages were recognised equally. The concept of 
“illegitimacy” was removed: from now on, children whose parents were unmarried were 
granted equal rights with those who were born inside of wedlock. Women were granted the 
right to maternity leave, they could sue their ex-partners for child support even if they had not 
been married and they were also entitled to receive alimony after their marriage (registered or 
de facto) had ended. 
As a consequence of this, shame (styd) and fear (boyazn’ or strakh) were no longer 
considered fully respectable motives in the 1920s. They were rather seen as “moral survivals 
of the past (moral’nye perezhitki proshlogo),” as the wording of the Decree of 1920 put it, i.e. 
old prejudices that should be abandoned. In the women’s journals, for instance, the shame of 
being pregnant outside of wedlock was no longer referred to as “styd”, but as “lozhnyi styd” – 
“false shame”, i.e. an unneeded and undesirable kind of feeling.  
“False shame” was, moreover, regarded as a reason why some women continued to 
turn to babki, especially in the countryside. Along with the old prejudices, babki represented 
everything the new Soviet state sought to combat, and they acquired an almost symbolic 
meaning in the early Soviet discourse on abortion and public health. The filthy old crone with 
dirty fingernails, presumably performing illegal operations in dark huts, served to illustrate 
most of what was wrong with the old regime (or “old world”, staryi mir): ignorance, poor 
hygiene, shame, sexual taboos. Legal abortion, on the other hand, performed by qualified 
doctors in the sanitary conditions of a Soviet hospital, represented a break with the hypocrisy 
and darkness – metaphorical and otherwise – of the past.  
With regard to the question of women’s rights, however, there are two things that 
should be mentioned. First, while the Soviet government’s family reforms were revolutionary 
in many ways, and while they did help to broaden women’s formal rights (at least on paper), 
the need to increase women’s social and legal standing was also acknowledged in the pre-
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revolutionary abortion discourse. Second, it is questionable whether the Decree of 1920 
represented a woman’s right: after all, the new abortion law was regarded as a temporary 
measure, one that would remain in effect only until the state was able to provide an adequate 
protection of maternity and infancy – i.e. eliminate the need for women to have abortions. 
Once the social reasons underlying the “epidemic” disappeared, it was believed that the 
phenomenon would cease to exist. Women were supposed to have children and contribute to 
the collective, and they were strongly discouraged from having abortions unless they saw no 
other choice. A Rabotnitsa article from November 1927 stated the following: 
 
 Having declared that the woman will not be subject to penalties for having an abortion, Soviet  
legislators have (...) granted the woman the right to control her own body (rasporyazhat’sya svoim  
organizmom). Unfortunately, at the moment, there are very many women who use this right extremely  
thoughtlessly, having developed a view on abortion as an insignificant, minor operation that can be  
performed a countless number of times. (...) [However,] abortion damages the female body, exhausts  
the woman, makes her old, turns her into a sick, nervous, unbalanced human being. (...) Before  
deciding to have an abortion, you have to give the matter serious consideration, and [you have to] look  
at abortion, in cases where it really is the only solution, as an unavoidable evil (kak neizbezhnoe zlo)  
(Rabotnitsa, no. 34, 1927: 17-18, emphasis in original). 
 
Consequently, the same article that stated the woman was granted “the right to control her 
own body” also tried to dissuade her in the strongest possible terms from having the abortion. 
Thus, this “right” was not without limitations. 
The Decree of 1920 and the abortion discourse: a break with the past? 
 
The question remains: did the Decree of 1920 on the Legalisation of Abortion really represent 
a break with the past, or was there more continuity than change in the abortion discourse 
between 1910 and 1930? 
 As we have seen, the debates on the abortion question did not commence with the 
implementation of this decree. Neither were the discussions originally initiated by the 
Bolsheviks – the first to address the abortion question were liberal professionals. 
Nevertheless, many of the arguments found in the pre-revolutionary discourse bear 
resemblance to the arguments of the early Soviet period.
90
 The Soviet arguments, admittedly, 
bear a closer resemblance to the radical discourse participants of the pre-revolutionary years, 
but even the moderate debaters had a number of arguments and reform suggestions that look 
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 This fact was also acknowledged by Vasilevskii and Vasilevskii (1924), who presented a detailed outline of the 
three congresses that had voted in favour of decriminalisation in Abortion as a social phenomenon. 
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strikingly similar to the policies implemented in the 1920s. In addition, it should be 
mentioned that some of the pre-revolutionary debaters stayed on as respected scholars well 
into the 1920s. They are occasionally referred to as sources by Soviet authors (e.g. 
Vasilevskie 1924: 84; Karlin 1925: 22). This was the case not only with “radicals”, such as 
the sociologist Mikhail Gernet and the female physician Lyubov’ Gorovits, but also with 
members of the “moderate” camp, e.g. Lyudvig Okinchits and Lazar Lichkus. Incidentally, a 
similar kind of continuity can be seen with regard to the development of Narkomzdrav as an 
organisation:  
 
Though Soviet reformers decried the efforts of the tsarist government and contemporary bourgeois 
states as ineffective, prerevolutionary goals for hygiene and bourgeois techniques meshed well with the 
ideals of the new state and its priorities. (...) Not only the institutions but also the personnel were 
similar. Many radical Pirogov physicians helped establish Narkomzdrav (Starks 2008: 47). 
 
Consequently, despite the new legislation – which truly did represent a break with the past – 
and despite the appearance of a new ideological mantle, the abortion discourse in the early 
Soviet period continued the legacy of the debates before 1917 on many levels. In other words, 
it can be argued that there was more continuity than change in the abortion discourse of these 
two decades.  
In the preface to The Women’s Liberation Movement in Russia (1991), Richard Stites 
writes that “a clear understanding of social history is impeded by the traditional obeisance to 
the year 1917 as a watershed (Stites 1991: preface, p. xix).” A similar line of reasoning can be 
found in the essay collection Russian Peasant Women (Farnsworth and Viola (ed.) 1992: 3): 
“Instead of viewing 1917 as the dramatic turning point in Russian society, we propose to look 
at the Revolution as part of a continuum.”  
As we have seen, the abortion discourse of 1910-1930 represented a similar kind of 
continuum. Thus, the Decree of 1920 might not have been as much of a “watershed” as it 
might seem at first glance.  
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